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ABSTRACT
In Air Traffic Control (ATC), communications outages may lead to immediate loss
of communications or radar contact with aircraft. In the short term, there may be safety
related issues as important services including power systems, ATC, or communications
for first responders during a disaster may be out of service. Significant financial damage
from airline delays and cancellations may occur in the long term. This highlights the
different types of impact that may occur after a disaster or other geographic event. The
question is How do we evaluate and improve the ability of a mission-critical network to
perform its mission during geographically correlated failures?
To answer this question, we consider several large and small networks, including
a multi-layer ATC Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) network known as SWIM. This
research presents a number of tools to analyze and mitigate both long and short term ge-
ographic vulnerabilities in mission critical networks. To provide context for the tools, a
iii
disaster planning approach is presented that focuses on Resiliency Evaluation, Provision-
ing Demands, Topology Design, and Mitigation of Vulnerabilities.
In the Resilience Evaluation, we propose a novel metric known as the Network
Impact Resilience (NIR) metric and a reduced state based algorithm to compute the NIR
known as the Self-Pruning Network State Generation (SP-NSG) algorithm. These tools
not only evaluate the resiliency of a network with a variety of possible network tests, but
they also identify geographic vulnerabilities.
Related to the Demand Provisioning and Mitigation of Vulnerabilities, we present
methods that focus on provisioning in preparation for rerouting of demands immedi-
ately following an event based on Service Level Agreements (SLA) and fast rerouting
of demands around geographic vulnerabilities using Multi-Topology Routing (MTR). The
Topology Design area focuses on adding nodes to improve topologies to be more resistant
to geographic vulnerabilities.
Additionally, a set of network performance tools are proposed for use with mission
critical networks that can model at least up to 2nd order network delay statistics. The first
is an extension of the Queueing Network Analyzer (QNA) to model multi-layer networks
(and specifically SOA networks). The second is a network decomposition tool based
on Linear Algebraic Queueing Theory (LAQT). This is one of the first extensive uses
of LAQT for network modeling. Benefits, results, and limitations of both methods are
described.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) operates a large and complex network
to support air traffic control (ATC) operations [44]. The network topology reflects the hi-
erarchical configuration of ATC facilities as aircraft progress through the different phases
of flight. Each class of ATC facility covers a specific airspace defined by the combination
of a geographical footprint and an altitude range above that geographical footprint. The
basic categories of ATC facilities actively involved in the control of aircraft are listed in
Table 1 [113].
Table 1: ATC Facilities [113]
Facility Phase of Flight
Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) Takeoff & Landing
Terminal Radar Approach Control Airport to approximately
(TRACON) 50 Miles from airport
Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) TRACON to TRACON (Enroute)
The ATC facilities require telecommunications connectivity to remote air/ground
radio sites for voice communication with aircraft, surveillance radars, weather radars,
navigational aids, and adjacent ATC facilities for coordination of hand-offs as aircraft
enter and leave their airspace [44].
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To support these communications requirements, the FAA operates a highly avail-
able, diverse, and telecommunications network that leverages the infrastructure of com-
mercial carriers throughout the United States and abroad. Major ATC facilities are de-
signed with diverse access paths with sufficient capacity to support the re-routing of all
critical services onto the alternate path providing high availability for those services [44].
But what happens when both paths are lost simultaneously? While rare, this type of
6-sigma event have occurred.
In 2007, the Memphis ARTCC experienced an outage when a circuit card at an
AT&T Central Office failed causing a failure on an AT&T fiber ring network that had been
considered to be fault tolerant [39,150]. A portion of the radar services and air-to-ground
frequencies was lost. The outage lasted for approximately three hours. 566 delays were
caused by the outage [150]. At the time of outage, 220 airplanes were in the Memphis
airspace. Controllers used cell phones to establish communications with adjacent facili-
ties. Airplanes with working air-to-ground communications relayed information via radio
from controllers to airplanes without working air-to-ground communication channels. Ul-
timately, the airplanes were landed safely and the airspace was closed [150].
More recently in September 2014, a disgruntled contractor set fire to the room
housing the communications network infrastructure at the Chicago ARTCC and attempted
to sever the communications lines. The facility had to be evacuated, including the air traf-
fic controllers, and the damage to the facility was so extensive that it took three weeks for
it to re-open. While the FAA’s telecommunications network was robust enough to re-route
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traffic around the Chicago ARTCC, the FAA faced the challenge of redirecting connec-
tions between Chicago and its remote sites to adjacent ARTCCs. This was achieved over
the course of several days and ATC operations were eventually restored to full capacity
by temporarily locating the air traffic controllers at the adjacent facilities [22, 72].
Like Memphis, there were two types of impacts. First, there were immediate
safety related impacts. In this case, 40 aircraft were in the air over the airspace when radio
and radar contact was lost [72]. Controllers used cell phones to notify adjacent facilities to
attempt to make contact with airplanes. Airplanes also used emergency procedures (like
the 121.5 MHz emergency frequency) to attempt to re-establish contact with air traffic
control [72]. All aircraft landed safely.
The longer term impacts were related less to safety and more to damage. During
the following two weeks, thousands of flights were canceled and an estimated $350 Mil-
lion was lost by the airline industry [71]. In 2014, the average cost to the airline industry
was $82 per airline minute of delay not counting the cost to consumers in wasted time and
productivity [4]. A large and lengthy delay causing outage can cause staggering financial
damages.
These examples demonstrate an interesting pattern of events during outages on
mission critical networks. First, there are normally safety critical services that are needed
immediately following an event either because the event interrupted mission operations
or because the safety critical services are needed to manage the event. This would be the
case for First Responders during a disaster. Second, outages on mission critical services
may have very high impacts over time until full restoration is achieved. This would apply
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Figure 1: Layered Network showing Geographic Failure
to services like air traffic control, power systems, and other critical infrastructure.
During disasters, the criticality of mission critical network services may even in-
crease as these services are called upon to assist with search, rescue, and recovery as well
as provide critical infrastructure such as power or Air Traffic Control (ATC) services dur-
ing search and rescue as is discussed in [157] and [144]. Given these two examples, the
question becomes:
How do we evaluate and improve the ability of a Mission-Critical
Network to perform its mission during geographically correlated failures?
Multilayer networks warrant additional concern since geographic events can affect
nodes and infrastructure in multiple layers of the network simultaneously (see Fig. 1)
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Figure 2: Disaster Planning Workflow and Approach
leading to challenges in determining network performance of higher layer services. The
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) System Wide Information Management (SWIM)
network is an example of a mission critical multi-layer network [143] that was studied
during this research. Chapter 2 describes the FAA SWIM Network.
1.1 Disaster Planning for Mission Critical Services
Research related to geographic vulnerabilities in networks frequently focuses on
one aspect of the problem like topology considerations or graph theoretic network mea-
sures. The users (especially mission critical users) and the impact that a geographic event
will have on those users is rarely considered. To address these challenges, we propose a
Disaster Planning Approach that includes vulnerability analysis, topology improvement,
provisioning, restoration, and routing improvement in the context of disasters.
Mature resilience frameworks like the Resilinets framework [147] provide a roadmap
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for the design of resilient networks in the face of network challenges such as disasters.
The active phase referenced in the Resilinets framework is defend, detect, remediate, re-
cover, also known as the D2R2 phase of the framework. The R2 of the framework refers
to remediate and recover, which are similar to the short term and long term impacts de-
scribed.
In Figure 2, we see a proposed design process for a mission critical network. The
inputs to the process include routine demands, mission critical demands, and disaster
scenarios. The disaster planning approach presented includes the following components:
• Topology Design
• Provisioning Demands
• Resiliency Evaluation
• Mitigation of Vulnerabilities
The workflow generally begins with a topology selection constrained with demand
endpoints. We then proceed to provisioning demands on the topology. Disaster evaluation
that uses potential scenarios follows. This yields a set of vulnerabilities. With the new
vulnerabilities, topology selection and/or provisioning is revisted and augmentation with
new nodes or links can be made. To properly frame the conversation about geographic
vulnerabilities in networks, we define the following terms that will be used throughout
this work.
DEFINITION 1.1. Geographic Vulnerability is the geographic area of a network that if
attacked can cause significant impact to the function of the entire network.
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Figure 3: Wireless Network showing Geographic Vulnerabilities and a New Node Loca-
tion that Eliminates the Vulnerabilities
DEFINITION 1.2. A Geospatial Event is an event that can cause a geographic vulnera-
bility.
DEFINITION 1.3. The Threat Radius is the physical radius of a geospatial event that is
used to define the geographic vulnerability.
In this work, it is usually assumed that during a geospatial event, all nodes in the
threat radius will fail.
1.1.1 Topology Design
Topology Design is related to the layout and connectivity of the physical infras-
tructure. A topology’s inherit relationship to geography can present vulnerabilities that
can only be mitigated by augmentation of the topology as opposed to having additional
capacity in the network. This is illustrated in Figure 3 where a new node was added to
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eliminate the vulnerabilities located at nodes 10 and 15.
Goals of topology design can be to minimize costs by optimizing node/edge loca-
tions or to provide coverage that is resistant to failures (random or correlated). Frequently,
topology design is based on reachability constraints (or diverse reachability constraints).
Heuristic and optimization based methods are used to for topology design purposes.
1.1.2 Demand Provisioning
Demand provisioning is generally accomplished via heuristics (like Find First (FF)
algorithms) or via optimization algorithms. Demand provisioning can take into account
path diversity and redundancy. Two formulations are generally used for demand provi-
sioning that consider path diversity. The first is the Path-Link Formulation [121], which
relies on path generation algorithms as an input to the formulation. This is useful if the
path generation is designed for a specific purpose. For example, two paths may be phys-
ically separated by a certain distance or avoid a certain area. This is explored in Chapter
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The second formulation is the Node-Link Formulation [121], which generates traf-
fic flow paths within the formulation. This is useful because it avoid the path generation
problem. There are methods within Node-Link formulations to create two paths that avoid
each other. Incorporating geographic distance between paths is more challenging and is
the subject of Chapter 6.
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1.1.3 Resiliency Evaluation
Resiliency evaluation as it relates to geographically correlated failures and as it is
used in this work involves two concepts:
1. Locating geographic areas that present vulnerabilities to a network
2. Creating a metric that evaluates the capability of a network to deal with geographi-
cally correlated failures given the mission of the network.
Resiliency evaluation is traditionally performed using a variety of methods which
include simulation, state space analysis, graph theoretic methods, and other techniques.
Some methods take into account the mission (or demands) on the network. Other methods
focus on reachability to locate vulnerabilities. Metrics are sometimes used to quantify re-
siliency. Some graph theoretic metrics include betweeness, algebraic connectivity, node
degree, and clustering coefficient. If the mission of the network is considered, perfor-
mance metrics must be computed as a part of the resiliency evaluation.
The mission of the network is considered in the Resilinets framework as the re-
lationship of Network State to the Service State [145]. Additionally, in [52], Garbin and
Shortle discuss the concept of resilience curves which connect the number of failed com-
ponents to the network function.
Performability is one of the metrics that considers the network mission during
the analysis. From Medhi [101], performability uses the probability of network events
and the network performance associated with that event to calculate an average network
performance. This is shown in (1.1), where Si is the system state, X[Si] is the network
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measure at state Si, and Pr[Si] is the probability of network state Si. N is the number of
network elements.
The problem with this approach is that high probability events tend to dominate
performability and thus the design of the network. If the network is relatively reliable,
the performance during the time when the network is up will dominate the performability
calculation. With mission critical networks, we are primarily interested in survivability
and resilience rather than performability alone. To address this concern, we explore the
concept of network impact as opposed to network measure.
P =
2N∑
i=1
Pr [Si]X [Si] (1.1)
1.1.4 Vulnerability Mitigation
As discussed earlier, vulnerability mitigation may have safety related short term
impacts and longer term impacts that tend to be related to cost. Different vulnerability
mitigation techniques can be used for each of these impacts.
Geodiverse routing techniques can be used to mitigate short term impacts [32].
Other concepts include coordinated switching techniques taking advantage of the speed
of lower layer switching versus upper layer switching. Geographically correlated events
present considerable challenges for routing algorithms. Route flapping occurs during
large outages delaying the time to route convergence and potentially leading to route
instability [16].
Longer term impacts tend to me addressed with capacity planning techniques. The
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concern with many approaches is the lack of attention paid to planning for the event itself
and the mission critical services that will need to be restored. As is pointed out in Section
1, the criticality of services during a geographically correlated event may even change
due to the event itself.
1.2 Performance in Mission Critical Networks
Is the mission met with this set of services operating at this level of service? The
key to this question is understanding the mission and relationship of the network to that
mission. Evaluating the resiliency of a network necessitates understanding the impact on
the mission of the network. If we make the following assumptions:
ASSUMPTION 1. Unacceptable high latency and/or packet loss by a service is consid-
ered an outage of the service.
This assumption implies that the PDF of the latency or packet loss directly affects
the availability of the service. First order (means based) network analysis techniques to
determine latency are common. Jackson Networks [75] are a well known, first order, open
queueing network solution. Techniques described in [105] also provide basic first order
response time analysis for web services. If second order statistics are desired, Queueing
Network Analyzer (QNA) [155] is a tool that provides these capabilities.
Multi-layer networks present additional challenges. Layered Queueing Networks
(LQN) are one of the techniques used to solve these challenges. LQNs are solved fre-
quently using means based analysis or simulation. Most multi-layer network performance
that is tied to critical services is simply modeled using Discrete Event Simulation (DES).
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These techniques all have disadvantages that hinder their adoption in multi-layer
mission critical network performance analysis. Jackson networks and other first order
analysis techniques are not accurate enough since they tend to make assumptions that
performance is based on exponential distributions. QNA had not been used extensively
for multi-layer modeling. This is one of the approaches proposed in Chapter 3. LQNs are
typically solved analytically using means based approaches and have the same concerns
as other first order approaches. Simulation is generally intractable for large networks and
has the other disadvantage that rare events are difficult to simulate without specifically
simulating the event itself.
Menasce [105] and [104], addressed web service QoS specifically. Generally, re-
quest/reply is the service type discussed here. The important characteristics discussed in-
clude response time, availability, reliability, predictability, security, and throughput. The
Publish/Subscribe message pattern is also important to the Air Traffic Control (ATC) en-
vironment.
In the ATC environment, certain types of data are more critical to receive than
other data types. In addition, timeliness is more important to certain types of data. For
example, aircraft position data to controllers may have much tighter availability and time-
liness constraints than perhaps aircraft position data to a web site that tracks aircraft for
display on the world wide web, which in fact may need to be deliberately delayed for
security reasons. This is also illustrated in the example in [104].
• Availability
• Survivability
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• Response Time/Latency
• Message Loss Rate/Error Rate
• Security/Trust
It is interesting that a trade-off tends to exist between many of these qualities. For
example, if buffer size is increased or message persistence is allowed, message loss can
be minimized but at the expense of response time or latency. If availability is defined by
the percentage of the time that messages arrive on time, availability would increase as
the latency metrics increase. This work looks at the first three items primarily, leaving
security and trust issues for separate work.
1.3 Service Level Agreements for Mission Critical Applications
During significant geographically correlated events, like earthquakes and hurri-
canes, a couple of challenges exist. The first challenge is to ensure that mission critical
services are restored first and other services follow as efficiently and quickly as possible.
The other challenge is ensuring that the network was provisioned properly prior to the
event to facilitate restoration of mission critical services during a variety of different po-
tential events. Do the network paths exist to route around the event? And is there enough
capacity to handle the additional traffic?
Service Level Agreements (SLA) may provide much of the information needed to
answer both of these challenges. SLAs can contain information about the importance of
the service as well as the necessary service level objectives (SLO) for the service. We can
13
both provision the network with the information in the SLAs as well as restore the most
important services based on this information.
Even though there is a large body of work related to assembling selecting services
for web service composition based on QoS parameters in SLAs, we have not seen work
that attempts to provision services or demands across a network using SLAs that have the
ability to provide geographic diversity in the network.
In mission critical networks, the network typically has a strong role to play due to
the high availability and sometimes low latency requirements that are imposed by mission
critical services. In [11], Badidi describes a brokered SLA service for SOA that could be
used by mission critical networks to provide and implement QoS. The author provides an
extensive discussion about how to implement service level objectives (SLO). One of the
advantages of brokered SLA services is that during events, the network has the ability to
use the SLA to restore the most important services.
In [15], methods of restoration using SLAs during failures are discussed. The goal
here is to ensure services are restored at a minimum QoS level during the event. We try
to account for this by provisioning using SLA QoS parameters.
1.4 Contributions
This work addresses many of the components of the disaster planning approach
described in Section 1 and shown in Fig. 2.
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1.4.1 Performance Analysis of Mission Critical Multi-Layer Networks
Mission critical services frequently have tighter availability, latency, and packet
loss requirements than is typically provided with traditional network analysis that relies
on exponential assumptions for arrival and service processes. Services over multi-layer
network infrastructure are also complex to analyze using traditional analysis techniques.
Two network performance models and a novel random number generator are proposed.
The first performance model that is proposed was an extension of the classic Queu-
ing Network Analyzer (QNA) by Ward Whitt [155] to include multi-layer analysis typical
of a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA). Given the constraints of QNA (only includes
1st and 2nd order analysis), we proposed a linear algebraic queueing method that utilizes
matrix exponential techniques. One of the significant advantages of these methods is the
ability to use non-exponential arrival and departure processes in a network analysis tool.
Additionally, simulation models to test the performance models yielded a novel matrix ex-
ponential random number generator. This results of this work are published at the IEEE
MASCOTS and SCS SpringSim conferences [54, 57, 58]
1.4.2 Evaluation of Geographically Correlated Vulnerabilities in Multi-Layer Networks
A novel Impact based resilience metric is proposed known as the Network Impact
Resilience (NIR) metric. In a manner similar to performability, it is based on a mapping of
failure impact to network states. The Self-Pruning Network State Generation (SP-NSG)
algorithm is created as a companion to the NIR. The SP-NSG is a reduced state space
method of analyzing impact for important states. The NIR using the SP-NSG produces
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two outputs. The first output is a metric that gives an indication of the disaster resilience
of the network being evaluated. The second output is a list of specific failure modes
or geographic vulnerabilities found. This work is published in the Journal of Network
and System Management (JONS) [63] and at IEEE DRCN and IEEE CQR conferences
[53, 56, 61].
1.4.3 Provisioning and Restoral of Mission Critical Services for Disaster Resilience
Provisioning ILPs and associated heuristics are proposed to solve the provisioning
problem considering geographic vulnerabilities. This work was a collaboration with the
University of Kansas and their diverse path algorithm was used with this work (see Section
1.5). Restoration algorithms and ILPs are presented to provide a priority of restoration
based on service survivability parameters. Finally, Service Level Agreement (SLA) ex-
tensions are proposed to communicate the various mission critical parameters. The results
of this work were recently published at the IEEE DRCN conference [59].
1.4.4 Topology Improvements to Avoid High Impact Geographic Events
Heuristic based Integer Linear Programs (ILP) are proposed here that augment
network topologies by adding nodes to reduce geographic vulnerabilities found using the
SP-NSG. Novel geographically based weighting algorithms are used with shortest path
first algorithms to find diverse point-to-point paths as well as diverse point-to-many trees.
Additionally, a novel swarm optimization approach is proposed that uses the SP-NSG
natively. Each method has benefits. The results of this work were published at the IEEE
Cogsima Conference [55].
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1.4.5 Routing of Mission Critical Services during Disasters
Routing improvement during disasters is one of the vulnerability mitigation tech-
niques considered for this work. Geographic Multi-Topology Routing (MTR) is proposed
as a novel method to allow for fast switching to a stable routing topology during large and
potentially cascading failures that may cause flapping or other routing pathologies in the
base topology. In a manner similar to Section 1.4.4, geographically based weighting is
used to divert the trunks of routing trees from vulnerable areas. This work is published in
the Computer Networks Journal [62] and at IEEE DRCN Conference [60].
1.5 Collaborations and Other Contributions
The motivation for this research stems from two areas. First, this work is sup-
ported by a cooperative agreement between UMKC and the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration1 to determine the suitability of a SOA for mission critical applications. The main
question asked by this research agreement is: Can SOA be used for mission critical sys-
tems? Which suggests the following question: Is the SOA resilient to disasters and other
rare events? Dr. Cory Beard is the Primary Investigator for this work.
Second, there is an overriding consensus that massive correlated failures in net-
works are not well understood. NSF has chosen to dedicate resources to a more compre-
hensive look at massive network failures in the form of a grant2 to UMKC and Kansas
University which also supports this work. Dr. Deep Medhi and Dr. James Sterbenz
1FAA-UMKC Cooperative Agreement - 11-G-018, “Analysis of the FAA NextGen SWIM Architec-
ture”. The Primary Investigator is Cory Beard.
2National Science Foundation grant No. CNS-1217736, “ Resilient Network Design for Massive Fail-
ures and Attacks”. The Primary Investigators are Deep Medhi and James Sterbenz.
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are the Primary Investigators for this work. Additional publications related to this work
include [31], [32].
1.6 Organization
The dissertation is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 - SWIM Network - A Motivating Example
• Chapter 3 - Performance Analysis of Mission Critical Multi-Layer Networks
• Chapter 4 - Evaluation of Geographically Correlated Vulnerabilities in Multi-Layer
Networks
• Chapter 5 - Provisioning and Restoral of Mission Critical Services for Disaster
Resilience
• Chapter 6 - Topology Improvements to Avoid High Impact Geographic Events
• Chapter 7 - Routing of Mission Critical Services during Disasters
• Chapter 8 - Conclusions
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CHAPTER 2
SWIM NETWORK - AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL EXAMPLE
The purpose of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) System Wide Infor-
mation Management (SWIM) network [143] is to provide an open and flexible informa-
tion management architecture that facilitates sharing of operational data among National
Airspace System (NAS) entities in a secure and manageable fashion [149] Flight and
traffic flow management (TFM), aeronautical information, and weather data can easily
be shared with both internal and external users of SWIM. SWIM is based on a Service
Oriented Architecture (SOA) multi-layer network concept.
A cooperative agreement between UMKC and the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion1 asked the question:
Can SOA be used for mission critical systems?
Note that a significant part of this question would be:
Can the SOA provide the required Quality of Service (QoS)?
Can the SOA provide the required service availability?
This leads to the related question:
Is the SOA resilient to disasters and other rare events?
There is an overriding consensus that massive correlated failures in networks are
1FAA-UMKC Cooperative Agreement - 11-G-018, “Analysis of the FAA NextGen SWIM Architec-
ture”. The Primary Investigator is Cory Beard.
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not well understood. This is unfortunately demonstrated by the communications experi-
ence during numerous natural and man-made disasters. This research project proposes
models to asses QoS, availability, and network resilience of SOA networks.
SOA loosely binds applications to users using a common messaging format. Web
Services generally extends SOA to include a publish/subscribe paradigm. In addition to
publishing, the services are registered in a web services directory system that allows users
to discover the service and subscribe. A typical publish/subscribe message distribution is
shown in Figure 4. Web Service protocols govern the creation, description, publishing,
discovery, invocation, and un-publishing of web services. SWIM implements Web Ser-
vices using Simple Object Access Protocol/Extendable Markup Language (SOAP/XML)
messaging to deliver data to NAS users. SWIM also implements a NAS service directory
system that uses the Web Service Description Language (WSDL) to describe the services
available to the users.
Message routing and delivery is handled by message brokers in the web service
environment. From an architecture perspective, message brokers operate at the HTTP
layer and above. This presents challenges to building QoS models because there is queu-
ing of messages at the Web Service Application layer as well as the TCP and IP layers.
From an availability perspective, hardware and software faults can occur at all three of
those layers.
Evaluation of mission impact provided by a given set of network provided services
over a particular network configuration is the most important metric of the performance
of the network. In [105], Menasce clarified the need for a set of metrics at the web service
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Figure 4: Typical Pub/Sub Message Distribution
layer that includes response time, availability, reliability, predictability, and cost. What
is missing here is the answer to the question: Is the mission met with this set of services
operating at this level? The key to the this question is understanding the connection be-
tween physical layer impacts to the network due to a disaster scenario and mission impact
due to the subsequent degradation of the network provided services. Service Oriented
Architecture (SOA) is one of the important mechanisms by which services are provided
to a system over an underlying network.
2.1 Unique Challenges for ATC/SWIM
Due to the nature of ATC, SWIM is generally a highly governed network. The
network provides security, QoS monitoring, etc... There is a large number of publishers
and consumers. Generally the relationship is not one-to-one. It is one-to-many, with
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multiple consumers being associated with each publisher and multiple publishers being
used by each consumer. An example is text based weather data (ASOS). A given ASOS
sensor located at an airport may publish its weather observations to multiple users at
ARTCCs and TRACONs. And each ARTCC would receive multiple ASOS sensor data.
Finally, in SWIM there is more of an abstraction between consumers and pro-
ducers than in a traditional web services relationship. In a traditional web services rela-
tionship where a customer may make a purchase from a vendor, the relationship between
producer and consumer is one-to-one during the interaction with almost no involvement
from the network (other than carrying data). In the SWIM/ATC environment, the net-
work is involved in more aspects like governance, security, outage reporting, etc. In the
SWIM/ATC environment, the consumers do not even need to know what producer is pub-
lishing the data.
Couple this environment with the basic question How are extremely high avail-
ability SOA services specified? and we have an interesting challenge. If we assume a
network of brokers approach referred to here as the SWIM Enterprise Service Bus (ESB),
we have the following context:
• ESB will need to know requirements
• ESB may make provisioning decisions based on the SLAs
• Some consumers may require high availability while others do not for the same
data.
• Some consumers may require diversity and/or survivability
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This seems to suggest that a strong centralized ESB is appropriate. Where the
publisher and subscriber agree on an SLA that the ESB negotiates and enforces. One
additional consideration is shown in Figure 5. The SWIM ESB needs to be interoperable
with multiple ESBs and domains, including an airborn domain.
Figure 5: SWIM Interoperability
2.1.1 MC-SOA SLA Agreement Approaches
The two basic agreement styles referenced in [17] are Publisher Offered - Sub-
scriber Requested (PO-SR) and Publisher Offered - Subscriber Requested - Middleware
Confirmed (PO-SR-MC). Figures 6 and 7 illustrate possible SLA interactions based on
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these agreement styles.
Figure 6: SLA based on PO-SR
Figure 7: SLA based on PO-SR-MC
Based on these interactions, we compare the two approaches.
• PO-SR
- Not scalable with multiple producers/consumers
- SLA(s) have no central control, could be arbitrarily specified and enforced
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- SOA would not be able to differentiate service
• PO-SR-MC
- Enforcement of SLA(s) can be controlled by the ESB
- Abstraction between producers and consumers is achieved
- [11] and [27] both describe how a brokered SLA service might be implemented
The PO-SR-MC agreement style seems to provide the most advantages for a MC-
SOA environment. In [20], some basic service level objectives (SLO) of a SOA SLA are
described:
• Measurable Qualities: Accuracy, Availability, Capacity, Cost, Latency, Provisioning-
related time, Reliable messaging, Scalability.
• Unmeasurable Qualities: Interoperability, Modifiability, Security
The language used for SLA(s) should be a common, flexible, supportable lan-
guage. Main SLA descriptions languages include WSDL, WS-Agreement, WSLA, WS-
Policy, others. As long as FAA Service Level Objectives (SLO) can be specified in an
SLA, several languages would work.
A minimum recommended set of possible SLO(s) based on the QoS parameters
in Section 1.2 include:
• Availability (multiple availabilities offered per product)
• Diversity (yes/no)
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• Response Time/Latency (Provider + ESB + Consumer)
• Message Loss Rate (Maximum Rate)
• Error Rate (Maximum Rate)
• Security/Trust
Figure 8 shows an example of a service that is delivered as a high and low avail-
ability service to different consumers. Based on the SLA(s) negotiated, the SWIM could
implement the service in the network based on the SLA. Notice that not only is availability
selectable based on the products offered, diversity in the network is also selectable.
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Figure 8: Example of High and Low Availability Products
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CHAPTER 3
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF MISSION CRITICAL MULTI-LAYER
NETWORKS
In order to evaluate mission critical networks for geographic vulnerabilities, we
must be able to determine if the network is performing the mission critical function with
respect to the most important services. One of the challenges is that many mission critical
applications tend to have requirements like high availability and/or low latency requiring
accurate performance models.
In this chapter, the performance models used to study multi-layer networks are
described. These include an extension of the well known Queueing Network Analyzer
(QNA) and a network analysis tool based on Linear Algebraic Queueing Theory (LAQT).
These new models are were published in [54] and [58].
Building network performance models that are capable of accurately predicting
response time distributions for mission critical applications has not generally been pos-
sible for large networks. This is especially true for SOA Publish-Subscribe networks.
There are a several reasons for the shortfall. Probability distributions representing the
arrival and service processes are generally too complex to accurately represent in a large
model without making the model intractable or using simplifying assumptions that do
not capture important characteristics of the distribution, like the length of the tail. Jack-
son networks and Queueing Network Analyzer are examples of such models. Simulation
models have difficulty generating rare events characterized by long tail distributions and
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also have computational issues with large complex networks.
This is particularly important when flows with significantly different service times
are mixed. Additionally, the Publish-Subscribe (Pub/Sub) messaging pattern creates a
tree-like distribution where interior nodes may copy a message and send it out on multiple
ports. A typical Pub/Sub distribution is shown in Figure 9. Many queueing models assume
that splitting is done probabilistically and not by duplicating jobs (or messages).
The motivation for this work is to have the capability to create performance mod-
els for mission critical Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) systems like the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) System Wide Information Management (SWIM) pro-
gram [143]. Sachs et al. [135] report on observed message sizes and arrival rates as-
sociated with SOA systems. SOA adds complexity to an already complicated tri-modal
packet size distribution on the internet as documented by Fraleigh in [48]. Moment match-
ing [151] can be used on empirical samples to approximate complex traffic with probabil-
ity distributions like Matrix Exponential (ME) distributions.
Figure 9: Typical Pub/Sub message distribution.
Matrix Exponential (ME) distributions used in linear algebraic queueing theory
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(LAQT) methods are becoming more prevalent as system modelers are able to accurately
incorporate various system conditions, frequently based on traffic samples. Since analytic
methods to represent complex probability distributions are not tractable mathematically,
we use ME probability distributions to approximate arrival and service distributions ac-
curately. The only limitation on the types of distributions that can be represented is the
size of the matrices needed to represent the distribution. Since LAQT models are exact
in many operations, they make great models for research, enabling analytical results for
problems that previously could not be solved analytically.
In this work, we use LAQT techniques in conjunction with a network decompo-
sition approach to compute the resultant process of these three basic operations: super-
position, splitting, departure. LAQT methods that compute the waiting time distribution
across a single server are used to compute approximations for the response time distri-
bution. Since state space explosion can occur with multiple operations across multiple
nodes, moment matching techniques are used to limit state space. The advantage of this
approach is that end-to-end network performance can be approximated with a minimum
of parameters at any point in the network. Renewal approximations are still assumed due
to the state space required to maintain correlation information. Research is on-going to
eliminate the need for the renewal approximation. LAQT methods are sometimes viewed
as complex when compared with traditional techniques. There are two good reasons to
consider these techniques. First, LAQT models are matrix analytic extensions of famil-
iar Markovian approaches, simplifying the LAQT operations used. Second, the extensive
capabilities of LAQT models are worth the increase in model complexity. One of the
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capabilities that is being explored in current research is the inclusion of correlation infor-
mation in traffic flows from node to node. This would potentially eliminate many of the
sources of error in network models.
Classic examples of network models that make simplifying assumptions to re-
duce complexity include Jackson networks [75] and the Queueing Network Analyzer
(QNA) [155]. The Jackson network makes exponential assumptions about the arrival and
service process. QNA was able to describe arrival and service processes using two param-
eters, mean and squared coefficient of variation (SCV) and then use linear equations to
approximate these parameters at each node in the network. QNA achieved a complete two
parameter approximation for network performance using linear equations making it the
standard for network decomposition methods. The reasons the QNA model was chosen
in this work as the baseline model over other models are:
• The model is tractable and multiple message classes (products) are possible. It
is conceivable that a large SOA network may have hundreds of message classes
each with its own SLA and arrival/service traffic distribution (which may not be
exponential).
• The publish/subscribe and request/reply message patterns are handled easily with
the customer creation feature of QNA.
• Multilayer modeling including fragmentation can also be handled using customer
creation.
One of the features that make QNA an important tool for Pub/Sub system modeling is the
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customer creation feature that is imbedded in QNA. This feature allows jobs (or in this
case messages) to be duplicated or combined at a node. This was proposed as a possible
solution to model Pub/Sub messaging environments in [54]. It is also possible to use this
feature for multi-layer modeling, incorporating network layer fragmentation.
Our goal is to produce results that are more accurate than is possible with previous
network decomposition approaches eventually creating a new class of network decompo-
sition models using the powerful LAQT toolset. Additionally, the ability of the LAQT
models to evolve to include new features like correlation both from superposed traffic
streams and from tandem servers plays an important role. The organization of this paper
is as follows. Related work is presented next. Then the LAQT and modified QNA models
are described. Finally, the simulation model is described and results with all three models
are presented.
3.1 Related Work
There are several threads of literature discussed in this section. First, works that
specifically attempt to model SOA nodes using a variety of methods are discussed. Sec-
ond, queueing network decomposition approaches are discussed. Next, LAQT techniques
are reviewed. Our work lies in the intersection of these areas of research.
In [105], Menasce covers the traditional methods of analyzing the performance
of SOA networks. These are based primarily on first order models with exponential as-
sumptions. Badidi, Esmahi, and Serhani [12] presented a queueing model that allows
for different classes of service to be directed to different queues in order to maintain the
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SLAs of each traffic class. Both of these models are first moment models and therefore
make significant simplifying assumptions. We are proposing methods here that do not
require those assumptions. Kounev in [79] used a novel queueing Petri Nets approach to
model the interactions at a SOA node. While this model seems to accurately reflect the
interactions at a node, it does not seem to allow for widely varying message arrival and
departure distributions.
Multiple works have used network decomposition approaches to predict network
performance. Probably the most well known approach is the Queueing Network Analyzer
(QNA). QNA was proposed by W. Whitt [155] in 1983 to address congestion in queuing
networks. The product that resulted from this work provided a framework to estimate
the 1st and 2nd moments of many network parameters including end-to-end delay. The
authors in [155] and [154] point out the limitations to the assumptions that were made.
The focus of our work is to create a model that improves on the limitations of the QNA
model in the SOA Pub/Sub environment. In [122] Pongthawornkamol, Nahrst-edt, and
Wang use concepts from QNA to improve their pub/sub model to include brokers modeled
as Gi/G/1 queues.
There are a couple of works that share goals of our work. In [136] Sadre and
Haverkort presents the FiFiQueue network analysis tool. FiFiQueue extended QNA, us-
ing a two parameter traffic descriptor and QNA assumptions for superposition and split-
ting. For the departure process, they use a phase type (PH/PH/1 or PH/PH/1/K) analysis.
Our work does not extend QNA, instead it replaces the analysis for superposition, depar-
ture, and splitting with LAQT methods. Kim et al. [78] extends QNA with CorrQNA by
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replacing the QNA squared coefficient of variation (SCV) linear equations with a regres-
sion equation that includes correlation information. Heindl et al. has proposed network
decomposition methods that are based on LAQT methods in [70]. In addition, they used
a Markovian Arrival Process (MAP) and moment matching methods that enable them
to capture correlation induced in upstream queues. In [73], network decomposition is
achieved using MAP processes as inputs and moments as inputs and outputs. This is done
to reduce the state space requirements in large networks.
Several queueing models in a manner similar to Heindl that are significantly more
complex have been designed with approximations that include correlation information.
Mitchell and Van de Liefvoort [111] were able to construct a feed forward network using
LAQT techniques that included correlated traffic inputs. It did not include superposition
or splitting. However, in [10] and [77], the authors used three parameter traffic descrip-
tions to build a simple queueing network with correlated inputs. It is still an open ques-
tion whether these methods can be applied to large networks with multiple diverse inputs.
In [126], Rabta proposed a QNA-like decomposition approach with an augmentation that
incorporates simulations for components that are challenging to model analytically.
3.2 Queueing Network Analyzer for SOA (SOA-QNA)
For brevity, most of the details related to the inner workings of QNA are left to
the reader in [155]. In [69], Haverkort also provides a good treatment of QNA. QNA
generally assumes that there three basic operations in the queuing network. These are
superposition, service, and splitting of renewal traffic streams. 1st and 2nd moment traffic
34
equations are formed and solved which yields the network node steady state statistics.
From that, we can estimate the end-to-end delay statistics of the individual streams. The
Queueing Network Analyzer (QNA) [155] uses a set of well known approximations for
superposition, splitting, departure operations and waiting time calculations.
Algorithm 1 SOA-QNA Model
1: Assign node number to each message node and communications link.
2: From traffic route tables, find paths of each message type to each subscriber. Every
pair represents a traffic class. Incorporate Message Exchange Pattern (MEP) informa-
tion.
3: Determine mean service times and C2s for each traffic class at each node. Collect
the arrival statistics for each traffic class.
4: Convert traffic data into QNA standard input.
5: If chunking/multiplexing is assumed on the links, estimate the mean service time
and C2s of each traffic class.
6: Calculate the customer creation constant (γ) for each node. This is the departure rate
leaving the node divided by the arrival rate.
7: Calculate 1st and 2nd order traffic equations and solve.
8: Calculate steady state network node statistics.
9: Calculate the end-to-end delay statistics for each traffic class
The model for superposition uses an approximation by Albin [6]. (3.1) shows the
calculation of the SCV of the superposed process which is a convex combination of the
weighted sum of the SCV of the input processes and the exponential, which has an SCV
of one. The weighting function uses utilization and the arrival rates as inputs and can
be found in [155]. The SCV for the ith arrival process is c2i and c
2
H is the SCV of the
superposed process.
c2H = w
∑( λi∑
k λk
)
c2i + 1− w (3.1)
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Since random splitting of a renewal process is also renewal, the splitting opera-
tions is easily handled by (3.2) [155]. c2 is the SCV for the input arrival process and c2i is
the SCV of the ith split process with a probability of pi.
c2i = pic
2 + 1− pi (3.2)
The work by Marshall [95] is used to create the linear departure approximation. It
is then simplified based on the waiting time approximation shown in (3.4) and analysis by
Whitt [155] to what we see in (3.3). c2s is the SCV for the service process; c
2
a is the SCV
for the arrival process; and c2d is the SCV of the departure process.
c2d = ρ
2c2s +
(
1− ρ2) c2a (3.3)
Waiting time is approximated using the well known approximation for Gi/G/1
queues shown in (3.4) [80]. ρ is utilization; τ is the mean service time; and EW is the
resultant expected (mean) waiting time. g is the Kramer and Langenbach-Belz approxi-
mation [80] used here when the SCV of the service process is greater than one, else it is
set to 1.
EW = τρ
(
c2s + c
2
a
)
g/2 (1− ρ) (3.4)
QNA also has a convenient feature known as customer creation which uses a mul-
tiplicative factor at each node to create new customers after service. This is an extremely
useful feature for modeling SOA message distribution to multiple nodes as was proposed
in [54]. Our work borrows this concept and implements it using an LAQT method. The
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reader is referred to [155] for more detailed information on the implementation of QNA.
3.2.1 Message Exchange Patterns (MEP) Implementation using QNA
The publish/subscribe MEP is implemented by estimating the distribution trees
of each message and coding these distribution trees into the QNA route matrix (qij) and
probability matrix (pij). This will place traffic on the appropriate nodes and links to ac-
count for the single source/multiple destination nature of pub/sub. γ is computed from the
resultant traffic streams as shown in (3.5). k represents incoming links and m represents
outgoing links.
γ =
∑
k λk,out∑
m λm,in
(3.5)
The request/response MEP is implemented in much the same manner. The request
traffic flows and the resultant reply traffic flows are estimated independently and coded
into the QNA route matrices. The arrival distribution of the request flow could influence
the arrival distribution of the response flow. Incorporating the correlation between the two
flows is still a subject of future research. Hybrid MEP, like those that involve a pub/sub
notification and subsequent request/reply for file retrieval is implemented in a similar
manner.
3.2.2 Message Chunking and IP Fragmentation
Modeling message chunking and link multiplexing involves modifying a couple
of parameters. First, the service time τs for that product on the link needs to be adjusted
for the message chunk size. Equations (3.6) - (3.10) show the service time model that was
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used for links with chunking/multiplexing. We assumed a batch of MTU size packets and
a single packet with a uniform distribution between MTU and zero. Next the customer
creation factor (γ) must be set to accommodate for the additional packets on the link.
(3.5) shows the calculation of the customer creation factor.
N =
MsgSize
ChnkSize
(3.6)
xs =
8(ChnkSize)
LinkSpeed
(3.7)
OVs =
8(Overhead)
LinkSpeed
(3.8)
x =
N − 1
N
(xs +OVs) +
1
N
((xs/2) +OVs) (3.9)
C2s =
N − 1
N
(
(xs +OVs)
2 − x2
x2
)
+
1
N

∣∣∣x23 + (4xsOVs3 )+ (OVs)2 − x2∣∣∣
x2
 (3.10)
3.3 Linear Algebraic Queueing Theory (LAQT) Performance Models for SOA
The network model using LAQT built here is based on the premise that each traffic
flow between nodes is assumed to be renewal and can be represented by an ME distribu-
tion. It should be noted that future work is in progress to extend the model to non-renewal
traffic flows. Looking at Figure 10, we see a small network of general servers and renewal
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Figure 10: Network LAQT Performance Model.
traffic flows represented as ME distributions of interarrival times and message sizes be-
tween the nodes. It is assumed to be a feed forward network for each flow but not neces-
sarily for the aggregate flows.
Figure 11 shows how an LAQT node is constructed. Traffic flows enter the node.
The interarrival processes are superposed. The message sizes are mixed probabilisti-
cally to create the output message distributions. In addition, the aggregate message size
distribution is used in conjunction with the rate of the FIFO queue to create the service
distribution for the queue. The superposed traffic flow is serviced by the FIFO queue. The
departure traffic flow is processed using a moment matching algorithm to reduce the state
space of the representation of the traffic flow. Finally, the traffic flow interarrival distribu-
tion is probabilistically split or duplicated according to routing tables for transmission to
the next node.
The building blocks of LAQT models are the Matrix Exponential Distribution
(ME). In Lipsky’s work [91], we see the definition of the ME distribution as given by its
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probability distribution (PDF) as (3.11) and its CDF as (3.12).
f(x) = pexp (−Bx)Be′ (3.11)
F (x) = 1− pexp (−Bx) e′ (3.12)
The starting vector is known as p. The progress rate matrix is B, and e′ is con-
sidered a summing operator usually consisting of all ones, but not necessarily so as long
as it can be use to construct a valid probability distribution. The nth moment in an ME
distribution is given as E [Xn] = n!pVne′. Where V is B−1 (the matrix inverse of B).
ME distributions have rational Laplace-Stieltjes transforms. Our notation to describe an
ME distribution is 〈p,B, e〉. L is the event generator matrix and for a renewal process,
L = Be′p. The Kronecker space is used throughout the LAQT model. It is denoted as
B̂1 := B1 ⊗ I2.
3.3.1 LAQT Algorithm
Figure 11: LAQT Node Model
40
The process to evaluate a network using LAQT tools is described in Algorithm 2.
The pre-processing portion involves a first order analysis to determine mean arrival rates
at all nodes for all products and aggregated. This is noted as λpn, where p is the product
and n is the node. The steady state service process at each node is also calculated using
the mean arrival rates of each product and the service process of each product at that node.
At this point node processing begins. A loop is setup that stops when the C2 of
the departure process at all nodes ceases to change during the iterations. The nodes are
processed incrementally. To process a node, the first step is to determine the superposed
arrival process from the input arrival processes. If a node input from an adjacent node
has not been calculated yet, assume exponential distribution at the mean rate from that
node. The next step is to determine the departure process followed by a moment match
to reduce the state space. Finally, the departure process is split/duplicated based on the
products that progress to the various next nodes.
Algorithm 2 LAQT Model
1: Compute service distribution 〈p,B, e〉s at all nodes n
while Departure (C2i − C2i−1) > err do
for all n in N Nodes do
2: Compute superposition process 〈B,L〉sup
3: Compute departure process 〈B,L〉dep
4: Compute reduced departure 〈p,B, e〉mm
5: Compute traffic flows out 〈p,B, e〉n,m
end for
end while
6: Compute Waiting Time Distribution at all nodes
* if a node input from an adjacent node has not been calculated yet, assume exponential
distribution < 1, λn−1, 1 >
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3.3.2 Step 1: Compute Service Distribution at all Nodes using ME Mixing
To represent message size distributions after a superposition operation, a proba-
bilistic mixing operation takes place. The equations used to mix the message sizes for N
flows are (3.13), (3.14). Since the message distribution is known, the products (and their
respective arrival rates) that pass through each node are also known. We also assume feed
forward message distribution.
pmix =
[
λ1∑
λi
p1
λ2∑
λi
p2 ...
λN∑
λi
pN
]
(3.13)
Bmix =

B1 0 ... 0
0 B2 ... 0
... ... ... ...
0 0 ... BN
 emix =

e1
e2
...
eN
 (3.14)
To create the service distribution used in the departure process and waiting time process
at each node, the message size distribution is scaled by the FIFO queue rate at that node
as shown in Figure 11
Bs = qrate×BM (3.15)
3.3.3 Step 2: Compute Superposition Process
The superposition of renewal processes is described by Lipsky in [91]. We follow
that approach in our work. (3.16) describes the equations to construct the superposed
traffic flow where Qi = e′ipi. The output of the superposition process < B,L > can be
sent to the departure process directly, which include any correlation information from the
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superposition process.
Bsup = B̂2 + B̂2 e
′
sup = ê
′
1 + ê′2
Lsup = B̂1Q̂1 + B̂2Q̂2
(3.16)
3.3.4 Step 3: Compute Departure Process
In [81], Kumaran et. al. provided the approach to produce a finite departure
process of an ME/ME/1 queue. This was an extension of work in [91]. This approach is
used to construct the departure process in the node. We show this in (3.17) and (3.18).
The Bb matrix is the B matrix from waiting time distribution, which is described in a
following section. The resulting B matrix is finite based on the approximation in the
lower right corner of the matrix [81]. The number of
(
B̂a + B̂s
)
to include is optional
and is referred to here as the departure level. After considerable simulation, departure
level of 4 was determined to be adequate for this work. Choosing the correct level is still
a subject of research.
Bd =

Ba Lap̂s 0 ... 0
0 (B̂a+B̂s) L̂a 0 0
0 0 (B̂a+B̂s) L̂a ...
... ... ... ... ...
0 ... 0 (B̂a+B̂s) L̂a
0 ... 0 0 (B̂a+B̂s−L̂a)
 (3.17)
Ld =

0 0 0 ... 0
L̂sê′s 0 0 ... 0
0 L̂s 0 ... 0
0 ... L̂s 0 0
0 ... 0 B̂bê′bp̂s (B̂s−B̂b)ê′bp̂s
 (3.18)
To convert the resulting MEP process described by < B,L >, to an ME distribution, we
compute the steady state distribution which gives new p and ematrices [91]. From (3.17),
it is clear that the size of the matrix is proportional to the size of the Kronecker space of
the B matrix multiplied by the departure level.
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3.3.5 Step 4: Compute Reduced Departure using Moment Matching
As the size of the network grows, the state space of the traffic flows grows. To
reduce that state space to a manageable level, the node employs a moment matching
algorithm that uses the moments of the incoming traffic flow to generate a new ME dis-
tribution for the arrival process. The moment matching algorithm is based on work by
Van de Liefvoort in [151]. The equations generated by the moment matching algorithm
for a three moment match are (3.19), (3.20), (3.21) where rn is a reduced moment of the
random process X , (rn = E[Xn]/n!).
pmm =
[
1 0
]
(3.19)
B−1mm =
 r1 r1
− r21−r2
r1
− r31−2r1r2+r3
r21−r2
 (3.20)
emm =
[
1
0
]
(3.21)
The use of this algorithm for a second degree distribution is described in [110].
To use a second degree distribution, there are a few important bounds that are need to be
mentioned. First, the second moment must be such that c2 ≥ 1/2. Second, if 1/2 ≤ c2 ≤
1, (3.22) provide bounds for the third moment. If c2 ≥ 1, (3.23) applies.
1
2
(
3c2 − 1 + (1− c2)
√
2− 2c2
)
r31 ≤ r3 ≤ c2(r31) (3.22)
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r3 ≥ 1/4(c2 + 1)2r31 (3.23)
It is possible with more deterministic distributions, that these bounds are violated.
The choices at that point are to either increase the degree of the moment match that is
used or make approximations based on the situation. In this work, the following approxi-
mations are used.
• if c2 ≤ 1/2, an Erlang distribution is constructed with size such that the SCV of
the distribution is smaller than the target SCV. The rates to proceed to the next state
versus exit in the B matrix are then adjusted to match the target SCV.
• if r3 violates (3.22), r3 is chosen in the middle of the bounds.
• if r3 violates (3.23), r3 is chosen near the bound.
In all cases, the constructed ME distributions are a close approximation to the
original distribution.
3.3.6 Step 5: Compute Output Traffic Flow using Splitting
To accomplish the splitting or thinning of the resulting renewal processes by a
probability α, we simply use the (3.24) to thin a renewal process, where L = Be′p.
Bα = B− (1− α)L Lα = αL (3.24)
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3.3.7 ME Waiting Time
To calculate the waiting time distribution across the node, we rely on the work
by Van de Liefvoort [152] and Kumuran et al. [82]. The waiting time distribution of our
ME/ME/1 queue is found using the algorithm in [82]. For brevity, this algorithm is not
reviewed in its entirety here. A brief description follows.
C =
[
Bs −Bse′spa
Bae
′
aps −Ba
]
(3.25)
C is known as the coupling matrix. The eigenvalues in the negative half-plane (ω1, ω2, ...ωk)
can be used to construct the Bw matrix of the waiting time distribution. The associated
left eigenvectors are stacked to form the X matrix used here.
Bw = X
−1diag (ω1, ω2, ...ωk)X (3.26)
pw = psVs ew = (Bs −Bw) e′s (3.27)
3.3.8 LAQT Complexity Considerations
As was discussed, the primary reason to use the moment matching techniques is
to reduce the state space of the departure matrix or the superposed matrix. Since the
departure process performs a waiting time calculation which requires eigenvalue decom-
position and additionally the moment matching process requires matrix inversion, O(p3)
operations are performed during departure and moment matching operations. If the model
converges in m iterations, we would anticipate the complexity to be O(2 ∗ m ∗ n ∗ p3),
where n is the number of nodes and p is the size of the departure matrix. This emphasizes
the need to control the state space size.
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3.4 Pub/Sub Simulation Model
OPNET from Riverbed [118] was used to create the simulation model of the
Pub/Sub message pattern as shown in Figure 13. Two standard OPNET components were
modified for this model. The message source is typical OPNET packet generator with a
modification to allow for the use of ME distributions both in the arrival process and in the
message size process. A modification for general ME distributions was proposed by the
authors in [57]. Configuration is via the OPNET attributes for the specific source. Figure
12 shows a typical hyper-exponential distribution with < p,B, e > matrices as shown
in (3.28). The B matrix is entered as a single line with columns and rows separated by
spaces. The ME use attribute can note exponential, hyper-exponential, erlang, or general
ME distributions. This enables the RNG to select the most efficient method of generating
that random variate.
p =
[
0.788 0.2113
]
B =
[
52.57 0.0
0.0 14.09
]
e =
[
1
1
]
(3.28)
The routing module is a typical OPNET first come first serve (FCFS) server with
a modification to duplicate messages to all required output ports based on input from a
static text based routing file. The format of the routing file is a, b, c. Where a is the node
affected by that route, b is the product affected by that route, and c is the output port for
that route. To duplicate a message to two ports requires duplicate routing entries with
the same a and b values and different c values. The simulation models and associated
random number generators (RNG) are described in detail respectively in Appendix A and
Appendix B.
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Figure 12: Source Configuration Attributes
3.5 SOA Performance Results
The analytic and simulation models were tested against the 9 node network shown
in Figure 9. It should be noted that parameters other than waiting time, as shown in this
paper are captured with the analytic and simulation tools. They include the squared co-
efficient of variation (C2) of the waiting time and of the arrival/departure processes at
each of the nodes. Scenarios were chosen that utilized just one product and 12 products.
Arrival and message size distributions were varied between exponential and more gen-
eral distributions. The message size distribution at each node is converted to the service
Table 2: Scenario 1-3 configuration.
Scn. Prod. Arr Rate Arr C2 Msg Size Msg C2
1 12 0.0667 1.0 2000000 1.0
2 12 66.7 1.0 2000 1.0
3 12 66.7 8.0 2000 3.0
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Figure 13: Opnet Modeler 9 Node Model
distribution using the queue rate. The product routing used for all scenarios is shown in
Table 3. Generally, shortest path routes were chosen to the destinations. The products
were selected to mimic a real life routing of air traffic products in an Air Traffic Control
SOA Message Network. In all scenarios, the queue rates were set for 0.1 to 0.9 utilization
at increments of 0.2. LAQT, QNA, and Simulation models were executed on all scenar-
ios. Each model scenario was simulated 10 times for at least 30,000 simulation seconds
each. The resulting confidence intervals are shown on the figures. With the exception of
utilization levels of 0.9, the confidence intervals were small compared to the mean. The
errors between simulation and analytical were generally outside the confidence intervals
for higher utilization scenarios.
The purpose of Scenarios 1-3 is to evaluate the effect of cascaded servers with
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Table 3: Scenarios 4-5 configuration.
Scenario 4 Scenario 5
Arrival Message Arrival Message
Prod. Src-Dest(s) Rate C2 = 1 Size C2 = 1 Rate C2 = 1 Size C2 = 1
1 1-1,2,3,4,5,6,7,9 16.67 500 16.67 500
2 1-1,2,6 0.1667 100000 0.1667 100000
3 3-1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 1.333 1000 1.333 1000
4 3-1,2,3,5,6,7,9 10.0 250 10.0 250
5 6-1,2,6,8,9 0.333 250000 33.33 2500
6 6-2,6 1.333 64000 133.3 640
7 6-1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 100.0 2000 100.0 2000
8 9-1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9 33.33 5000 333.33 500
9 3-2,3,6,9 0.0667 150 0.00667 1500
10 9-1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9 .0333 1000000 33.33 1000
11 3-1,3 0.1333 150 0.01333 1500
12 1-1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 .0667 2000000 66.7 2000
various mean message sizes. The rate is messages/sec. The message size is in bits. In
Scenario 1, we used large exponentially distributed message sizes. Figures 14(a) and
14(b) show the dramatic difference in end to end delay due to the change in message size
and thus average service time. Notice the utilization is the same for both scenarios. Both
scenarios had significant differences at high utilization. The mean waiting time across
nodes 1 and 4 are shown in Figure 14(c) and Figure 14(d). Based on additional testing,
it appears related to correlation between the service and arrival process generated by the
departure process at node 1. This type of correlation is discussed extensively in [46] as
well as in the conclusions of this paper.
Scenario 2 is the same as Scenario 1 with the exception that the messages are
small by comparison. The arrival rate was increased to maintain the same data rate out
of the producer. The waiting time decreased appropriately in all models. LAQT tended
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Table 4: Scenarios 6 configuration.
Scenario 6
Arrival Message
Prod. Src-Dest(s) Rate C2 Size C2
1 1-1,2,3,4,5,6,7,9 16.67 0.25 500 1.0
2 1-1,2,6 0.1667 4.0 100000 2.0
3 3-1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 1.333 1.0 1333 2.0
4 3-1,2,3,5,6,7,9 10.0 1.0 250 1.0
5 6-1,2,6,8,9 0.333 0.25 250000 1.0
6 6-2,6 1.333 0.333 64000 3.0
7 6-1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 100.0 1.0 2000 2.0
8 9-1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9 33.33 2.0 5000 1.0
9 3-2,3,6,9 0.0667 5.0 10.005 5.0
10 9-1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9 .0333 2.0 1000000 0.25
11 3-1,3 0.1333 12.0 150 3.0
12 1-1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 .0667 12.0 2000000 3.0
to be closer to simulation especially as utilization grows. Scenario 3 is the same as Sce-
nario 1 with the exception that the messages are small by comparison and have arrival
and message size distributions that are hyper-exponential. LAQT tended to be closer to
simulation especially as utilization grows. Simulated waiting time tended to be less than
both models when utilization was high on nodes that were not node 1, which supports the
idea of correlated arrival and departures out of node 1.
3.5.1 Multiple Product Scenarios
In Scenario 4, 5, and 6, all 12 products were chosen with sources and destinations
as shown in Table 3 and Table 4. This will exercise the superposition and splitting op-
erations. The product traffic characteristics are also shown. Three product paths out of
31 were chosen to illustrate here. They were products 1 (nodes 1-2-6-9), 6 (nodes 6-2),
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and 12 (nodes 1-4-8-7). They represent small, medium, and large message sizes with dif-
ferent routing. Scenario 4 uses widely varying message sizes (across the products) with
exponential arrival and departure distributions. Scenario 5 changes the messages sizes
to similar sizes across the products. Scenario 6 uses widely varying message sizes with
general arrival and departure distributions.
Looking at Figures 15(a), 15(b), and 15(c), we see reasonably good agreement
with simulation at utilization less than 0.7. In Scenarios 4 and 5, as opposed to Scenario
6, LAQT was closer to simulation. The errors between simulation and analytical solutions
tend to grow as utilization grows as would be expected.
As is shown with Figures 15(d), 15(e), and 15(f), we see also reasonably good
agreement with simulation with the exception of Scenario 5 at high utilization. It appears
that as message sizes are similar. As expected, we see low mean delay, but differences
between simulation and analytical modeling at high utilization. The appearance is that
correlation between arrival and service processes are possibly to blame. But, as the num-
ber of flows grows, the effect should decline. This will be examined as a component of
future research.
Figures 16(a), 16(b), and 16(c) show reasonably good agreement with simulation
at utilization levels less than 0.7. Again, in Scenarios 4 and 5, LAQT was closer to
simulation. Scenario 6 was an anomaly to this pattern with simulation tracking with
LAQT at lower utilization and QNA at higher utilization. Scenario 6 has more traffic
variation than the other scenarios. Correlation caused by superposition of varying traffic
types is suspected as the cause of the differences with simulation. This will be investigated
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further in future research.
3.6 Summary
This work presents a new Linear Algebraic Queueing Theory (LAQT) network
model that relies on a form of network decomposition with LAQT tools to model Pub-
lish/Subscribe messaging systems. Additionally, this work presents an extension to QNA
to model the pub/sub messaging system. Previous decomposition approaches have gener-
ally used first and/or second moments to approximate network flows. The LAQT system
proposed here is more accurate in most situations than QNA and enables the study of
many additional interesting problems including correlation in networks. The one source
to many destinations model used for Pub/Sub is also interesting as many network queue-
ing models are work conserving. Both the LAQT model and QNA, using the customer
creation feature have the ability to model one-to-many type flows. A simulation model
was also created that was capable of copying messages to multiple destinations at any
point in the network.
Some of the interesting observations that were made during this work include the
discrepancies between simulation and the analytic models after a flow has progressed
through cascaded servers. Dramatic differences in waiting time occurred during periods
when widely varying message sizes and message size distributions were used by different
products. This is undoubtedly related to the increase in the variation of the superposed
process (when those products were superposed). We expect that the simulation model
is accurate and that differences between analytical and simulation are assumed to be
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approximations made by the analytical models, like the renewal approximation. Future
research is planned that will confirm these hypotheses.
In addition to delay and waiting time, the LAQT model is capable of tracking other
attributes like coefficient of variation of the departure process and correlation caused by
superposition. We plan to use these features and develop new capabilities to address is-
sues like correlation between arrival and service processes caused by tandem or cascaded
servers.
One of the challenges to use LAQT models is the explosion in state space that
occurs during the departure process and to a lesser extent during the superposition process.
Using moment matching to mitigate this problem does accomplish the goal, however it
comes at a cost of a loss of information including potential correlation information in the
arrival flow. Another potential prospect of future research includes incorporating moment
matching algorithms that includes correlation information.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 14: Single product testing (95% confidence interval for simulation at U = 0.1,
0.9). (a) Scenario 1 - single product - end to end delay (0.01, 4.3). (b) Scenario 3 - single
product - end to end delay (4.36e-05, 0.017). (c) Scenario 1 - waiting time at node 1
(0.0008, 3.0). (d) Scenario 1 - waiting time at node 4 (0.0017,0.617).
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 15: Multiple product testing (95% confidence interval for simulation at U = 0.1,
0.9). (a) Scn. 4 - prod. 1 - end to end delay (0.005, 1.40). (b) Scn. 5 - prod. 1 - end to
end delay (6.0e-07, 1.9e-04). (c) Scn. 6 - prod. 1 - end to end delay (0.017, 9.44). (d)
Scn. 4 - prod. 6 - end to end delay (5.5e-04, 0.44). (e) Scn. 5 - prod. 6 - end to end delay
(1.4e-07, 6.7e-05). (f) Scn. 6 - prod. 6 - end to end delay (0.002, 4.53).
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 16: Multiple product testing (95% confidence interval for simulation at U = 0.1,
0.9). (a) Scenario 4 - product 12 - end to end delay (0.029, 1.8). (b) Scenario 5 - product
12 - end to end delay (7.5e-07, 1.1e-04). (c) Scenario 6 - product 12 - end to end delay
(0.049, 12.52).
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CHAPTER 4
EVALUATION OF GEOGRAPHICALLY CORRELATED FAILURES IN
MULTI-LAYER NETWORKS
Once an effective method of mission critical network evaluation is selected, tech-
niques are needed that can use that evaluation to determine what vulnerabilities exist in
a network. This chapter looks at methods to determine if geographically correlated vul-
nerabilities exist and where they are located given a particular evaluation method. Work
related to geographic vulnerabilities in networks frequently focuses on one aspect of the
problem like topology considerations or graph theoretic network measures. The users (es-
pecially mission critical users) and the impact that a geographic event will have on those
users is rarely considered.
In this chapter, we take a look at the evaluation process as it relates to geographic
failures in mission critical networks. We offer the following as contributions:
• A novel impact driven, probability based resilience evaluation tool referred to as
the Network Impact Resilience (NIR) metric [63].
• A self-pruning, flexible state based method, referred to as the Self-Pruning Net-
work State Generation (SP-NSG) algorithm, to analyze multilayer networks for
geographic vulnerabilities based on user requirements [63].
The NIR uses ideas borrowed from performability to combine network impact
with state probability to calculate a new metric called Network Impact Resilience (NIR).
58
The idea is that the highest impact to the mission of a network should drive its resilience
metric.
State based analysis offers tremendous flexibility in the types of network testing
that are both possible and demonstrated in this work. Many other methods tend to be tied
to a particular network measure. The Self-Pruning Network State Generation algorithm
(SP-NSG) uses the idea of pruning the state space during the execution of the algorithm
to reduce the states that need to be investigated, which drastically reduces computation
time. One of the benefits is that it allows an effective method to identify geographic vul-
nerabilities in networks. Even with intelligent state space pruning methods, the analysis
can become intractable for large networks. To maintain tractability in large networks, we
also present a K-means clustering method. It relies on the idea of reducing the number
of nodes for purposes of the state based analysis using clustering. In addition to improv-
ing tractability, we propose a method to analyze multilayer networks that simultaneously
maps geographic failures onto multiple layers and analyzes the performance.
We demonstrate the accuracy of the SP-NSG with K-means clustering using sim-
ulation and observe our approach to be accurate more than 99% of the time. Additionally,
the performance of the SP-NSG algorithm is reported. With proper constraints applied
to the analysis, we were able to complete state based analysis techniques on very large
multilayer networks that were previously intractable.
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4.1 Related Work
Network resilience analysis is a varied and well studied research area. This work is
a cross section of several research areas including geographically correlated failures, mul-
tiple layer networks, and network resilience metrics. We did not find existing research that
generates a comprehensive set of geographic vulnerabilities in networks or resilience met-
rics that evaluate those vulnerabilities based on specific mission critical user requirements
in multilayer networks.
For comprehensive surveys on the subject of network survivability to disasters
please refer to the work by Sterbenz et al. [147] and Habib et al. [67].
4.1.1 Geographic Vulnerabilities in Networks
Much of the work related to finding geographic vulnerabilities in networks fo-
cuses on reachability of network components (or connectivity) or degradation of network
capacity during a given geographically correlated failure [14, 89, 114, 128, 137]. There
is also a significant amount of work that focuses on graph theoretic approaches that is
discussed in Section 4.1.3.
Banerjee, Shirazipourazad, and Sen [14] presented an algorithm that uses inter-
sections of regions around nodes and links to create a complete set of regions that can be
used to analyze region based failures in networks. Li, Wang, and Jiang [89] expand on
the work in [14] by considering multiple regions and link capacity.
Rahnamay-Naeini et al. [128] use geographically correlated stochastic models to
generate link failures known as the Strauss point process. Then they compute the average
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two-terminal connectivity and all-terminal connectivity using Monte Carlo simulation.
Sterbenz et al. pioneered the concept of geographic network challenges using simulation
as described in [145]. Our work is not stochastic in nature; rather, it produces all possible
failure modes. Naumayer and Modiano [114] present work to calculate probabilities of
geographically correlated failures in the presence of randomly placed line segments that
can intersect network links. Recently, Saito [137] used probabilistic geometric models
to determine geographic vulnerabilities in networks. In [1, 2], Agarwal et al. create hip-
podromes around network components based on an attack radius. They were able to use
geographically correlated events to estimate the probability of failure of these components
using average two-terminal reliability and capacity degradations.
4.1.2 Multilayer Network Survivability
A user requirement can be protected using end-to-end protection or link (or node)
level protection. These protection techniques can implemented at the optical layer (wave
protection or SRLGs), hybrid data link/network layer (Multiprotocol Label Switching
(MPLS) or Generalized MPLS), network layer (IP rerouting), or higher layers using tech-
niques like virtual network embedding (VNE) or virtual topologies. Coordination be-
tween layer protection is typically based on technology reroute times with tradeoffs, as
described in [51] and [33].
Survivability of multilayer networks has been addressed before [99,102,121,145,
153], but not significantly from the perspective of mission critical networks or for large
geographically correlated events except by means of simulation.
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State based approaches include Oikonomou, Sinha, and Doverspike who present
a multilayer model in [116] that relies on the most probable states first to minimize the
number of states analyzed. In our work, we utilize and extend the algorithms in [56] that
use state space pruning instead of most probable states. In [88], Lee and Modiano propose
a method of choosing diverse routing in multilayer networks using the Max-Flow Min-
Cut theorem. In [120], Pacharintanaku and Tipper develop a multilayer mapping approach
that uses lower layer mappings to provide diverse paths for upper layer connections and
use mathematical programming to assign capacity.
Early work in disjoint path selection with Shared Risk Link Groups (SRLG) was
completed by Oki et al. [117]. The concept of a probabilistic SRLG (P-SRLG) in order
to find probabilities of dual path failure in the presence of correlated link failures was
proposed by Lee and Modiano in [87]. In [42], Esmaelili et al. created multidomain
Routing and Wavelength Assignment (RWA) solutions to improve lightpath reliability
during correlated failures using drivers like risk minimization or traffic engineering. In
[40], this was generalized to include protect paths.
In [158], Yu et al. proposed a Mixed-Integer Linear Program (MILP) and heuris-
tics to map virtual infrastructure (VI) onto a substrate network so that the VI could survive
certain regional failures. Also extending Virtual Network Embedding (VNE) concepts,
Rahman and Boutaba [127] added survivability in order to maintain virtual networks dur-
ing link failures.
In [145], Sterbenz et al. discusses an extensive frameworks in detail that describe
mapping techniques from the physical layer to the application layer for the purposes of
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resilience modelling. They then use these techniques to generate NS-3 code that allows
the simulation of a wide variety of attacks including geographically correlated attacks.
4.1.3 Network Resilience Metrics
Network resilience metrics have different meanings based on the context. When
referencing applications like web services, metrics like performability are considered
[101, 105]. When referencing topologies and network structure, it is more likely to see
graph theoretical or reachability metrics.
As was proposed by John Meyer in 1980 [109] and is described in [101] and
[105], performability is the probability that a network will perform at a given network
measure. Since the NIR has a basis in performability, it is described in detail in Section
4.2. The difference between the NIR and standard performability is that highly probable
events tend to dominate performability and thus the design of the network. With mission
critical networks, we are primarily interested in survivability and resilience rather than
performability alone. To address this concern, we propose the concept of network impact
versus network measure.
Much of the work in network reliability using state enumeration techniques was
by Colbourn and Ball in [37] and [13]. This work was extended by Li and Sylvester
[90] to include most probable state algorithms to calculate bounds for network reliability.
Jarvis and Shier [76], as well as Dotson and Gobien [41] presented methods based on
the most probable states. Gomes, Craveirinha, and Martins [65] extended these ideas
to multimode network models. In 1979, Dotson and Gobien [41] created methods to
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calculate 2-terminal reliability based on De Morgan’s law. The method works by using
failure modes to reduce the state space. Our methods utilize and extend these ideas by
using failed and unfeasible network states to reduce the state space.
Graph theoretic metrics including node degree, algebraic connectivity, betwee-
ness, clustering coefficient, and more recently weighted spectral distribution can be used
to evaluate geographic vulnerabilities in networks. Work that compares these metrics in-
cludes Bigdeli, Tizghadam, and Leon-Garcia [21]; Long, Tipper,and Gomes [92]; and
Cetinkaya et al. in [29]. A complete description of the more recent weighted spectral dis-
tribution can be found in [43] and also in [29]. Of interest for geographic vulnerabilities
is the clustering coefficient metric that focuses on the connectivity of a node’s neighbors
described in works by Sterbenz et al. [146] and Ahn et al. [3]. One of the challenges of
most of these metrics is that in general they evaluate a topology for a specific metric and
not an entire network with traffic demands of varying design and importance. The abil-
ity to evaluate weighted graphs improves the situation. By itself, this information is not
sufficient to help find vulnerable regions in networks considering different demand struc-
tures without a brute force type of analysis. In [159], Zhang and Sterbenz determined
sets of critical nodes by computing pairwise availability as specified in [133] in weighted
graphs with node sets removed that were chosen using a combination of key nodes based
on centrality metrics that included degree, betweenness, and closeness.
In [52], Garbin and Shortle articulated the concept of a resilience curve, where a
network performance measure like network bandwidth is contrasted to a failed percentage
of network assets. The intuitive effect is useful as the concavity of the curve is indicative
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of the resilience. The resilience measure can then be calculated by summing the area
under the curve or simply a level of damage necessary to reduce the network measure
below a given threshold. A similar approach is used by Manzano et al. [94]. They an-
alyzed a network measure (referred to as a QoS parameter) versus the number of failed
components. They were able to compare their approach against many graph metrics and
network resilience metrics. In [106], Menth et al. measured resilience by calculating a
complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) and network availability based
on the network load and a set of relevant failure modes.
4.2 Network Impact Resilience (NIR)
The inspiration for the NIR is rooted in performability, which is one of the metrics
used to evaluate mission critical networks. Performability uses the probability of network
events and the network performance associated with that event to calculate an average
network performance [101]. If N is the number of network elements, Si is the system
state, X[Si] is the network measure at state Si, and P [Si] is the probability of network
state Si, then performability is given by
P =
2N∑
i=1
P [Si]X [Si] (4.1)
Calculating a given network measure such as dropped connections or available
bandwidth for network states is well understood; these measures are used to calculate
several resilience metrics and performability metrics. However, relating network measure
to the mission of the network is considerably more challenging. To effectively do this,
two pieces of information are required.
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1. The minimum network measure required to support the mission of the network
(Xmin)
2. An understanding of the relationship between the network mission and network
measure
How to determine these factors is complex and requires knowledge of the network
mission. Modeling and simulation of catastrophic events can be used to determine this
information. To define network impact, we start with a review of the terms network state
and network measure.
DEFINITION 4.1. Network State. The network state Si is defined as [s1s2 · · · sN ] where
si is ‘0’ if the network component i is up and si is ‘1’ if the network component i is down.
Clearly, this creates 2N unique network states. Each network state may also have a
unique effect on the performance of the network. Typically, the performance of a network
with a particular performance indicator is called the network measure.
DEFINITION 4.2. Network Measure. The network measure, X[Si], is defined as the
performance of a network using a given metric at network state Si.
From (4.1), network measure X[Si] is related to the ability of the network to meet
the demands placed on the network. Typically X[Si] ranges from 0 (i.e., 0% of demands
met) to 1 (i.e., 100% of demands met). Returning to the question, is the network able to
meet its mission?, we consider the following:
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DEFINITION 4.3. Minimum Network Measure . The minimum network measure, Xmin,
is defined as the Network Measure below which the network can no longer serve its mis-
sion.
DEFINITION 4.4. Network Impact. The network impact, Y [Si], is defined as an indica-
tion of the networks’ inability to perform its mission in a given network state Si.
Using this definition, Y [Si] ranges from 0 to 1. When Y [Si] is 0, the network is
meeting its mission fully and there is no negative impact to the mission. When Y [Si] is 1,
which by definition means X[Si] = Xmin, the impact in state Si has caused the complete
failure of the network to meet the mission. Xmin is strongly application dependent. This
work uses Xmin values between 30% and 50%.
Consider the situation where the network is under-provisioned. In ideal condi-
tions, the mission of the network may still be met. But, a failure in the network may
decrease the available bandwidth to the point that severe congestion occurs and the mis-
sion cannot be met due to increased latency or dropped traffic. This situation would not
be considered resilient. In the opposite situation, the network may be over-provisioned to
the point that many failures may occur and available bandwidth can decrease significantly
before an impact to the mission is noted, providing considerably more resilience. An im-
pact curve can be used to visualize the relationship between the network measure and the
mission of the network:
DEFINITION 4.5. Impact Curve. The impact curve is the function created by Y [Si]
when it is sorted from minimum impact to maximum impact over the possible state space
Si.
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To provide a possible mathematical interpretation for Y [Si], we begin by incorpo-
rating the minimum network measure, Xf [Si]:
Xf [Si] = max {X[Si], Xmin} (4.2)
It is then straightforward to define the following normalized network impact func-
tion:
Y [Si] =
1−Xf [Si]
1−Xmin (4.3)
Fig. 17 shows an example where X[Si] is a simple decreasing linear function over
all network states. Y [Si] increases linearly from 0 impact to 1 impact at the point where
Xmin is reached.
Figure 17: Network Measure and Impact (α = 1) versus Network States Si sorted by
Decreasing Impact
To provide the ability to fit the relationship between the network mission and
network measure, we add an impact parameter, α:
Y [Si] =
(
1−Xf [Si]
1−Xmin
)α
(4.4)
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Figure 18: Impact versus Network States Si sorted by Decreasing Impact
Note that since the minimum impact is 0 and maximum impact is 1, the impact parameter
does not affect the impact at the endpoints. It will also be demonstrated that as Xmin is
decreased, the ability to improve network resilience increases.
Fig. 18 shows the effect that the impact parameter α has on the impact curves.
What is useful to note here is that as α increases, the impact of the network is reduced for
a larger proportion of the network state space. Therefore, it is obvious that as α increases,
the resilience of the network increases. The implication here is that a network that can
withstand multiple service failures prior to the inability to perform its mission would have
a high α value.
Finally, the Network Impact Resilience is defined as:
I =
2N∑
i=1
P [Si]Y [Si] (4.5)
Like performability (4.1), the NIR (4.5) uses state probability to determine average
performance. By using impact instead of network measure, the NIR is better at predicting
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the occurrence of high impact events. When I = 0, there is no impact over the state
space and would indicate that a network is impervious to failure. When I = 1.0, it would
indicate that a network cannot perform its mission. The usage of the NIR would be to
compare network architectures that serve the same demands and mission. If the NIR is
calculated for two networks with the same demand and mission, the lower NIR would
indicate the more resilient network. This will be demonstrated in the results section.
One of the challenges with the NIR, as well as the performability, is calculating
the network measure or the network impact for enough samples to accurately represent
the probability of that impact or measure. Being able to represent the probability curve
with a small number of samples is necessary to calculate the NIR in a tractable manner.
We use 3 − 6 samples in the most sensitive area of the probability curve and then use a
piecewise approximation to construct the probabilities needed for the NIR.
4.3 Self-Pruning Network State Generation
The self-pruning network state generation (SP-NSG) algorithm was proposed in
[53, 56]. It borrows on concepts from an algorithm developed by Dotson [41] to generate
states as the algorithm progresses. We first present an overview of SP-NSG for single-
layer networks before discussing it in the context of multilayer networks in Section 4.4.
It creates a lexicographic ordering of states based on De Morgan’s law where ‘0’ denotes
a working or up network component and ‘1’ denotes a down network component:
if P = {1 2 3 . . .} then {P} = {1}+ {1 2}+ {1 2 3}+ ... (4.6)
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Figure 19: Lexicographically Ordered States (‘1’ Denotes a Failed Node)
As stated previously, we focus on nodal failures but our work could be extended
to link failures as well. In section 1, geographic vulnerability, geospatial event, and threat
radius are defined. To present the algorithm, we define the following additional terms:
DEFINITION 4.6. Feasible Mode: Based on the Threat Radius (and other filters), Fea-
sible Mode implies that this Network State is possible.
DEFINITION 4.7. Network Test: Test procedure X(Si) that evaluates the performance
of a network at a given Network State Si with a Success or Fail outcome based on the
ability of the network to be able to perform its mission.
For a given Network State with a failed Network Test, the intersection of circles
with radii equal to the Threat Radius surrounding each down node forms the Geographic
Vulnerability. The following assumptions are used to develop SP-NSG.
ASSUMPTION 2. If a network state Si withm (≥ 1) nodes, k1, . . . , km, down causes the
network to fail to perform it’s mission, i.e., X(Si) < Tˆ (where Tˆ is the failed threshold of
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Xmin), then any Sj that contains the same nodes will result inX(Sj) ≤ X(Si). Therefore,
state Sj does not need to be examined since it would also cause the network to fail its
mission.
ASSUMPTION 3. If a network state Si with m (≥ 1) nodes, k1, . . . , km, is not a feasible
network state, then any Sj that contains the same down nodes will also not be feasible.
Therefore, state Sj does not need to be examined.
An example of Assumption 3 is a failure state that has down nodes separated by
a large distance if geographically correlated failures are being analyzed, which would not
need to be analyzed. We use De Morgan’s Law (4.6) to reduce the search space necessary
to calculate reliability [41]. As we can see from Fig. 19, State 1 can be used to generate
States 6 to 9 by incrementally changing the status of each node to down that is after the
last down node in State 1. This follows De Morgan’s Law (4.6) by dividing the state space
into two sections. The first section is represented by the previously successful test (in this
case state 1) represented by P and the section that is untested (in this case States 6-9)
represented by P .
We first test the state S0 = [0 0 0 . . . 0]. If it is successful (which it should be),
we use De Morgan’s law to add the complement of S0 to a list to test for both feasibility
that a geographic event could affect that particular set of nodes and if that state contains a
previously failed state. This would include S1 = [1 0 0 . . . 0], S2 = [0 1 0 . . . 0], etc... The
states that are feasible and that do not contain previously unsuccessful failure modes, are
added to the queue to test. The next state is popped from the queue to test and the process
is repeated. If the test is unsuccessful, that state is noted. In the absence of infeasible or
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unsuccessful failure modes, a lexicographic ordering is produced where the failure states
are ordered by the number of failed nodes in that state as shown in Fig. 19. The SP-NSG
is described in Algorithm 3 and operates as shown in Fig. 20.
Figure 20: Self-Pruning Network State Generation (SP-NSG) Flowchart
4.3.1 Network Tests
In the step Network Test in Algorithm 3, we consider two different tests to de-
termine if the network is performing its function or not under a failed state critical to its
mission. These tests are 1) reachability of a network in terms of connectivity (“connec-
tivity test”), 2) provisioning of demands for a capacitated network (“capacitated network
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Algorithm 3 Self-Pruning Network State Generation (SP-NSG)
Q← [000 . . . 0]
while Q 6= {} do
Si ← Q(top)
Gi ← ReconfigureNetwork(Si)
if TestNetwork(Gi) = SUCCESS then
N0 ← Si
while NextLexicographicState(Si, Nj−1) 6=  do
Nj ← NextLexicographicState(Si, Nj−1)
if Nj is Feasible then
Q(bottom)← Nj
end if
end while
else
FailSet← Si
end if
end while
test”).
For the connectivity test, we consider the set of demands to determine if each
source is connected to each destination. The metric, MC(Si), for state Si is defined as
the ratio of successful connections over total connections. If the metric is below a certain
threshold for a particular failed state, then we say that the mission critical network does
not meet its requirement.
For the capacitated network test, we first provision all user demands on the net-
work with no failures, assigning capacity to each link as needed by the demands. We
consider the metric, MD(Si), to be the ratio of the demands provisioned as successful at
state Si compared to the total traffic demands provisioned initially. If the metric is below a
certain threshold for a particular failed state, then we say that the mission critical network
does not meet its requirement. It should be noted that additional capacity can be added via
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a redundancy factor. This is shown in the multilayer provisioning algorithm, Algorithm 5.
4.3.2 Feasible Modes
In addition to using failure modes to reduce state space, another important method
to reduce state space is by using network state feasibility. If a particular network state (Si)
is not feasible, then by Assumption 3, any states that contain the same down nodes as Si
would also not be feasible. The main test for feasibility used here is maximum geographic
distance, which is the maximum distance that any two down nodes may be located from
each other. When planning for a disaster with a maximum radius of d kilometers, that
disaster would not be able to simultaneously destroy two nodes that are separated by more
than 2d kilometers. Therefore, a failure mode containing those two nodes is assumed to
not be feasible under that disaster scenario. Other feasibility filters that could be used to
limit state space include the maximum number of simultaneously failed nodes during a
random failure analysis.
4.4 Multilayer SP-NSG Model
We first define our multilayer network model and then describe the Multilayer
SP-NSG algorithm.
4.4.1 Multilayer Network Model
The network model being used includes a lower layer undirected graph denoted as
GL(VL, EL) shown in Fig. 21. The upper layer network is modeled as an undirected graph
denoted as GU(VU , EU). Customer demands are assumed to be given to the upper layer
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Figure 21: Multilayer Network Model
network. The i-th demand is the tuple 〈sU , tU , DU〉 that indicates the demand from the
upper layer source (sU), upper layer destination (tU), and the amount of demand (DU).
The demand 〈sU , tU , DU〉 is then provisioned across GU .
After all of the demands are provisioned, EU now contains the link capacity re-
quired at the upper layer. EU with the updated capacity requirements at the upper layer
is passed to the lower layer network GL for provisioning. GL is provisioned with the
upper layer link capacity requirements providing baseline. For example, in Fig. 21, two
demands are sent to the upper layer network as 〈2, 3, 1〉 and 〈1, 3, 1〉. These are mapped
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onto GU and the subsequent requirements are mapped onto GL. With shortest path rout-
ing, this leaves nodes 1-2 with a bandwidth of 1, nodes 2-5 with bandwidth of 2, and
nodes 5-4 with a bandwidth of 2.
4.4.2 Multilayer SP-NSG
In Algorithm 3, the step Reconfigure Network(Si) assumes that the links and nodes
are based on the network state Si. To reconfigure in the case of the multilayer network,
we need to generate GU and GL. In order to generate new links (EL, EU ), surviving
nodes (VL, VU ) must be generated. If we assume that the upper layer nodes will always
share a location with a lower layer node, the state space for both layers can always be
defined with the lower layer state space (Si = SL,i). Then a simple transformation is
required to convert to the upper layer state space. This is completed with the use of an
n ×m transformation matrix LLU where n is the number of lower layer nodes and m is
the number of upper layer nodes. If a mapping exists between the lower and upper layer,
LLU(l, u) = 1, where l is the lower layer node number and u is the upper layer node
number. All other matrix locations are 0. Converting the network state i from a lower
layer to an upper one is a simple transformation as shown below.
SU,i = SL,iLLU (4.7)
To illustrate the point, the network shown in Fig. 21 would have a transformation
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matrix as shown below.
LLU =

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0
0 0 1
0 0 0

(4.8)
The algorithm for ReconfigureNetwork(Si) for multilayer networks is shown in Algorithm
4.
Algorithm 4 Reconfigure Network from State Si
for all n in VL nodes do
if Si,n = 0 then
include n in VL,i
end if
end for
for all k in EL links do
if VL,i contains end nodes for k then
include k in EL,i
end if
end for
SU,i ← SL,iLLU
for all n in VU nodes do
if SUin = 0 then
include n in VU,i
end if
end for
for all k in EU links do
if VU,i contains end nodes for k & path k exists in GL,i then
include k in EU,i
end if
end for
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4.4.3 Multilayer Network Test
The step TestNetwork in Algorithm 3 for single-layer networks considered either
the connectivity test or the capacitated network test as discussed in Section 4.3.1.
We now describe a more sophisticated approach to perform the network test for
multilayer networks that uses ideas similar to the single layer capacitated network test. In
this two stage approach shown in Algorithms 5 and 6, we first provision the demands onto
the upper layer network by adding capacity to the links EU in the upper layer network.
These links and their capacities would serve as demands on the lower layer network DL.
These demands are then provisioned onto the lower network creating a set of links with
baseline capacities. Those capacities in the lower layer network can be augmented with a
redundancy factor R as shown in Algorithm 5.
For the network test using a network state Si, the upper layer links EU are pro-
visioned on the augmented lower layer network after it was reconfigured from Si. The
links that are provisioned successfully provide the links for the reconfigured upper layer
network. The demands are provisioned on the reconfigured upper layer network. The pro-
portion of successfully provisioned demands provide the metric as shown in Algorithm 6.
It should be noted that during the network test, links from the upper layer network
may be provisioned on the lower layer network using longer paths because previously
available nodes are down. This can result in more resources being allocated to the longer
links which would potentially deny those resources to the shorter links. In Algorithm 6,
we address this with an augmentation that searches the old list of paths generated for the
links. If that path and capacity still exists, then that link is provisioned immediately. If
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the path and capacity does not exist, the provisioning of that link is delayed until all of
the links have been processed for the first time.
Algorithm 5 Initial Multilayer Network Provisioning
for all k in DU Demands do
if path PU,k is available in GU for k then
for all e in EU Links do
if e is in PU,k then
ecap ← ecap + kdem
end if
end for
end if
end for
for all k in EU do
if path PL,k is available in GL for k then
for all e in EL do
if e is in PL,k then
ecap ← ecap + kcap
end if
end for
end if
end for
for all e in EL do
ecap ← ecap ×R Redundancy Factor
end for
4.4.4 Improvements to SP-NSG for Geographic Vulnerabilities in Large Networks
One of the issues with multilayer networks is that the network test typically has
high computational costs, especially for large networks. The basic implementation of SP-
NSG has a cost that is associated with the possible number of states 2Nr given a maximum
of Nr nodes in a particular threat radius r. However, as we know from [56], the number
of states analyzed is still typically a very small fraction of the maximum number of states.
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Algorithm 6 Multilayer Network Test
Reconfigure GL,i ← GL for Event i
GU,i ← []
for all k in initial EU links do
if initial PL,k and kcap is still available in GL,i then
for all e in EL do
if e is in PL,k then
ecap ← ecap − kcap
GU,i ← GU,i + k
end if
end for
else if path PL,k and kcap is available in GL,i for k then
for all e in EL do
if e is in PL,k then
ecap ← ecap − kcap
GU,i ← GU,i + k
end if
end for
end if
end for
EU,i ← GU,i
pos← 0, neg ← 0
for all k in DU Demands do
if path PU,k and kdem is available in GL,i for k then
for all e in EU,i do
if e is in PU,k then
ecap ← ecap − kcap
end if
end for
pos++
else
neg ++
end if
end for
NetMeasure← pos/(pos+ neg)
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We consider the following assumption to improve on SP-NSG for large networks:
ASSUMPTION 4. If two nodes are located in close proximity to each other and one node
fails due to a geographic event, then the other node will also fail.
Assumption 4 raises a few questions. First, should probabilistic failures be con-
sidered? This is a question that affects the entire SP-NSG algorithm. Following the
mission-critical thread for this work, when looking for geographic vulnerabilities in net-
works, we are less interested in what is the likely outcome as we are with what is the
potential outcome if mitigating steps are not taken. To that end, Assumption 3 seems to
apply. Furthermore, we are interested for the worst case, not the average case.
With Assumption 4, we propose that a node could represent multiple nodes that
are located in close proximity to each other. The set of nodes used in the state generation
algorithm can be reduced and mapping can be established to both the upper and lower
set of nodes/links. We acknowledge that this is an approximation when the node location
that is considered in the state generation is not exactly the node location in the network.
However, we build on the premise that if the distance between the new node location and
the mapped node is relatively small, the outcome is likely to be the same. The advantage
of this approach is that the network nodes (in either layer) that are no longer included in
the state generation algorithm are still used via mapping. This preserves the network con-
nectivity and structure at those layers. To select new node locations, we use the K-means
clustering algorithm similar to the algorithm described in [23] in areas of the network that
are dense as described in Algorithm 7, which is used to create a new set of nodes VA.
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Algorithm 7 Large Network Node Reduction Algorithm using K-Means Clustering
reduce← yes
VA ← VL
LAL ← [zero]A×L
while reduce do
reduce← no
maxnode← 0
for all n in VA nodes do
if Number of Nodes m contained in threat radius rn > threshold then
if m > maxnode then
reduce← yes
maxnode← m
update← n
end if
end if
end for
if reduce then
VA ← K-Means(Vrupdate)
LAL ← ‘1’ at VA, VL for all VL reduced
end if
end while
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Once VA is known, the mapping can be generated in a manner similar to the pre-
vious section that allows the network states generated from VA to be mapped onto VL and
VU as follows:
SL,i = SA,iLAL (4.9)
Note that SU,i is still created from (4.7).
One final optimization that was used was to store the shortest path results during
the initial (all working) network test. If a new network state does not affect any of the
nodes in the original shortest path, the original results would still hold and a new shortest
path calculation does not need to be run. In a large network, we found that this leads to
substantial improvements.
4.5 Using Clustering Models to Reduce Complexity
Without clustering, the complexity of our approach is F (N) ∗ N ∗ 2Nr where
Nr is the maximum number of nodes in a threat radius, N is the total number of nodes,
and F (N) is the complexity of computing the network measure. When clustering is
incorporated, the complexity is reduced to F (N) ∗N ∗ 2k, where k is the new maximum
number of nodes in a threat radius after clustering. Clearly, if k can be limited to a
relatively small number (k  n), then the complexity is significantly reduced.
Now consider the complexity of F (N). For the multilayer case, a breadth-first
shortest path calculation (BFS) is used for every link in the upper layer network across the
lower layer network along with a breadth-first shortest path calculation for every user de-
mand across the upper layer network. Therefore, F (N) = |Eu|(|NL|+ |EL|)+D(|NU |+
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|EU |) for a total ofD demands in the upper layer network. If |NL|  |NU |, this simplifies
to F (N) = |Eu|(|NL|+ |EL|).
4.5.1 Model Selection Considerations
The concept behind using clustering to represent portions of the system topology
during the state generation algorithm is to approximate node locations with clustered node
locations then use mapping techniques to reconstruct the topologies with the selected
states. One of the challenges with K-Means Clustering is the selection of K. If K is
too large, complexity reduction benefits are eliminated and the model is potentially over-
specified. If K is too small, the model may be inaccurate.
Rissanen suggested the minimum description length (MDL) concept in [131] and
is described by Principe, Euliano, and Lefebvre in [123] as a way to balance model com-
plexity and accuracy. The basic idea is to understand the minimum set of datapoints to
describe the system in question. Here we would assume that is the list of communication
nodes. If we assume we need to reduce the number of nodes to represent the system,
this can involve either eliminating redundancies in the data or approximating the system,
increasing the error associated with the model. In our system, we also assume that every
node in the topology is needed to fully describe the topology. therefore, any reduction in
the number of nodes would be associated with an approximation.
Next we need to determine an error metric that can be used to evaluate our model.
Without a complete analysis of the system (which is not always tractable), we can evaluate
the system in a tractable configuration and attempt to associate it with a metric. Using
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Assumption 4, we assume we can replace closely positioned nodes with a single node for
purposes of generating network states. This fits a clustering model conveniently. We used
a K-Means Clustering algorithm as described by Bishop in [23].
One of the challenges with the K-Means Clustering algorithm is that the selection
ofK is left to the user. It would seem that a largerK would be more accurate but also less
tractable. In Figure 22, we see that in our system, the errors using a clustered approach
follows the average Euclidean distance from each node to the selected cluster location.
This would imply that the average squared distance from the clustered location (which
is known) would be reasonable error metric. We will denote this as the average sum of
squared error (Average SSE) and define it as shown in (4.10). LK is the total number of
clusters across the entire topology which is based on the selection of K. Ci is the set of
nodes in the ith cluster (along x and y dimensions). N is the total number of nodes that
were clustered and mi is the cluster location for the ith cluster.
Average SSE =
1
N
LK∑
i=1
∑
n∈Ci
(
(nx −mix)2 + (ny −miy)2
)
(4.10)
Taking a look at Figure 23, we see that as expected, processing time is inversely
related to Average SSE. For our purposes, we chose a variation of the elbow method to
chooseK. Basically, the location where the reduction in error associated with the increase
in K begins to decrease and a steep increase in processing time was chosen. K of 4,9,16
were all tested and this is shown in Section 4.7.
An alternative method might be to use an MDL criterion like the Akaike Informa-
tion Criterion (AIC) [5] or the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) [139] to select a K
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Figure 22: Comparison of Average Distance to Cluster Location and Model Errors
value that balances accuracy and model complexity. The AIC and BIC are both described
in [23] and [123]. The equations used here to compute AIC and BIC are shown in (4.11)
and (4.12)
AIC(LK) = N lnJ(LK) + 2LK (4.11)
BIC(LK) = N lnJ(LK) +
LK
2
ln(N) (4.12)
Where N is the total number of nodes; J(LK) is the Average SSE; and LK is
the total number of clusters across the topology with a selection of K. Additionally, we
looked at the AICc criterion as described in [25] which is shown in (4.13). The AICc
criterion was created for situations where the number of free parameters is more closely
related to the size of the model as is the case with our system. AIC and BIC do not really
meet this criteria for our system but are included here for discussion purposes.
87
Figure 23: Comparison of Average Distance to Cluster Location, Average SSE, and
Model Processing Time
AICc = AIC +
2LK(LK + 1)
N − LK − 1 (4.13)
Figure 24 shows a comparison of the AIC, BIC, and AICc. It is clear that the AIC
and BIC do not penalize the model complexity enough while the AICc penalizes it too
much. This is an area that requires further study to realistically use these criterion for
assessment of K.
It is possible to select clustered locations using different models completely. For
example, many classifiers like Support Vector Machines (SVM) and Neural Networks
(NN) [23] could be used to identify clusters of nodes that may be able to be approximated
using a single node in a manner similar to how K-Means Clustering is used here. Finally,
credit assignment is a method by which model components that improve the performance
of the model are identified and rewarded accordingly and visa versa. This could be used
88
Figure 24: Comparison of AIC, BIC, and AICc
to help select K on a cluster by cluster basis [23].
Taking these concepts a step further, one could define the problem in terms of risk
and loss, where the error function is considered the loss and the risk is the expected value
of the loss. This would allow bounding of the problem to a certain level of loss. A bigger
picture approach could even attempt to attach a monetary value to the vulnerabilities found
and use that value to assess loss and therefore risk.
4.6 Evaluation Methodology
To evaluate the methods proposed here, we consider three multilayer networks
representing a small, medium, and large network. The small network is a Gabriel topology
with 16 nodes in the lower layer network and 6 (N1, N6, N12, N1, N5, and N14) nodes
in the upper layer network. As shown in Fig. 25, we consider three different upper layer
topologies: the ring topology (Topology-1), semi-mesh topology (Topology-2), and star
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topology (Topology-3) with N13 as the hub.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 25: Gabriel Network. Lower layer network is shown with solid lines. Upper
layer network is shown with dotted lines. (a) Gabriel Upper Layer Network #1 (ring) (b)
Gabriel Upper Layer #2 (semi-mesh) (c) Gabriel Upper Layer #3 (star)
The medium network is the Nobel-EU topology from the Survivable Network
Design Library (SNDlib 1.0) [119] with 28 nodes in the lower layer network and 10 nodes
in the upper layer network. Again, three different upper layer topologies are tested: the
ring topology (Topology 1), semi-mesh topology (Topology 2), and semi-star topology
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(Topology 3); see Fig. 26. This multilayer network example is referred to as the EU
network.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 26: Nobel-EU Network. Lower layer network is shown with solid lines. Upper
layer network is shown with dotted lines. (a) EU Upper Layer Network #1 (semi-mesh)
(b) EU Upper Layer #2 (semi-star) (c) EU Upper Layer #3 (ring)
The large network is the AT&T Layer 1 topology generated by Sterbenz, et al. [145]
and available at [84] . This is a large physical layer network with 383 nodes. There are
two different upper layer topologies that are tested: the dense topology (Topology-1) and
regular topology (Topology-2); see Fig. 27. This multilayer network example is referred
to as the ATTL1 network.
All upper layer demands are simply one unit of bandwidth for each demand and
the demand structure is always from all upper layer nodes to all other upper layer nodes.
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(a) (b)
Figure 27: ATTL1 Network. Lower layer network is shown with solid lines. Upper layer
network is shown with dotted lines. (a) ATTL1 Upper Layer Network #1 (dense) (b)
ATTL1 Upper Layer #2 (regular)
These networks are analyzed using a network test that is appropriate for the topology.
For example, if one node is down in the upper layer network of the Gabriel network, 10
demands become automatically out of service. If the network test required 70% demands,
then one node down would cause the network to fail. So for the Gabriel networks, 40%
was selected as the threshold to satisfy mission critical requirements. For the EU network,
50% was selected and for the ATTL1 network 70% was selected.
A set of 3000 random network attacks was also created to test the accuracy of the
algorithms. The network test is run based on the random location of the attack and subse-
quent down nodes within the given Threat Radius of the attack location. They are shown
with the output of the SP-NSG algorithm. There are several parameters that can be varied
to conduct the analysis. These include the number of nodes allowed in a cluster (which are
varied from 4 to 16), the size of the threat radius (which is topology dependent), redun-
dancy factor (which is varied from 1 to 3), and network test parameter. Several statistics
are collected with each operation including run time, states tested, states failed, vulnerable
areas of the network, and ratio of vulnerable area to total area.
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4.7 Results
The analysis tool that implements the SP-NSG algorithm was built and compiled
using GCC C++ on an MS Windows 7 Personal Computer with an Intel I7 processor
and 8 GB of RAM. The graphic output and network/configuration interfaces use an XML
format. Python 3.2 was used to generate the output graphics. The random attack generator
was also built and compiled using GCC C++. The XML network formats used here are
very similar to those used by [119] in the Survivable Network Design Library.
For all three networks, the NSG-SP algorithm predicts the Geographic Vulnera-
bility. The red ‘o’ sign denotes a random attack that did sufficient damage to cause the
network measure to be less than Xmin causing the mission to fail. The gray ‘+’ sign de-
notes a random attack that caused a network measure that was greater than Xmin and thus,
the mission did not fail. The shaded area should correlate with the red marker locations.
4.7.1 Gabriel Network
From Figures 28(a) to 28(e), we illustrate a few important points. First, as the
threat radius grows, the vulnerable area grows. This is intuitive since with the increase in
the threat radius, more nodes are affected by a single event causing more severe impacts.
Figure 28(b) shows that as the threat radius grows from 20 to 25, vulnerabilities show up
between nodes N5 and N14, and between nodes N1, N12, and N13. The latter failure
mode illustrates the interaction between the upper layer and lower layer since N13 is only
a lower layer node and nodes N1 and N12 are present in both layer topologies.
An important point is that the effect on different upper layer topologies are not
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Table 5: Results for the Gabriel Network
Upper Layer Threat Red. Vuln. States Filter Tested Succ. Loss Comp. Errors
Topo. Radius Factor Area Exam. States States States States Time
1 10.0 1 0.000 355 289 66 66 0 0.25 0
1 12.5 1 0.017 497 381 113 111 2 1.11 0
1 15.0 1 0.103 907 623 241 235 6 1.97 0
1 15.0 2 0.103 907 623 241 235 6 3.00 0
1 15.0 3 0.103 907 623 241 235 6 3.19 0
2 12.5 1 0.421 328 234 66 56 10 5.45 0
2 15.0 1 0.617 532 328 113 101 12 7.86 0
2 10.0 1 0.236 264 210 47 41 6 3.03 0
2 10.0 2 0.209 288 234 51 49 2 2.25 0
2 10.0 3 0.086 296 238 58 57 1 1.28 0
3 10.0 1 0.259 308 246 47 45 2 2.22 0
3 12.5 1 0.386 384 281 63 61 2 2.64 0
3 15.0 1 0.512 633 403 117 115 2 5.29 0
3 15.0 2 0.512 633 403 117 115 2 5.56 0
3 15.0 3 0.512 633 403 117 115 2 3.25 0
always predictable. The Gabriel #2 topology had vulnerabilities that the Gabriel #1 topol-
ogy did not. This is because when the upper layer network was more flexible, more direct
routes were available between nodes and they tended to utilize the same nodes (N1 and
N14) while entirely ignoring other longer routes. This was determined by analyzing the
flow analysis after provisioning. This suggests that some extra steps would need to be
exercised to ensure that the flexibility of the upper layer network did not cause the entire
network to be more vulnerable. The star topology performed as expected with a vulner-
ability at the center of the star. Table 5 shows the information that was collected on the
Gabriel network. Computation time (sec.) and errors are discussed later in the paper.
The NIR metric shown in Table 6 reflects the vulnerabilities shown in Table 5 and
in Figure 28. The Gabriel #1 topology has the least vulnerabilities with a threat radius of
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15. To compute the NIR, the minimum network measure Xmin was swept at intervals of
10% from 40% to 90%, approximating the probability curve. It is noteworthy that as α
grew to 16, the differences between the topologies became more apparent. This is because
the #1 topology had very few vulnerabilities when X(S) was less than 50%. Figure 31
shows the impact curve and the approximated probability distribution for Gabriel #1 and
#3 topologies. With topology #3, it is apparent that the higher probability of network
failure at a lower network measure drives the NIR up for that topology.
Table 6: Gabriel NIR with Xmin = 0.4 for three upper layer topologies
α Topology 1 Topology 2 Topology 3
1 0.73 0.83 0.78
4 0.33 0.68 0.57
16 0.11 0.62 0.51
4.7.2 EU Network
For the figures associated with the EU network, we use the same notation used
with the Gabriel network. In a similar manner to the Gabriel network, Figures 29(a)
to 29(e) illustrate that as the threat radius grew the vulnerable area grew. Perhaps the
most noteworthy point is that when the upper layer network was more dense, the network
was more vulnerable. We saw this same effect with the Gabriel network. Also notable
is that the loop topology was as resilient to geographic events as any other topology to
geographic events. Table 7 shows the information that was collected on the EU network.
Computation time and errors are discussed later in the paper.
The NIR metric shown in Table 8 reflects the vulnerabilities shown in Table 7.
Note that the NIR favors different alternatives for different α values. With α = 1, the
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Table 7: Results for the EU Network
Upper Layer Threat Red. Vuln. States Filter Tested Succ. Loss Comp. Errors
Topo. Radius Factor Area Exam. States States States States Time
1 2.5 1 0.011 866 751 111 107 4 1.34 0
1 5.0 1 0.200 4190 2439 1213 1181 32 8.02 0
1 3.75 1 0.078 1969 1521 354 343 11 3.45 0
1 3.75 2 0.078 1982 1533 356 344 12 3.56 0
1 3.75 3 0.060 2019 1569 358 348 10 3.23 0
2 2.5 1 0.114 563 467 89 83 6 1.39 0
2 5.0 1 0.353 1645 939 559 537 22 8.41 0
2 3.75 1 0.227 881 673 175 162 13 3.43 0
2 3.75 2 0.227 881 673 175 162 13 3.82 0
2 3.75 3 0.223 975 745 200 190 10 3.49 0
3 2.5 1 0.031 828 714 106 103 3 1.17 0
3 5.0 1 0.200 4045 2358 1124 1099 25 12.62 0
3 3.75 1 0.089 1805 1393 316 305 11 3.40 0
3 3.75 2 0.089 1832 1417 317 307 10 3.34 0
3 3.75 3 0.089 1832 1417 317 307 10 3.60 0
NIR indicates that the EU #2 topology is more resilient. At α = 16, the EU #1 and
#3 topologies are more resilient. The reason for this non-intuitive result is that all three
upper topologies perform similarly when the concern is equal for the loss of 10% to 90%
of the demands. However, when the loss of 60% of the demands is weighted more heavily
(α = 16), the loop and partial mesh topologies (#1 and #3) are the clear favorites. The
intuition for the results seems to hold.
Table 8: NIR for the EU network for three upper layer topologies
α Topology 1 Topology 2 Topology 3
1 0.44 0.34 0.54
4 0.14 0.18 0.15
16 0.06 0.13 0.06
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4.7.3 ATTL1 Network
Figures 30(a) to 30(c) show that the area of vulnerability seems to follow a line
from the northeast to the southwest U.S. During the initial multilayer provisioning pro-
cess, only two flows were created across the network in the western part of the country.
One path was near the vulnerabilities marked and the other path was through the middle
part of the country, entirely ignoring the path on the northern part of the topology. Even
with redundancy augmentation, capacity was not added as no additional initial capacity
was needed.
The provisioning algorithms (used in this work) use a shortest path algorithm to
find paths. It may be required to investigate other methods to generate paths in order to
encourage more path diversity. Interestingly, the large network tended to follow tradi-
tional assumptions, with sparse upper layer networks faring worse than more dense upper
layer networks.
Figure 32 shows the results of the clustering algorithm. The dark lines are a tree
with the new clustered location at the base of the tree. The nodes that are clustered are at
the leaves of the tree. When the threat radius is large (in this example it is 2.0) and the
cluster factor is high (9), considerable clustering occurs.
The NIR also agrees with Table 9 and Figure 30(e), which shows the most resilient
topology to be topology 1.
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Table 9: Results for the ATTL1 Network
Upper
Layer Threat Red. Clust. Vuln. States Filter Tested Succ. Loss Comp. Err.
Top. Rad. # # Area Exam. States States States States Time
1 1.0 1 4 0.010 54322 53669 645 641 4 240.27 2
1 1.0 1 9 0.010 243286 240554 2317 2708 5 1004.27 0
1 1.0 1 16 0.010 243286 240554 2713 2708 5 1004.27 0
1 1.5 1 9 0.032 202660 199914 2686 2668 18 979.90 9
1 1.5 1 4 0.030 25230 24762 454 443 11 168.70 24
1 1.5 1 16 0.028 840301 829568 10546 10514 32 4132.77 1
1 1.5 2 9 0.026 202137 199425 2660 2646 14 1077.35 7
1 1.5 3 9 0.019 204780 202038 2695 2685 10 1048.27 2
1 2.0 1 9 0.057 194046 1906878 3188 3156 32 964.31 17
2 1.0 1 4 0.019 51678 51045 618 608 10 209.70 6
2 1.0 1 9 0.021 229575 226896 2643 2629 14 746.80 1
2 1.0 1 16 0.021 898963 885373 13403 13385 19 3297.23 1
2 1.0 2 9 0.021 229575 226898 2643 2629 14 534.84 2
2 1.0 3 9 0.019 230628 227950 2659 2649 10 915.40 2
2 1.5 1 9 0.052 193607 190957 2596 2580 16 572.96 13
2 2.0 1 9 0.083 187420 184213 3011 2990 21 1048.46 20
2 1.25 1 9 0.033 272584 269607 2932 2918 14 724.30 2
Table 10: NIR for the ATTL1 Network for two different upper layer topologies
α Topology 1 Topology 2
1 0.059 0.089
4 0.009 0.037
16 0.002 0.028
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
Figure 28: Gabriel Network. Lower layer network is shown with solid lines. Upper layer
network is shown with dotted lines. (a) Gabriel Network, L2 Network #1, Threat Radius
= 10, Redundancy Factor = 1, Network Test = 40% (b) Gabriel Network, L2 Network #1,
Threat Radius = 12.5, Redundancy Factor = 1, Network Test = 40% (c) Gabriel Network,
L2 Network #1, Threat Radius = 15, Redundancy Factor = 1, Network Test = 40% (d)
Gabriel Network, L2 Network #2, Threat Radius = 10, Redundancy Factor = 1, Network
Test = 40% (e) Gabriel Network, L2 Network #3, Threat Radius = 10, Redundancy Factor
= 1, Network Test = 40%
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
Figure 29: EU Network. Lower layer network is shown with solid lines. Upper layer
network is shown with dotted lines. (a) EU Network, L2 Network #1, Threat Radius
= 2.5, Redundancy Factor = 1, Network Test = 50% (b) EU Network, L2 Network #1,
Threat Radius = 3.75, Redundancy Factor = 1, Network Test = 50% (c) EU Network, L2
Network #1, Threat Radius = 5.0, Redundancy Factor = 1, Network Test = 50% (d) EU
Network, L2 Network #2, Threat Radius = 3.75, Redundancy Factor = 1, Network Test
= 50% (e) EU Network, L2 Network #3, Threat Radius = 3.75, Redundancy Factor = 1,
Network Test = 50%
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
Figure 30: ATTL1 Network. Lower layer network is shown with solid lines. Upper layer
network is shown with dotted lines. (a) ATTLA Network, L2 Topology #1, Threat Radius
= 1.0, Redundancy Factor = 1, Network Test = 70% (b) ATTL1 Network, L2 Topology #1,
Threat Radius = 1.5, Redundancy Factor = 1, Network Test = 70% (c) ATTL1 Network,
L2 Topology #1, Threat Radius = 2.0, Redundancy Factor = 1, Network Test = 70% (d)
ATTL1 Network, L2 Topology #2, Threat Radius = 1.5, Redundancy Factor = 1, Network
Test = 70% (e) ATTL1 Network, L2 Topology #2, Threat Radius = 2.0, Redundancy
Factor = 1, Network Test = 70%
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(a) (b)
Figure 31: Gabriel Network NIR Impact and Probability Curves with Threat Radius of 15
(a) L2 Topology 1 (b) L2 Topology 3
Figure 32: ATTL1 Network, Clustering with Threat Radius = 2.0, Redundancy Factor =
1, Network Test = 70%, Cluster location is at center of each tree (dark lines)
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4.7.4 Performance of the Algorithm
(a) (b)
Figure 33: (a) Threat Radius/Cluster Size versus Processing Time (b) Threat Radius ver-
sus Vulnerable Area
In Figure 33(a), the effect that the threat radius has on processing time is shown
normalized against the processing time at the largest threat radius. It is intuitive for the
Gabriel and EU networks that the processing time rises as the threat radius increases. For
the ATTL1 network, the processing time is relatively flat. This is because the complexity
is controlled by the clustering algorithm. The plot of the clustering factor versus pro-
cessing time is included to demonstrate this. In Figure 33(b), we see the vulnerable area
versus the threat radius normalized against the total area in the network. The vulnerable
area increases as would be expected when the threat radius is larger.
One of the concerns of using clustering for the purpose of reducing the number of
states to be analyzed was the accuracy of the predicted vulnerability. In the Gabriel and
EU networks (without clustering), we did not observe any errors. In the ATTL1 network,
the effect of clustering on accuracy was shown in Table 9. As the number of clusters is
reduced, errors do rise. However, even with 4 clusters the percentage of errors was still
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less than 1% of 3000 random attacks.
4.8 Summary
During the SP-NSG process, one of the important benefits of state space pruning is
that it can be used to find geographic vulnerabilities in networks. This benefit is exploited
in this work. The NIR has the primary benefit that it can be used with different network
tests, which allows the NIR to be configured specifically to the mission of the network
and its applications.
However, for large networks, the vulnerability analysis can still become intractable.
To maintain tractability in large networks, we also present a K-means clustering method.
It relies on the idea of reducing the number of nodes for purposes of the state based anal-
ysis using clustering. Matrix transformation is used both for the K-Means Clustering
Approach and the multilayer testing methods that maps geographic failures simultane-
ously onto multiple layers.
Small (16 node), medium (28 node), and large networks (383 nodes) with several
different upper layer topologies are used to demonstrate our approach. Various threat
radii were tested both for performance and impact on vulnerability. Typical results were
seen with increased areas of vulnerability for larger threat radii. The performance was
also reduced with larger threat radii. The notable exception to this is when other factors
manage the growth in complexity like clustering are used. Maximum simultaneous node
failures could also be used to manage complexity in a similar way.
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Attacks were simulated to test the accuracy of the SP-NSG with clustering. Var-
ious clustering factors are tested for performance and accuracy. As the clustering factor
is reduced, the number of nodes reduced to a single node is increased. This decreases
accuracy but increases performance. Nine nodes in a threat radius seemed to provide
good performance gains while maintaining reasonable accuracy. Different upper layer
topologies were also tested. The selection of the topology had dramatic and sometimes
unpredictable results. Loop topologies generally perform well with geographic attacks.
Mesh topologies do not always perform as expected. This is related to vulnerabilities
created by the initial provisioning algorithm.
The NIR was also demonstrated on the three test networks. It consistently fol-
lowed our intuition on the prediction of resilient networks. We found success using the
NIR with a high α value to predict resiliency. It would be interesting to learn more about
the application of this metric with α = 1 (or even less than one) and possibly its relation-
ship with availability or reliability.
With respect to disaster planning, one factor that is not covered in this work is
the communication of mission critical requirement information between the users and
the network. In [59], extended Service Level Agreements (SLAs) are proposed for this
purpose.
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CHAPTER 5
PROVISIONING AND RESTORAL OF MISSION CRITICAL SERVICES FOR
DISASTER RESILIENCE
During natural disasters such as earthquakes and hurricanes, providing communi-
cations is essential to support rescue and recovery operations associated with the disaster.
This brings up a couple of important questions. Is the network sufficiently prepared, from
a capacity planning perspective, to handle the change in demands associated with an
emergency event? When the event occurs, how can the network provide service to the
most important users even when the network itself is challenged?
In this chapter, we are proposing efficient methods to use Service Level Agree-
ments (SLA) to improve capacity planning and provisioning for geographic emergency
events as well as post-event restoration priorities. This includes new provisioning ILPs
and heuristics, new restoration ILPs and heuristics, and suggested SLA extensions to sup-
port these algorithms [59]. A key finding of this work is that with only a small reduction
in protection, significant cost savings are achievable.
This work is motivated by the idea that the network has different demands and re-
quirements when it is normal than when it is in a disaster or emergency status. It is trivial
to simply add capacity to support all demands needed during a normal mode and during
an emergency event on primary and backup paths. Using multi-situational optimization
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techniques, we can more efficiently manage that capacity to support either normal opera-
tions or emergency operations during geographic events but not necessarily both simulta-
neously in a stressed network. Once the emergency event occurs, and the network enters
an emergency mode, the demands needed by the emergency response personnel become
more important than in a normal mode. Ensuring that these demands are provisioned on
the network first is the responsibility of the rerouting algorithms presented here.
An example of an emergency service that would need to be survivable during a
disaster might be first responder communications or air traffic control needed to restore
flights to a disaster area. Services, which under normal circumstances may be highly
available but are not under disaster conditions, may include businesses that are not directly
involved in disaster relief. Services that may need to be highly available during normal
and disaster conditions may include hospitals.
SLAs can contain information about the importance of the service as well as the
necessary service level objectives (SLO) for the service. We can both provision the net-
work with the information in the SLAs as well as remediate the most important services
based on this information. An augmented SLA structure is proposed to support initial
network provisioning, and critical service remediation and rerouting during geographic
network challenges.
5.1 Related Work
Although there is a large body of work related to assembling selected services for
web service compositions based on QoS parameters in SLAs, we are not aware of any
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work that attempts to provision services or demands across a network using SLAs that
have the ability to provide resiliency from geographic challenges in the network. With
respect to provisioning based on SLAs, most of the research is related to composing web
services to meet a particular QoS level as proposed in [26] and [18]. These works assume
that the number of web services to choose from are large and therefore, are a difficult
problem. Our work is more interested in networks that have a relatively smaller number
of emergency demands and present a different problem.
Several works address the use of SLAs. In [20], SLAs in the service-oriented
architecture (SOA) environments are described as well as the web services agreements.
They highlight a couple of important points including the need for SLAs to be machine
readable and decomposable. By decomposable, they refer to the concept that different
parts of the SLA may be needed by different entities for implementation. These features
are also important to our work.
In networks supporting emergency services, the network typically has a strong
role to play due to the high availability and sometimes low latency requirements that are
imposed by emergency services. In [11], Badidi describes a brokered SLA service for
an SOA that could be used by networks supporting emergency services to provide and
implement QoS. The author provides an extensive discussion about how to implement
service level objectives (SLOs). One of the advantages of brokered SLA services is that
during events, the network has the ability to use the SLA to restore the most important
services.
In [15], methods of restoration using SLAs during failures are discussed. The
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goal is to ensure services are restored at a minimum QoS level during the event, provided
services are searched to locate services that meet the minimum QoS. We try to account for
this by provisioning using SLA QoS parameters. Designing for SLAs based on different
quality of services for failures from normal operating conditions and restoration priorities
have also been addressed and studied in [100, 103, 127].
Providing resilience to geographic challenges generally requires diverse paths be-
tween users in networks. In [32], Cheng et. al. proposed algorithms, including the iWPSP
algorithm, that can be used to create diverse paths in networks. We used their algorithms
in this work to ensure that the topology prior to provisioning has sufficient geographic
diversity to support routing around many geographic challenges. For an early work on
diverse routing, see [98].
Perhaps the most interesting work that has been done in the capacity planning
area, with demands that have a variety of protection requirements, was proposed orig-
inally by Gerstel and Sasaki in [64] and is known as Quality of Protection. This was
extended by Kuperman, Modiano, and Narula-Tam in [83] to include capacity planning
using optimization. In this work, node-link formulations are used to provide capacity for
working paths and demand specific backup path protection on a link by link basic. Since
node-link formulations are used, paths do not need to be specified. In [142], varied levels
of protection for network traffic engineering was modeled using a link-path formulation.
Our work differs from these works in two ways. First, we use multi-situational link-path
formulations to allow normal mode and emergency mode capacity planning that is not
simultaneously needed. Second, by providing path generation, we are able to control the
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distance between paths and therefore, provide protection against certain larger geographic
events that may not have been possible using a node-link formulation.
In [121], extensive treatment is given to the construction of linear (or mixed-
integer linear) programs that are capable of provisioning bandwidth in networks with con-
straints like path diversity and redundancy. Also in [121], multi-hour and multi-situational
ILP approaches have been presented. We borrow from those ideas in this work. By treat-
ing the emergency demands as a separate provisioning situation, we are able to ensure
that the links are provisioned to handle both the normal and emergency situations.
5.2 Mission Critical Disaster Resilience: Concepts and Illustration
Prior to any disaster, a network operates in the normal mode when the normal
SLAs for the demands on the network are in force. Provisioning those demands would
support these SLAs. Once a disaster occurs, a new paradigm comes into existence. Typi-
cally, emergency responders begin to use the network with different demands that usually
have much more stringent requirements for availability and possibly latency. Network
provisioning should allow for normal demands or emergency demands to be met. Ad-
ditionally, when the event occurs, rerouting algorithms should be used to more strongly
support the emergency services during the emergency event. It is important to note that
during the emergency event, the network is challenged eliminating many of the primary
paths available. For this reason, the rerouting algorithm only requires one path for all
demands. The following steps are used to implement these concepts:
1. Collect Normal demands/SLAs
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Figure 34: Gabriel Network with Sample Demands in Normal Operating Mode with no
Redundant Capacity Provisioned on Diverse Paths. Redundancy can be Specified in Nor-
mal Operating Mode
2. Collect Emergency demands/SLAs
3. Select a resilient topology (not the subject of this work)
4. Assign capacity using a multi-situational capacity planning approach
5. Create a prioritized restoration approach for an emergency mode
To illustrate these ideas, Figures 34 and 35 show the normal and emergency oper-
ating mode concepts. If the normal demands were a volume of 10, then the links along the
paths shown in Fig. 34 would need to have capacity added. To provision the Emergency
Operating Mode, consider Fig. 35 to confirm that sufficient capacity exists (from the Nor-
mal Operating Mode) to support the Emergency Operating Mode demands. Links N4-N1
and N1-N12 would need additional capacity provisioned to support the Emergency Oper-
ating Mode. At this point, capacity should exist to support both configurations.
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Figure 35: Gabriel Network with a Sample Demand in Emergency Operating Mode with
100% Redundancy Always Specified on a Diverse Path
5.3 Resilient Service Level Agreement (SLA) Configuration
In this work, we assume that SLAs can be customized to include new service level
objectives (SLOs).
In addition to typical information included in the SLAs that are used to complete
capacity planning, many common SLAs include specifications of service availability and
system response times. In the WS-Agreement specification [9], the concept of a business
value list is described as the ability to assign importance, penalties, and rewards to the
SLOs.
In addition to other common SLOs, we propose specifying the following SLOs
for use in this work: response time, availability, and survivability.
5.3.1 Response Time.
This is the maximum end-to-end response time that can be tolerated by a particular
demand or service (Td). This is used to compute the maximum utilization on the links. If
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the path length per demand d using path p is Ldp, the maximum delay per link is assumed
to be the worst case average response time divided by the path length for each demand
that passes through that link:
Wmax = max((Td)/Ldp). (5.1)
Using M/M/1 approximations, we assume that the link delay, W , is as shown in
(5.2) where τ is the average service time and ρ is the utilization:
W =
τ
1− ρ. (5.2)
Rearranging, the maximum utilization per link is given by
ρe = 1− τe
Wmax
. (5.3)
where τe is the average service time on link e. Note that a utilization model based on
different response time requirements could easily be implemented.
5.3.2 Availability.
This is used to specify the service availability. If a given network availability is
AN and the required demand availability is Ad, the number of flows carrying the same
information is increased until the availability offered is greater than Ad. Here, we assume
that the flows are independent. If the number of flows is represented by the redundancy
factor χ
d
, then the relation with the availability can be stated as:
Ad = 1− (1− AN)χd . (5.4)
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Note that the availability cannot be improved without path diversity (see the path diversity
mechanisms discussed further in Section 5.4.1. Additional redundancy over the demand
is provisioned on diverse paths to support availability. From (5.4), we can determine the
requirement on the redundancy factor χ
d
as follows:
χ
d
=
ln (1− Ad)
ln (1− An) . (5.5)
5.3.3 Survivability.
Survivability (Sd) is specified for the emergency demands d that are required dur-
ing times of network challenge. These demands will be provisioned separately to ensure
that they can be rerouted during network challenges. They will also be rerouted with
priority during network challenges. It is important to note that if a service with surviv-
ability is specified but is not of high availability, it may not be restored during a normal
component failure but would be rerouted with priority during network challenges.
5.3.4 Example of Resilient SLA Configuration
To illustrate the mapping of an SLA to the geo-diverse provisioning and rerouting
models, consider the following example to show sample network calculations for maxi-
mum utilization and redundancy factor.
• Calculating Utilization
– Max allow delay per link, Wmax = 50 ms
– Average Service time, τe = 15 ms
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– Then, from (5.3), we have ρe = 0.7
• Calculating Redundancy Factor
– Network Availability, AN = 0.99
– Desired Demand Availability, Ad = 0.999
– Then from (5.5), χ
d
= 1.5
5.4 Geo-Diverse Provisioning Models
We use two different approaches that add capacity with the goal of resiliency
during unknown geographic events. The first one is a multi-situational mixed-integer
linear programming (MILP) optimization with a link-path formulation utilizing a geo-
diverse path generation method. The second one is a provisioning heuristic that adds
capacity to the network along a set of pre-determined diverse paths for each demand. The
advantage of these approaches is that we can generate the minimal number of paths that
achieve the level of geo-diversity required. In this work, the number of paths is limited to
4. Before we do that, we briefly describe our path generation scheme.
5.4.1 Geo-Diverse Path Generation
In [32], Cheng et al. presented and analyzed two heuristics for generating geo-
graphically diverse paths between a source and destination in networks. The first heuris-
tic is the Iterative WayPoint Shortest Path (iWPSP). The second heuristic is the Modified
Link Weight Heuristic (MLW). In this work, we use iWPSP to create paths for this work.
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Figure 36: Iterative Waypoint Shortest Path Heuristic [32]
Briefly, the goal of iWPSP is to select a set of waypoint nodes from the source to
destination that are d distance apart denoted as Si andDi. The number of paths determines
the size of the set selected. Afterwards, another set of d + δ separated nodes are selected
(m,m′,m′′, ....) in the center of the source to destination path, Dijkstra’s shortest path
algorithm is used to select paths between the first set of nodes after the source and the set
in the center of the path. This is repeated for the center to the destination sets of nodes as
shown in Fig. 36. For more details, refer to [32].
5.4.2 Geo-Diverse MILP Provisioning
The geo-diverse MILP formulation shown is a novel use of the multi-situational
link-path formulation from [121] that contains constraints for path diversity, additional
capacity for redundancy and a set of constraints specifically designed to augment the
network to account for emergency services. The link-path formulation requires pre-
calculation of the routing paths to be potentially used for each demand—these paths are
determined as briefly discussed in Section 5.4.1.
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Table 11: Geo-Diverse Provisioning Notation
constants
δedp 1 if link e belongs to a path p realizing
demand d, 0 otherwise
hd volume of demand d
χ
d
redundancy factor of demand d
Sd survivability factor for demand d : ‘1’ if demand d
is needed for emergency mode, else ‘0’
ζe cost for link bandwidth ye
ξe initial cost of link based on distance of e
ρe maximum utilization on link e
H conversion factor for binary variable
variables
xdp normal flow allocated to path p of demand d
wdp emergency flow allocated to path p of demand d
ye flow on link e
ue ’1’ if link e is used, else ’0’
minimize
F =
∑
e
ζeye + ξeue (5.6)
subject to∑
p
xdp = hdχd (5.7)∑
d
∑
p
δedpxdp ≤ ρeye (5.8)
xdp ≤ hd (5.9)
ye ≤ Hue (5.10)∑
p
wdp = 2Sdhd (5.11)∑
d
∑
p
δedpwdp ≤ ρeye (5.12)
wdp ≤ hd (5.13)
xdp ≥ 0 (5.14)
ye ≥ 0 (5.15)
ue binary (5.16)
wdp ≥ 0 (5.17)
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The above MILP formulation is used to provision for the normal operating mode
demands as well as for the emergency demands for survivability. The notations used in
this formulation are summarized in Table 11. The objective shown in (5.6) minimizes
the cost per link bandwidth assigned plus the initial link cost based on the link distance.
(5.7) maps demand hd to the flow paths. (5.8) maps the flow paths to the network links
with additional capacity as needed to support the latency requirements (from (5.3)). (5.9)
requires that no more than the volume of a demand be allowed on a given path. This
forces any redundant capacity to be provisioned on other paths. In (5.10), if H is larger
than max(ye), then binary variable ue will take on a ’1’ if ye has capacity provisioned and
’0’ otherwise. Practically, H can be just a large number.
The additional constraints shown in (5.11) - (5.13) are used to provide additional
capacity to support the Emergency Operating Mode demands. (5.11) maps demand hd
with 100% redundant capacity to the Emergency Operating Mode flow paths wd; hence,
the multiplier 2 is used. (5.12) maps the flow paths to the network links with additional
capacity as needed to support latency requirements (from (5.3)). (5.13) requires that no
more than the volume of a demand be allowed on a given path. This forces the redundant
capacity to be provisioned on other paths. The remaining constraints are used for defining
the requirements on all the variables.
5.4.3 Geo-Diverse Heuristic Provisioning
To reduce the complexity of solving the MILP model in the provisioning process,
we also propose a heuristic to assign the capacity to the generated paths based on the
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demands. In Algorithm 8, capacity is assigned to each path based on the length of the path.
The shortest path will always receive the full volume of the demand. The next shortest
path will receive the redundant capacity for that demand (χ
d
− 1)hd. If the demand is
marked for Emergency Operating Mode, the next shortest path will also receive the full
volume of the demand. The additional capacity to account for latency requirements is
added as the paths are mapped to the links. This heuristic approach is not intended to
duplicate the MILP approach but rather used as an approximation.
Algorithm 8 Geo-Diverse Heuristic Provisioning
for all d in D do
xd1 ← hd
if Sd = 1 then
xd2 ← hd
else
xd2 ← (χd − 1)hd
end if
for all p in 2 paths generated for demand d do
for all e in E links in path p for demand d do
ye ← ye + xdp/ρe
end for
end for
end for
for all e in E do
if ye > 0 then
ue = 1
else
ue = 0
end if
end for
Compute cost function F given by (5.6)
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Table 12: Geo-Diverse Rerouting Notation
constants
δedp 1 if link e belongs to a path realizing
demand d, 0 otherwise
hd volume of demand d
nd diversity factor for demand d
Sd survivability factor
ce Capacity available on link e after an event
ρe maximum utilization on link
αd incremental normalized cost factor(αd ≤ Sd)
variables
xdp flow allocated to path p of demand d
µd 1 if demand d is provisioned
5.5 Post-Event Service Rerouting
After a geographic event occurs causing potentially widespread outages, the initial
activity is rerouting of services. A common method is to reroute the emergency operating
mode services first, and then reroute the remaining services using shortest path routing.
If a path with the necessary link capacity does not exist, that demand is skipped. The
link capacity on the found path is decreased by the demand volume. We refer to this as
heuristic rerouting.
We propose an ILP model here to select demands to reroute based on a number of
factors including the capacity remaining in the network, paths available for that service,
priority (translated into cost) of that demand.
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Geo-Diverse Rerouting Formulation
maximize
F =
∑
d
(αd + Sd)µd (5.18)
subject to∑
p
xdp = hdµd (5.19)∑
d
∑
p
δedpxdp ≤ ceρe (5.20)
xdp ≥ 0 (5.21)
µd binary (5.22)
The notations used in the geo-diverse rerouting formulation are summarized in
Table 12. The objective (5.18) maximizes the number of demands that are filled if the
demands have higher weights in terms of the survivability factor and incremental nor-
malized cost factor (αd) for that demand, where the demands selection is indicated by
the binary variable µd. This ensures that the Emergency Operating Mode demands are
rerouted with high priority and then the remaining demands rerouted as capacity exists.
To ensure the Emergency Operating Mode demands are rerouted with high priority, αd
would need to be a fraction of 1 (value of Sd for an emergency demand). Typically, we
use αd = 0.1. (5.19) and (5.20) are constraints to assign demand to link capacity for
the demands selected. Notice that ce is the available link capacity increased to account
for maximum link utilization to achieve the response time requirements after the event
has occurred. The goal is to maximize the emergency demands that can be fulfilled in an
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optimal manner.
The other important aspect of the rerouting formulation is the relaxation of several
key constraints found in the provisioning formulation. These include the requirement
for redundant capacity and the requirement for multiple path availability for demands.
During remediation and rerouting, the goal is that the most important demands be rerouted
regardless of the diversity or redundancy that is available on the network.
5.5.1 Model Implementation
The provisioning and rerouting heuristics were implemented using the Python lan-
guage on a machine with an Intel I7 processor with 8Gb RAM. Python was also used to
create the text based MILP files needed for the provisioning and rerouting MILP formula-
tions. The LPSolve [19] optimization program, was called from Python to solve the MILP
and ILP formulations. Random numbers needed for the attack analysis were generated
using the Python Random library.
From [121], we know that solving linear problems using the Simplex algorithm is
exponential time algorithm in the worst case, but in practice is generally O(n+m), where
n is the number of variables and m is the number of equations.
The MILP provisioning problem was solved relatively quickly in all cases with
the worst case solution time in the larger Nobel-eu network (28 nodes, 82 links, and 780
demands) being 78 seconds. Because of the relatively quick solution time, measures were
not taken to reduce the solution time like relaxing the binary variables. However, for the
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rerouting problem, there were attacks that generated MILP problems that were not solv-
able in a reasonable time frame. In those instances, the binary variables µd were relaxed
to 0 ≤ µd ≤ 1.0. This allowed a feasible solution to be created with a linear program. In
the relatively rare situation that a µd variable did not solve to 1.0 or 0.0, it was assumed
that the i link would not support the traffic. This is a conservative assumptions that would
results in slightly more demands being able to be provisioned than are calculated here.
5.6 Results
We implemented the provisioning and rerouting heuristics in the Python language
on a machine with an Intel I7 processor with 8Gb RAM. Python was also used to create
the text based MILP files needed for the provisioning and rerouting MILP formulations.
The LPSolve [19] optimization program, was called from Python to solve the MILP and
ILP formulations. Random numbers needed for the attack analysis were generated using
the Python Random library.
To test the capabilities of both the geo-diverse provisioning and rerouting algo-
rithms, we evaluated the models on two network topologies. Fig. 34 shows a Gabriel
network. The Gabriel network was used because it provides a good grid like structure
with a configurable number of nodes (16 nodes). The capabilities of Gabriel networks are
studied in [28]. The second network, shown in Fig. 37 is from the medium sized Nobel-eu
network that is available at the Survivable Network Design Library (SNDlib 1.0) [119].
We first briefly comment on computing time and run time. We found that the
MILP provisioning problem was solved relatively quickly in all cases with the worst case
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Figure 37: Nobel-eu Network
solution time in the larger Nobel-eu network (28 nodes, 82 links, and 780 demands) being
78 seconds. Because of the relatively quick solution time, measures were not taken to
reduce the solution time like relaxing the binary variables. However, for the rerouting
problem, there were attacks that generated MILP problems that were not solvable in a
reasonable time frame. In these instances, binary variables µd were relaxed to 0 ≤ µd ≤
1.0. This allowed a feasible solution to be created with the relaxed linear program. This
is a conservative assumption that would result in slightly more demands being able to be
provisioned than are calculated here.
For each network, six scenarios were tested as shown in Table 13. For all sce-
narios, the demand structure was created by fully connecting all nodes in the network to
each other for a total of 240 and 756 demands, respectively, for the Gabriel and Nobel-eu
networks each with a volume of 1. The demands marked for the Emergency Operating
Mode were randomly selected based on the percentage in Table 13. The redundancy χ
d
was set according to Table 13 and the appropriate provisioning algorithm was executed.
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Table 13: Scenario 1-6 Configuration (Gabriel and Nobel-eu Networks)
# Provision/ Redundancy % Emer. Threat
Reroute Factor Demands Radius
Alg. (χ
d
) (%Sd = 1) Gabe/Nobel
1 ILP/ILP 1.0-2.0 25% 10/5
2 ILP/Heur 1.0-2.0 25% 10/5
3 Heur/ILP 1.0-2.0 25% 10/5
4 Heur/Heur 1.0-2.0 25% 10/5
5 ILP/ILP 1.0 25% 5-15/3-7
6 ILP/Heur 1.0 10%-50% 10/5
ρ is set to 0.7 as was calculated in the earlier SLA example.
After all demands were provisioned on the networks, a series of 100 attacks were
generated at random locations in the network. Each attack failed all links that intersected
with a circle surrounding the attack known as the threat radius representing the estimated
radius of a disaster. The rerouting algorithm was then executed and the number of de-
mands that could be rerouted successfully were computed without violating the capacity
of the links as provisioned. The percentage of successfully rerouted demands wss the
primary metric used to evaluate the attempted remediation activity. Additionally, the cost
to provision the network was computed. In this analysis, if the demand source or demand
destination nodes were contained in the threat radius, that demand was considered to have
failed. In some cases, that would make the demand restoration percentages seem low.
5.6.1 Provisioning Costs
Figure 38 shows the provisioned Gabriel network using MILP Provisioning. Also
shown are the attack locations used to test the network. The width of the lines indicates
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Figure 38: Gabriel network with MILP provisioning (χ
d
= 1.0) and attack locations. Line
width indicates link capacity provisioned in each direction
the capacity of the link in that direction. The actual capacity is also shown in the text next
to the link number. Dashed lines indicate no capacity assigned. Path generation uses the
iWPSP algorithm.
The provisioned Nobel-eu network is shown in Fig. 39. The influence of the
distance component of the provisioning cost tended to drive capacity toward the shortest
paths in the center of the network in both Gabriel and Nobel-eu networks. The MILP
formulation is meant to drive just enough capacity to the edges of the network to cover
contingency scenarios when the center of the network is lost.
The cost of each of the provisioning methods is shown in Fig. 40(a) and Fig.
41(a). The methods include MILP and Heuristic provisioning methods using iWPSP
path generation. The cost includes a fixed cost for each link used based on the length
of the link plus a cost related to the amount of capacity assigned to that link. The cost
factors for each network were adjusted so the initial costs and capacity related costs are
approximately equal.
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Figure 39: Nobel-eu Network with MILP Provisioning (χ
d
= 1.0) and attack locations.
Line width indicates link capacity provisioned in each direction
The Heuristic Provisioning methods were always slightly more expensive than the
MILP methods. Note that in the heuristic approach, the redundant capacity is always
placed on path 2. On the other hand, in the MILP model, multiple paths are available for
certain demands (as determined by the iWPSP algorithm). This enable the paths to be
chosen to minimize the cost function.
127
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 40: Gabriel Network Performance (a) Provisioning Cost (b) Scenarios 1&2, MILP
Provisioning (c) Scenarios 3&4 - Heuristic Provisioning
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 41: (a) Provisioning Cost (b) Scenario 1&2, MILP Provisioning (c) Scenarios 3&4
- Heuristic Provisioning
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5.6.2 Rerouting Performance
The average percentage of successful demand rerouting in the Gabriel network is
shown in Fig. 40(b) and Fig. 40(c). Figures 41(b) and 41(c) show the Nobel-eu network.
We observe that the heuristic approach to rerouting always provides a slightly better per-
formance than the MILP restoration approach for the demands marked for emergency op-
eration mode. However, the MILP significantly outperformed the heuristic approach for
the remaining normal services. As expected, the difference between emergency services
and normal demands is significantly more apparent when the redundant capacity associ-
ated with normal services (since emergency demands always have 100% redundancy) is
near 1.0 (no redundancy). These results were not unexpected as the heuristic method was
similar to a priority method.
Comparing the MILP and heuristic provisioning approaches, we see that the rerout-
ing performance is almost identical. The costs for the heuristic approaches were higher
for the Gabriel topology and slightly higher for the Nobel-eu network. These two facts
would indicate that generally, the heuristic approach is capable of creating competitive
solutions with the MILP provisioning approach, albeit at a higher cost.
5.6.2.1 Effects of Threat Radius
Figures 42(a) and Fig. 42(c) show the effect of changing the threat radius on
the performance of the rerouting algorithms. As would be expected, the performance
decreases almost linearly based on the size of the threat radius. We observed that in
general, the decrease in performance was linear with the increase in the threat radius.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 42: Network Performance (a) Gabriel Network, Scenario 5 (b) Gabriel Network,
Scenario 6 (c) Nobel-eu Network Scenario 5 (d) Nobel-eu Network, Scenario 6
This is not an unexpected result. As we noted earlier, the MILP performance for the
emergency demands was slightly less than the heuristic performance for the emergency
demands. However, the MILP rerouting solution for normal demands was significantly
better than the rerouting heuristic solution
5.6.2.2 Effects of Increasing the Ratio of Emergency Demands
Figures 42(b) and Fig. 42(d) help us to make a couple of observations. When
the percentage of emergency demands is low (< 25% of all demands), the difference
between the performance of emergency demands and normal demands is consistent. As
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the percentage of emergency demands increases (> 50%) the performance of the all of
the demands increases since more demands are being provisioned with 100% redundancy
at the increased costs as shown.
5.7 Summary
This work proposes a framework to use Service Level Agreements (SLAs) to pro-
vide much of the information necessary to solve the challenging problems of defending
and remediation in network vulnerability to geographical events like natural disasters. We
form the solutions to these problems as provisioning and rerouting solutions to prevent
damage from geographic events. From the SLA parameters: system response time, avail-
ability, and survivability, we can create integer linear programs and heuristics to solve the
provisioning and rerouting problems.
The MILP and heuristic approaches to the network provisioning problem with
geographic challenges are both found to be effective solutions. The performance of both
approaches are similar. The cost of the MILP approach varies from slightly less expensive
to moderately less expensive than the heuristic solution.
The MILP and heuristic approaches to the rerouting problem have significant dif-
ferences. The heuristic approach performs slightly better than the MILP solution for
the emergency services. But, the normal services see significant benefit under the MILP
rerouting. solution. The MILP formulation provides a better overall solution to the rerout-
ing problem.
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A final observation is the importance of diverse path generation. Once the provi-
sioning is complete, the network is reliant on that process to help deal with the restoration
during an event. If good path generation is an integral part of the provisioning process,
the chance of successful restoration is significantly higher. The iWPSP path generation
methods provided that capability for this work.
Our approach could be extended to multi-layer networks, service oriented archi-
tecture (SOA), and software defined networks (SDN). It is not uncommon for emergency
applications to be deployed on an SOA, like the Federal Aviation Administration’s System
Wide Information Management (SWIM) network [143].
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CHAPTER 6
TOPOLOGY IMPROVEMENTS TO AVOID HIGH IMPACT GEOGRAPHIC EVENTS
During a disaster, communications systems can be devastated. When this occurs, a
communications black hole is created at the center of the disaster. This causes a significant
lack of situational awareness immediately that extends throughout the geographic impact
zone. The network infrastructure that remains becomes stressed from a flood of users
trying to communicate. This is the basic description of a geospatial event in a network.
Events of this nature are not limited to small or large geographic areas.
Typically network designers separate topology from geography. In this chapter
we develop optimization models to add nodes to a network topology that eliminate the
geographic vulnerabilities, protecting the network from geospatial events. We develop
models based on Integer Linear Programming (ILP) and Particle Swarm Optimization
(PSO) to optimize networks for both point-to-point and all-terminal applications. This
work was published in [55]. To demonstrate the flexibility and applicability of both ap-
proaches, we use simple wireless propagation link models as well as more complex link
models that include obstructions like buildings and other terrain features.
Both the ILP based approach and the PSO based approach were successful in
mitigating geographic vulnerabilities found in our test networks. In Section 1.1, the geo-
graphic vulnerability of a network with nodes N , links E, and threat radius r is defined as
134
the vulnerable area of a network. We further define V (N,E, r) as the Geographic Vul-
nerability which participates in the objective function of the PSO approach. The network
test V (N,E, r) used for this portion of the work is based on a connectivity model. But
any network test could be used. Since the V (N,E, r) is non-linear, the ILP approach is
only an approximation. The PSO approach can use V (N,E, r) as the objective providing
a more direct solution. Another important difference between the two approaches is that
the ILP approach can augment the network with multiple nodes concurrently, whereas the
PSO approach adds one node at a time.
6.1 Related Work
There have been significant recent advances in the assessment of geographically
correlated failures and network design related to geographically correlated vulnerabilities.
Section 4.3 provides geographic vulnerability assessment methods used for this work.
Sen, Murthy, and Banerjee in [140] construct region disjoint paths between a
source and destination. Their work has some similarities to our work. The regions in
their work are predetermined. Li, Wang, and Jiang [89] expand on the work in [140] in
two areas. First, they consider multiple regions as opposed to one. Second, they augment
the network by adding link capacity to ensure all traffic can withstand multiple region fail-
ures. Instead of predetermining regions, they assume regions are centered at each node.
Our work designs the network assuming the region can be centered anywhere in the net-
work. Also, we augment our network with new node locations as opposed to finding
region disjoint paths within existing nodes.
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Alenazi, Cetinkaya, and Sterbenz recently proposed methods to augment network
resilience by using algorithms that add network links that maximize the improvement in
Algebraic Connectivity with the new link in [7] and maximize the improvement in the
pairwise path diversity in [8].
In [30], Cetinkaya, Broyles, Dandekar, Srinivasan, and Sterbenz have taken a
different approach and developed a simulation platform that is capable of locating ge-
ographic vulnerabilities in networks. Their framework is capable of modeling both mali-
cious and non-malicious attacks, disasters, and wireless challenges.
6.2 Overview of Methods
In Section 1, geographic vulnerability, geospatial event, and threat radius are de-
fined. We further define V (N,E, r) as the Geographic Vulnerability. Figure 43 shows
an example of geographic vulnerabilities in a 20 node network. Note that when multiple
nodes need to be disabled concurrently, the vulnerable area is the intersection of the threat
radius around those nodes. Algorithm 9 is used to compute V (N,E, r).
Algorithm 9 Calculation of V (N,E, r)
V (N,E, r) = []
for all i in F Failure Modes (found with SP-NSG) do
for all j in Nodes associated with i do
if j = 1 then
Vi = Threat Radius(j)
else
Vi = Vi
⋂
Threat Radius(j)
end if
end for
V (N,E, r) = V (N,E, r)
⋃
Vi
end for
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Figure 43: Wireless Network showing Geographic Vulnerabilities and a New Node Loca-
tion that Eliminates the Vulnerabilities
With this in mind, we try to accomplish the following with this work:
1. Develop an Integer Linear Program (ILP) that augments a network by selecting
locations to add nodes to a network which approximates the minimization of the
geographic vulnerability V (N,E, r) of that network. This applies both to point-to-
point demands as well as point-to-any (all-terminal) demands. For point-to-point
demands we create paths that are physically diverse from a line between the source
and destination (s, t). New nodes are added (with a new node cost) that lower the
diversity cost of the path. The all-terminal model is similar, using spanning trees as
opposed to paths.
2. Develop a particle swarm optimization (PSO) approach to select a location to add
a single node that minimizes the geographic vulnerability V (N,E, r) for the point-
to-point case and the all-terminal case. Because PSO is used, non-linear objective
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functions can be employed. The objective function used is V (N,E, r) as described
in Appendix 1.
3. Test both approaches (ILP and PSO) with networks of various sizes (15 nodes to
50 nodes) and multiple link models, allowing our approaches to be used in wireless
networks as well as wired networks. In addition, we include obstructions in the link
models.
Since the V (N,E, r) is a non-linear function, we chose two approaches. The ILP
approach is a heuristic approach that attempts to minimize V (N,E, r) by using weighting
to create diverse paths. If the two paths are physically separated by at least the threat
radius, the effect is to reduce V (N,E, r) as shown in Figure 44. Both solutions are
feasible. But, path 2 reduces V (N,E, r) more than path 1 due to nodes 10 and 15.
The PSO approach directly uses the minimization of V (N,E, r) as its objective
function. PSO particles move across the network space using the PSO algorithm, testing
the objective at each particle location as they move. The particle location that minimizes
the objective function the most is added as a new node.
6.2.1 Integer Linear Program (ILP) Based Approach
The ILP formulation is based on the premise that the program is executed two
times with opposite weighting each time, creating two diverse paths (point-to-point) or
two diverse spanning trees (all-terminal). Since calculating geographic vulnerability V (N,E, r)
is an inherently non-linear problem, we use weights that make it more costly for the di-
verse paths or diverse spanning trees to be geographically close together. The geographic
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Figure 44: Point-to-Point Scenario Showing Two Potential Diverse Paths on Opposites
Sides of the Network
space in which the network resides is weighted to push Path 1 or Spanning Tree 1 to a
specific geographic area. The weights are then changed to push Path 2 or Spanning Tree 2
to the opposite geographic area. Possible new nodes are selected from a grid pattern with
a new node cost to improve a poorly weighted path.
By ensuring that two paths exist through the network on opposite sides of the
network, vulnerabilities located anywhere in the network can be mitigated. A single path
may not mitigate the vulnerability, if it is located in the same area as the path is weighted
toward as shown in Figure 2. The same rational applies for using spanning trees located
in different physical areas of the network. Path 1 or Path 2 (Spanning Tree 1 or 2) may
then be chosen to augment the network.
By ensuring that two paths exist through the network on opposite sides of the
network, vulnerabilities located anywhere in the network can be mitigated. A single path
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may not mitigate the vulnerability, if it is located in the same area as the path is weighted
toward as shown in Figure 44. The same rational applies for using spanning trees located
in different physical areas of the network. Path 1 or Path 2 (Spanning Tree 1 or 2) may
then be chosen to augment the network.
Spanning trees are used in the all-terminal case ensuring that all nodes can com-
municate with all other nodes. We chose nodes with the lowest geographic diversity cost
to serve as root nodes. This prevents poor root node choice from adding significant di-
versity cost to the optimization. Since, we are concerned only with connectivity, any
spanning tree will suffice.
Figure 45 shows the node weights for an example point-to-point case. The weight-
ing scheme is based on the perpendicular distance from a line across the geographic space
that includes the source and destination nodes (s, t). For Path 1, the weights are normal-
ized at zero on the furthest edge perpendicular to the source-destination line and grow
toward the opposite side of the geographic space. For Path 2, the weights are reversed
with zero being normalized to the opposite corner and growing the other direction. The
effect is that Paths 1 and 2 would form on opposite sides of the network space geographi-
cally.
For the all-terminal example shown in Figure 46, the weighting scheme is based
on an interior/exterior concept. For Spanning Tree 1, the weights start at the center at
zero and grow toward the exterior of the space based on the distance from the center of
the space. The weighting scheme for Spanning Tree 2 will have the furthest point in the
space starting at zero and growing toward the center. Spanning Tree 1 will tend to form
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Figure 45: Point-to-Point Weighting Plan (Path 1) for an Example 10 Node Network
in the center of the network space and Spanning Tree 2 will tend to form on the edge of
the graph providing diversity between the two trees.
W = dα α > 0 (6.1)
Equation 6.1 shows the calculation of the geographic diversity cost W. α is a
constant used to scale the weights exponentially. d is the distance from the (s, t) line
(source - destination) or from the center for the all-terminal case. The ILP approach uses
a node-link formulation as described in [121] that includes all nodes and links (existing
and potential). The formulation follows.
minimize
F =
∑
nWnvn + C
∑
pvp n = 1 · · ·N p = m · · ·N potential new nodes (6.2)
constraints (point-to-point)
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Figure 46: All-Terminal Weighting Plan (Spanning Tree 1) for an Example 15 Node
Network (α = 1)
∑
eaenue −
∑
ebenue =

1 if n = s
0 if n 6= s, t
−1 if n = t
 n = 1, 2, · · · , N (6.3)
∑
eaenue = vn n = 1, 2, · · · , N (6.4)
Equation 6.3 is the balance equation for a node-link formulation [121]. Equation
6.4 sets vn to the units of flow passing through node n. In the point-to-point model, the
total flow is 1, vn is either 1 or 0.
constraints (all-terminal)
∑
eaenue −
∑
ebenue =
{
N − 1 if n = root
−1 for all others
}
n = 1, 2, · · · , N (6.5)
∑
eaenue = vn n = 1, 2, · · · , N (6.6)
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Table 14: Notations ILP Formulation
notation
e = 1, 2, · · · , E List of all possible links
n = 1, 2, · · · ,m− 1,m, · · · , N List of all existing(1 · · · (m− 1))
and potential new(m · · ·N)nodes
constants
Wn Diversity Cost at node n
aen Used for Node-Link formulation, 1 if noden
is the originating node of link e; else 0
ben Used for Node-Link formulation, 1 if noden
is the terminating node of link e; else 0
s Source node of demand
t Sink node of demand
N Number of nodes (existing and possible)
C Cost to add a node
K Maximum number of possible added nodes (optional)
variables
ue Binary variable is 1 if link e is used, else 0
vn Integer variable is indicative of traffic flows passing through the node.
yi(t+ 1) =
{
yi(t) if f(xi(t+ 1)) ≥ f(yi(t))
xi(t+ 1) if f(xi(t+ 1)) ≤ f(yi(t))
}
(6.7)
To compute f(xi(t+ 1)) = V (N,E, r) in a network of N nodes:
1. Convert location of particle xi(t+ 1) to new node
2. Add node to the set of nodes N
3. Generate set of links E based on set of nodes N .
4. Compute V (N,E, r) as described in Algorithm 9
These stopping parameters halt PSO movement:
1. A geographic vulnerability threshold is reached.
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Table 15: Test Network Configuration
Networks A 1-3 Configuration
Nodes 15
Wireless TX Level 15 dBm
Antenna Gain 0 dB
Receive Threshold -98 dBm
Frequency (MHz) 2400 MHz
Link Generation Method FSL
Obstruction Loss 0 dB
Networks B 1-3 Configuration
Nodes 25
Wireless TX Level 25 dBm
Antenna Gain 10 dB
Receive Threshold -120 dBm
Frequency (MHz) 1000 MHz
Link Generation Method ITU-R
Obstruction Loss 6 dB
Networks C 1-3 Configuration
Nodes 50
Wireless TX Level 18 dBm
Antenna Gain 10 dB
Receive Threshold -120 dBm
Frequency (MHz) 1000 MHz
Link Generation Method ITU-R
Obstruction Loss 6 dB
2. Maximum iterations are reached.
6.2.2 Link Generation Techniques
To demonstrate the model usage in realistic scenarios, we tested different wireless
link generation models that could include terrain obstructions. Two basic models were
used to generate links.
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1. Free Space Loss (FSL). Friis’s Law is used to determine if sufficient power is avail-
able at the receiving node [112].
2. ITU-R Pedestrian Model with Obstructions. Equation 6.8 shows the ITU-R Pedes-
trian Model [112]. A 6 dB loss is added if the path crosses obstructions.
PL = 40log10d+ 30log10fc + 49; (6.8)
6.3 Results
To evaluate the methods in this paper, we have selected 9 different randomly gen-
erated networks, three 15 node (A1 - A3), three 25 node (B1 - B3), and three 50 node (C1
- C3) networks. In networks A1-A3, we assumed no obstructions and the free space loss
(FSL) link model. For networks B1-B3 and C1-C3, we chose to include obstructions and
used the ITU-R Pedestrian Model to calculate loss. All networks are assumed to occupy
a 10 km x 10 km space. The configuration parameters are shown in Table 15.
The ILP parameters needed to add nodes to a network are strongly dependent on
the topology of that individual network. For the point-to-point case C was set to 1.0 and
α was set to 0.5 for networks A(1-3) and B(1-3). For network C(1-3), α was varied from
0.25 and 1.0 till nodes were added to the solution. The same approach was used for the
all-terminal case. In the high weight option, α ranges from 0.5 to 0.75. C remained 1.0.
In the low weight option, C ranges from 2.0 to 5.0. The PSO approach used acceleration
constants of c1 and c2 of 0.1 for all cases. Stopping parameters of 16 iterations and
V (N,E, r) = 0.03 were used for all tests.
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In Tables 16 and 17, we see the geographic vulnerability V (N,E, r) of the A, B,
and C networks with no augmentation, augmentation with the ILP approach, and aug-
mentation with the PSO approach. It is interesting to note that the ILP approach can add
multiple nodes. This occurs frequently because one node (in the predetermined location)
may not sufficiently reduce the diversity cost to bring that solution into feasibility. Since
the diversity cost is an approximation of V (N,E, r), nodes can be added that reduce the
diversity cost but do not improve V (N,E, r). The ILP approach can be weighted such
that nodes are cheap and many new nodes are brought into feasibility or such that nodes
are expensive. This will create varying values of V (N,E, r).
Table 16: V (N,E, r) - Point-to-Point (added nodes shown in parentheses)
Network Initial ILP Optimized Swarm Optimized
A1 0.182 0.028 (1) 0.028 (1)
A2 0.116 0.018 (1) 0.029 (1)
A3 0.063 0.000 (1) 0.009 (1)
B1 0.183 0.000 (1) 0.000 (1)
B2 0.333 0.000 (1) 0.000 (1)
B3 0.216 0.000 (1) 0.043 (1)
C1 0.062 0.000 (4) 0.021 (1)
C2 0.204 0.000 (1) 0.031 (1)
C3 0.075 0.017 (2) 0.024 (1)
The PSO approach has the ability to find the optimum solution, but since it is
based partially on random movement, it is possible to find a good solution but not the best
solution. The all-terminal scenario presents interesting challenges because normally there
are multiple unrelated vulnerabilities in the network that need to be mitigated.
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Table 17: V (N,E, r) - All Terminal (added nodes shown in parentheses), ILP Optimized
shown for low and high weight options
Network Initial ILP Optimized Swarm Optimized
A1 0.236 0.122, 0.000 (1,6) 0.070 (1)
A2 0.278 0.152, 0.000 (1,7) 0.141 (1)
A3 0.089 0.012, 0.000 (2,4) 0.019 (1)
B1 0.356 0.080, 0.017 (2,4) 0.082 (1)
B2 0.449 0.049, 0.004 (2,6) 0.049 (1)
B3 0.230 0.092, 0.000 (1,4) 0.047 (1)
C1 0.341 0.099, 0.0551 (3,7) 0.147 (1)
C2 0.329 0.133, 0.0146 (3,4) 0.091 (1)
C3 0.301 0.156, 0.0275 (3,11) 0.211 (1)
6.3.1 Network A1 - Point-to-Point Scenario
Figure 47 shows Network A1 (the point-to-point scenario). The source node is 2
and the destination node is 5. Figure 47(a) shows the geographic vulnerabilities in this
network for the 2-5 pair. It is clear why the vulnerabilities are centered on nodes 10,
11&1, and 11&4. The vulnerability radius used is 2.
In Figure 47(b), the path formed by weighting the network to reduce the diversity
cost to the right of the line from 2-5. The cost of a new node is C = 1 and α = 0.5.
Node 43 is added which eliminates the vulnerabilities caused by nodes 10, 11&4, and
11&1, but leaves a smaller vulnerability caused by nodes 11&6. Figure 47(c) shows the
4 initial swarm particle locations. The particle movement is shown. The vulnerability
(0.028) was found and the movement stopped after a threshold of (0.03) was reached as
shown in Figure 47(d).
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6.3.2 Network B1 - All-Terminal Case
Figure 48 shows a 25 node example (Network B1) for the all terminal case. In
Figure 48(a), we see the connectivity generated by the ITU-R Pedestrian Model with a
random set of obstructions as shown. Each obstruction exterior wall contributes 6bB to
a path. The non-optimized network in Figure 48(a) shows significant vulnerabilities in 4
areas of the network with a vulnerability radius of 2.
6.3.3 Network B1 - All-Terminal Case
Figure 48 shows a 25 node example (Network B1) for the all terminal case. In
Figure 48(a), we see the connectivity generated by the ITU-R Pedestrian Model with a
random set of obstructions as shown. Each obstruction exterior wall contributes 6bB to
a path. The non-optimized network in Figure 48(a) shows significant vulnerabilities in 4
areas of the network with a vulnerability radius of 2.
6.3.4 Network C1 - All-Terminal Case
Figure 49 shows a 50 node example (Network C1) for the all-terminal case. In
Figure 49(a), we see the connectivity generated by the ITU-R Pedestrian Model with
random obstructions. The non-optimized network in Figure 49(a) shows significant vul-
nerabilities in the network and V (N,E, r) of 0.341. A vulnerability radius of 1.5 was
used.
Figure 49(b) shows the results of the ILP (spanning tree) approach with edge
weighting and vulnerability of 0.099. The results of the PSO approach are shown in
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Figure 49(c). The vulnerability by adding node 51 is 0.147.
6.4 Summary
The goal of this work was to develop methods to identify and mitigate geographic
vulnerabilities in networks by adding nodes at locations that would minimize the vulner-
abilities. Two scenarios were considered. The point-to-point scenario looks at providing
geographic diversity between two paths on a given demand. The all-terminal scenario
seeks to develop network configurations to protect the connectivity of all nodes in the net-
work from geographic impacts. Two approaches were used. The first is an ILP approach
that used a geographic weighting scheme to encourage path 1 to locate in a different geo-
graphic area of the network than path 2 and spanning tree 1 (all-terminal) from spanning
tree 2. The second was a PSO approach that incorporated V (N,E, r) as the non-linear
objective. This was used for both the point-to-point and all-terminal scenarios.
Since V (N,E, r) is non-linear, the ILP approach cannot use that function directly.
Thus the ILP method produces results that approximate minimizing V (N,E, r). The
weight parameters in the ILP approach are strongly topology dependent. A small increase
in the diversity weight can cause several nodes to be added drastically reducing V (n, e, r).
More research needs to be done to study the effect that the weight parameters have on
solutions with different topologies.
The PSO approach adds one node at a time as it attempts to minimize V (N,E, r)
directly. This can produce optimal solutions. However, PSO is a heuristic and therefore
it is possible to not locate the optimal solution. In our problem, generally we are looking
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for good solutions not necessarily optimum solutions to produce low or zero geographic
vulnerability. Given that assumption, the PSO approach seems to produce good solutions
in most cases.
The disadvantage of the PSO approach over the ILP approach is the complexity of
the PSO approach. In this work, we solved all problems using Matlab [96] with lp solve
[19] for for the ILP installed on a Windows XP desktop computer. V (N,E, r) in the worst
case calculates a shortest path calculation (point-to-point) or Eigenvalue decomposition
(all-terminal), a maximum of 2N times, whereN is the number of nodes. We are currently
working on methods to reduce the complexity of the geographic evaluation function. In
this work, the ILP approach calculation averaged approximately 1.0 seconds for the 15,
25, and 50 node problems. The PSO approach averaged 25.0 seconds for the 15 node
problems, 172.0 seconds for the 25 node problems and 1500 seconds for the 50 node
problems. The ILP approach has clear advantages in this regard.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 47: Network A1 Point-to-Point Example. (a) Network A1 Showing the V(N,E,r)
of 0.182 prior to Augmentation. (b) ILP Optimized Showing Path 1 (Added Node 43),
V(N,E,r) of 0.028. (c) PSO movement. (d) PSO Optimized Network (Added Node 16),
V(N,E,r) of 0.028.
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e)
Figure 48: All-Terminal Example with ITU-R Model and Obstructions - Network B1 (25
Node) (a) Network B1 Showing the V (N,E, r) prior to Augmentation (0.356). (b) ILP
Optimized Outside Weighted Spanning Tree (Added Node 37, 48). (c) ILP Optimized,
V (N,E, r) of 0.090 (d) PSO Optimized (Added Node 26) (e) PSO Optimized, V (N,E, r)
of 0.082
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 49: All-Terminal Example with ITU-R Model and Obstructions - Network C1 (50
Node). (a) Network C1 Showing the V (N,E, r) of 0.341 prior to Augmentation. (b)
ILP Optimized, V (N,E, r) of 0.099 (Added Nodes 78, 82, 79). (c) Swarm Optimized,
V (N,E, r) of 0.147 (Added Node 51).
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CHAPTER 7
ROUTING OF MISSION CRITICAL SERVICES DURING DISASTERS
Large scale geographical events such as natural disasters, major weather events,
and geo-political events can significantly disrupt network services. Thus, efforts to re-
duce or minimize disruptions is desirable since such events are also when disaster re-
sponse data is needed and when users want to inform their friends and families about
their whereabouts. Therefore, it is imperative to create robust network functionalities.
From a network perspective, when geographically-correlated events occur, several
problems surface. These problems range from slow convergence of the routing protocols
due to congestion on overloaded links caused from rerouting traffic affected by the event.
Furthermore, such events cause stability issues during the transient period. An important
issue is how basic link-state interior gateway protocols (IGP) such as OSPF and IS-IS, that
are commonly deployed in large networks, are affected and what can be done to increase
throughput during a major event. In [49] and [16], the authors explore the tradeoff be-
tween routing stability and convergence speed in link state protocols. Disruptive outages
in networks tend to cause multiple link state advertisements (LSA) to be flooded across
the routing area and the routers to perform multiple shortest path calculations and there-
fore have long convergence times. Flapping can occur if link information is propagated
through the network too quickly. To prevent flapping, hold down timers are used, but they
slow down the convergence time [49]. This highlights the tradeoff between convergence
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speed and routing stability. In addition, major disruptions can cause large numbers of
traffic flows to be interrupted or rerouted to other links causing congestion [16].
Another concern during geographical events is that the failures may not occur at
one instance. The outages may cascade, moving through the geographic area with the
event or subsequent outages are caused by side effects of the initial outage, like conges-
tion. In [147], Sterbenz, et. al. discussed several examples of major events where cascad-
ing outages were an issue. Earthquakes can have aftershocks that cause cascading out-
ages. Floods can cause cascading outages as floodwaters penetrate different geographic
areas. Even political situations can escalate and spread across a geographic region. Fre-
quently, routing protocols will attempt to reroute with little knowledge that the paths that
are selected are also vulnerable [147] or that the paths go around the edges of the disaster
area.
In this chapter, we propose a preemptive geographic multi-topology routing (gMTR)
approach based on multi-topology routing (MTR) [124, 125] to improve network perfor-
mance during a major geographically correlated event. This work is published in [60,62].
Basic OSPF and IS-IS protocols have now been extended with MTR functionality. Thus,
our gMTR-based approach is intended to improve network throughput compared to ba-
sic link-state protocols in order to isolate parts of the network affected by a large-scale
geographic event. Using our mechanism, there is less disruption to existing traffic, and
the routing convergence time delay due to the basic link-state protocol can be avoided.
Specifically, we use gMTR to protect against the problems associated with geographically
correlated failures. Briefly, in the gMTR framework, we create a series of topologies that
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can be useful to mitigate potentially disruptive events in the network.
7.1 Routing During Large Failures
To understand why gMTR is needed for geographic failures in networks, an un-
derstanding of what happens during link or node failures in link-state routing protocols is
necessary. First, detection of a link or node state change (like an outage) occurs. Next,
routers affected by the change will create LSAs and send them to their neighbors. This
information will be flooded across the routing area till all routers have the same link state
database. If database changes occurred, each router independently calculates the shortest
path tree to all nodes based on the new database.
If multiple outages occur, like a geographic event, several things can happen that
negatively impact the above restoration process. First, where multiple links are involved,
links may exhibit repeated and intermittent failures causing link flapping behavior [16].
This behavior typically causes frequent routing changes that lead to routing instability. If
the outages are significant, multiple rounds of LSAs will be flooded across the network
causing shortest path first (SPF) calculations to run repeatedly at each node. This is
commonly referred to as SPF Throttling and can lead to longer convergence times. A
significant impact of route instability is that traffic paths may also become unstable and
impacted severely [16]. Long RouterDeadInterval settings in routers also impact
convergence times during major outages.
In this work, we show through simulation that RouterDeadInterval directly
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impacts the time required to re-establish traffic across a network during a large geo-
graphic failure. Given that the reduction of this timer setting increases routing instability,
a method to switch to a stable routing tree quickly is desirable to avoid significant traffic
disruption during these events. We show that this can be achieved using gMTR.
In our gMTR approach, we create multiple alternate topologies starting from the
default topology where link weights are pre-determined in such a way that in the event of
a geographic failure, the routing paths created move away from a vulnerable geographic
region. In particular, we propose a method to compute the link weights so that the path
selection attempts to avoid an affected region. While the MTR-based approach has been
used for network resilience [34,35,85], our approach considers a geographic vulnerability
as the driver for how to determine links weights that can be used in MTR. This paper
extends our earlier conference paper [60] in a number of ways: 1) we present two different
ways to generate alternate topologies, one based on a circular coverage and the other based
on a hexagonal coverage; 2) we include additional analysis on assessing improvements
based on our approach; 3) we also include simulation results using the OPNET [118]
simulation tool to show gains with gMTR during the transient period.
The general effect is that once the geographic event is detected, the trunk of the
shortest path tree (SPT) is rapidly moved away from the affected area in the topology.
This isolates the affected region from the rest of the network and limits the impact of the
disruption on the whole network.
The primary reason to extend the coverage model to include hexagonal coverage is
related to the well known efficiency of the hexagon coverage pattern making them useful
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for sensor coverage and cellular networks. Hexagon coverage patterns have two important
properties. Hexagonal tiling patterns have 100% coverage of a physical space as opposed
to circular patterns. The other important property is that all locations in hexagonal cover-
age patterns are nearest to the center of the covering hexagon.
7.2 Related Work
Several schemes to improve convergence times and/or improve route stability
have been proposed through the years. Modification of OSPF (or IS-IS) timers is the
primary way proposed to prevent link or route flapping behavior. Hello timers and
RouterDeadInterval timers can be extended to dampen flapping behavior. In ad-
dition, the interval between successive SPF calculations (SPF hold down timer) can be
adjusted to prevent repeated SPF calculations. Clearly, increasing these timers will delay
convergence times. These methods are discussed in detail in a number of works includ-
ing [16, 36, 49].
Improvement in the outage detection time has also been proposed to improve sta-
bility and convergence [49]. This is most productive if hardware methods of detecting
outages can be used instead of strictly relying on reducing the Hello timer. False alarms
can cause link flapping and other instability. Additional information may also be avail-
able that could improve geographic outage detection times, like weather information or
political events.
Incremental SPF (iSPF) has been proposed as a way to reduce SPF processing at
the routers [97]. The idea behind iSPF is to incrementally change the shortest path tree
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when link or node changes occur near the leaves of the tree. Performance improvements
due to iSPF are discussed in [16, 49]. The algorithms we propose can take advantage of
iSPF efficiencies.
In [93], one of the important observations of the impact of Hurricane Sandy is
that the major internet providers moved the majority of the traffic away from New York
City during the event. The goal was not to eliminate Internet access for the New York
City area, but to reduce the possible impact the hurricane was having on traffic that was
originally passing through the New York City area. We propose gMTR to quickly move
traffic from a vulnerable geographic region.
There have been several concepts to modify routing mechanisms to accommodate
disaster planning. In [68], Hanson et al. proposed a method of using routing layers to iso-
late areas of a network. The idea is similar to our work, except that they do not propose
using Multi-Topology Routing to accomplish it. Instead they utilize the ability to seg-
ment networks into areas using protocols (like OSPF) that can have multiple areas. Their
methods require that a routing area be pre-configured for possible geographic events. We
opine that this was not flexible enough for robust disaster planning. In [107], the authors
use a novel hill-climbing algorithm to assign link weights such that the link utilization is
maintained at a level so that in the event of a disaster, re-routing would not overload links
causing congestion. While this is useful for network provisioning, it does not necessarily
prevent the routing churn caused by large geographic events.
Several local IP fast re-routing methods have been proposed that are summarized
in [141]. In general, the router that detects the outage reroutes locally. There are also
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methods where the packet carries information about the network elements that are to
be avoided. These include the not-via methods as described in [134] and others like
Localized On-Demand Link State Routing in [132]. These methods are good for a small
number of link or node failures, but the mechanisms in these methods either do not support
large numbers of correlated node/link failures or the methods do not scale well enough to
support large scale outages.
Multi-Topology Routing (MTR) was originally proposed to enhance traffic engi-
neering in link state protocols, OSPF and IS-IS [124, 125]. MTR allows different classes
of traffic to use different virtual topologies such that traffic that requires higher Quality
of Services could use a lower latency path than other traffic. In OSPF, the distribution
of additional link weight information for different topologies is accomplished using the
LSA. The Type of Service (TOS) field in the LSA is redefined as the MT-ID field. This
provides link weight information for each topology to all of the routers in the network. A
default (non-modified weighting) topology is required to be maintained.
When an IP packet is to be routed, the Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP)
field is used to note which topology is to be used for this packet. The router can look up
the topology ID for this packet, check the shortest path tree (SPT) for this topology, and
forward the packet based on this SPT.
It was found that MTR could be used for other purposes such as fault tolerant rout-
ing besides for use in traffic engineering for different services’ classes. Approaches for
implementing MTR for fault tolerance have been described by several authors including
Menth and Martin [108], Cicic [34], and Scheffel et al. [138], and Kvalbein et al. [86].
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Alternate topologies are used in these works primarily to protect against a single link or
node failure. In [34], Cicic defines a legal topology with the following three criteria. All
restricted links are attached to an isolated node and non-isolated node. The links between
two isolated nodes are isolated. And the non-isolated nodes have no isolated links. Us-
ing an algorithm to create the topologies from this criteria, they are able to minimize the
number of topologies.
Scheffel et al. [138] took a optimization approach to creating topologies. They
created a binary integer linear program (BILP) to create topologies that had the goal of
being able to mitigate single link failures with a given number of topologies. The objective
was to minimize path distance.
In both works, once a link outage occurs the detecting node is responsible for
finding a topology where the failed link is isolated. The packet can then be rerouted
around the failed node or link. We refer to this as local rerouting based on MTR.
7.3 The Geographic Multi-Topology Routing (gMTR) Approach
With the goal to reduce the impact that a geographic event can have on a network,
our approach is different than previous works. The topologies created here are intended
to avoid routing (other than local routing) in a specific geographic area. The topology
creation algorithm increases link weights around a specific geographic location with a
specific radius. This has the affect of pushing the SPT away from the vulnerable area
and, thereby, only allowing leaves of the SPT to exist in the vulnerable area. The link
weight calculation algorithm decreases linearly from 100 at the avoided location till the
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radius boundary and then the weights are set to 1. Although we have tested other weight
calculation algorithms (such as exponential decrease), we found that the linear weight
with a boundary at the radius seems to perform well. The advantage of using high (but
not infinite) weights is that the SPT tries to avoid the vulnerable area using it only if no
other route is available. Multiple topologies are then created with different geographic
locations.
Once topologies are created, several options exist to select a topology and transi-
tion to that topology.
• Individual routers may choose the topology based on the early link state information
that arrives at that router. A set of criteria to govern the selection of a topology that
is not the default topology is presented.
• A protocol could be created separately from the routing protocol that has the re-
sponsibility of detecting geographic events rapidly and notifying routers in the net-
work of the topology change. This would allow routing timers to be maintained at
traditional stable levels.
• Network administrators may preemptively select a topology based on situational
information that exists. This could be a significant weather forecast, declining po-
litical situation, or other large scale events that are known prior to the impact to the
network.
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7.4 Topology Creation Algorithms: gcMTR, gtMTR
We propose two methods to create multiple topologies: the Geographic Cover-
age Multi-Topology Routing (gcMTR) approach and the Geographic Targeted Multi-
Topology Routing approach (gtMTR). In gcMTR, N topologies are created, each that
can avoid a geographic area in a network. If these topologies are distributed accordingly,
they can provide coverage against most geographic events.
The gtMTR approach uses existing knowledge about specific events to build a
topology that targets a specific geographic area. Targets could include natural disasters
that have a likely location (like an earthquake fault line or area frequently impacted by hur-
ricanes), geo-politically vulnerable areas, or other anticipated geographic impacts. This
enables network planners to anticipate certain geographic impacts. The notations used
are:
• G(V,E): Network Graph with nodes V and edges E (links)
• N : number of topologies required in gcMTR or gtMTR
• Vi: center of vulnerable area i
• R: radius of any vulnerable area
• Ti: MTR Topology i
• Dij: the distance between Vi for Ti and the closest point on link j.
• MaxDij: the maximum distance across network
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• Wij: the Link Weight on link j for Ti.
Algorithm 1 (gcMTR) creates a set of topologies that provide coverage across a
network to protect against against a variety of geographic events where the size of the
event is known but the location of the event is not known. Function genCoverageP lan
generates locations to avoid based on a coverage plan that can be configured for a specific
network.
Algorithm 2 (gtMTR) utilizes knowledge about a particular type of an event where
the size and location of the event is known. Function genTargetList generates locations
to avoid based on a custom list of predefined geographic event locations.
Algorithm 10 Create Coverage Topologies - gcMTR
for all i in N do
Vi ← genCoveragePlan(i)
for all j in K links do
if Dij < R then
Wij ← Norm(MaxDij −Dij)
else
Wij ← 1
end if
end for
end for
The results in the following sections show that the greatest gain for gMTR meth-
ods occurs when the vulnerable area is well matched to the actual geographic event both
in size and location. Therefore, if the event center was in a non-covered area, it is likely
that the topology chosen would not be a good match for the event. In Fig. 51, a grid
pattern is used to lay out the circles. The circle packing in a square method of coverage is
shown using the Cost266 network from the Survivable Network Design Library (SNDlib
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Algorithm 11 Create Target Topologies - gtMTR
for all i in N do
Vi ← genTargetList(i)
for all j in K links do
if Dij < R then
Wij ← Norm(MaxDij −Dij)
else
Wij ← 1
end if
end for
end for
1.0) [119]. It is easily shown that coverage of circles in a square is pi/4 (78.5%).
A more efficient method of coverage would be to use a hexagonal approach. It
is well known that the highest coverage of circle packing is possible using a hexagonal
approach with a coverage of pi/(2
√
3) (90.7%). The coverage difference using this ap-
proach is shown in Fig. 52. It is noted that even with this coverage approach, an event near
the intersection of the hexagons is still not necessarily a good match to a given topology
vulnerable area. A possible solution would be to overlay another hexagonal pattern of
topologies on the existing layout, shifting the centers to align with the intersection of the
hexagons. The topology with the center closest to the event center would still be chosen.
To use gcMTR, knowledge of the size of the geographic event that is anticipated
is needed to determine the radius R. Once that is known, a coverage pattern can be
selected. The two coverage patterns that are presented here are square (circle packing)
and hexagonal. Figures 51 and 52 show how these coverage options would look on a
typical network. In the square method, the topology centers Vi are laid out in a grid
pattern with the distance between topology centers Dist = 2R, where R is the radius of
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the desired circle. To design the hexagonal pattern, the distance between centers is two
times the perpendicular distance from a topology center to the center of a flat edge on
the hexagon. The hexagon pattern is staggered such the next row is centered between the
topology centers of the previous row forming equilateral triangles. Both of these patterns
are shown in Fig. 50.
Once the topology centers and the radius are chosen, weights are assigned based
on (7.1). It is a simple linear scaling of the weights across a distance equal to the maxi-
mum distance across the network space. The modified weights are then applied inside of
the circle targeted by that topology with 1 being applied elsewhere.
The gtMTR algorithm is similar to gcMTR with the exception that the topology
Vi location is determined by prior knowledge of a specific event rather than a coverage
pattern. The concept is similar, choose a radius and location. Calculate weights based on
(7.1). Multiple gtMTR topologies can be created.
Wij =

100(MaxDij−Dij)
MaxDij
if Dij < R
1 otherwise
(7.1)
Figure 50: Coverage Pattern Design
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Figure 51: Topology Coverage Pattern (based on Circular Approach)
Figure 52: Topology Coverage Pattern (based on Hexagonal Approach)
7.5 Topology Selection and Use
As mentioned in Section 7.3, there are multiple operational concepts related to
the selection of a topology. The Select Topology algorithm is relatively simple in its
operation. Once a geographically correlated event is detected and location of that event
estimated, the topology center that is closest to that location causes that topology to be
selected. Details and discussion about defining and detecting geographically correlated
events follow.
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7.5.1 LSA Method
As OSPF (or other IGP) detects link and node failures via hardware methods and
the Hello protocol, LSAs are generated and flooded across the routing area notifying the
other routers of the link and node failures. Each router will use a set of criteria to enter
the MTR mode and note a Geographically Correlated Event EVi. The proposed criteria
are:
1. More than 2 nodes or more than 3 non-adjacent links are out of service simultane-
ously within radius R. These devices form the basis of the geographic event with
its center at the geographic mean of the failed nodes or links, and
2. The geographic center of the geographic event is within R distance of any Vi.
These criteria allow considerable flexibility to topology creation algorithms in-
cluding overlapping coverage algorithms. If overlapping coverage is used, better fitting
topologies should exist. The criteria also allow for a no MTR mode option that may be
desired for certain geographic locations. It is assumed that all routers in the routing area
are using the same algorithm (gcMTR or gtMTR). In addition, all routers would use the
same topologies and the topology selection criteria. Routing loops would be possible
only during the time between when the first router has changed topologies to the time
when the last router changes topologies. One of the disadvantages of this approach is that
RouterDeadInterval is still used for notification.
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7.5.2 Geographic Detection Protocol
This approach overlays a protocol that monitors the network using other methods
and when the criteria discussed in Section 7.5.1 are met, the protocol notifies the routers
to switch to a different topology. The advantage of this approach is that faster switching
could be accomplished since it is not as reliant on RouterDeadInterval, assuming
other accurate and faster methods are used to detect router or link failures.
7.5.3 Situational Awareness
Perhaps the most promising use of our approach is when there is awareness of
events in the different geographic areas of the network where our approach can aid in the
decision making process to human operators. The advantage with this approach is that a
preemptive switch to a different topology is possible at the appropriate instant, lessening
the impact of the proposed event significantly.
Certain types of large geographic events can actually spread, causing routers near
the edges to fail later than the routers near the center of the event. This could be the case
with certain weather events like hurricanes or even political instability. In this case, the
impact to routing in the network is more significant as route stability is further delayed.
We tested this situation using simulation, as reported in Section 7.9.
Regardless of the operational concept chosen, to achieve fast switching during
the event, routers must maintain SPTs for all topologies that could be used. In order
to minimize processing at the routers, two approaches could be used. First, the SPT
calculations of not-in-use topologies should be put in a lower priority than the in-use
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topologies. Second, it may not be required that the not-in-use topologies be calculated
as often as the in-use topology. If there were k topologies and we assume that t default
topologies require SPT calculations before the not-in-use topologies SPTs are calculated,
that would be k/t SPT additional calculations for every normal SPT calculation. Since, it
is well known that Dijkstra shortest path algorithm hasO(n log(n)+e) complexity, where
n is the number of nodes and e is the number of edges (links), the overall complexity
would increase linearly in the worst case with the number of topologies.
We now formally define a geographically correlated event:
DEFINITION 7.1. 〈EVk, Pk, Tk〉 is a Geographically Correlated Event meeting MTR
mode criteria that is centered at point Pk with topology selected Tk.
Algorithm 12 is proposed for the selection process.
Algorithm 12 Select Topology
if Geographically Correlated Outage Occurs, 〈EVk, Pk, 0〉 then
V dist←∞
Tk ← 0
for all j in N Topologies do
if Djk < V dist then
V dist← Djk
Tk ← j
end if
end for
〈Ek, Pk, 0〉 ← 〈Ek, Pk, Tk〉
end if
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7.6 Illustrative Example
To illustrate our approach, we now use the topology generation algorithms 1 and 2
on a 5× 5 grid topology.
Fig. 53(a) shows the 5 × 5 grid topology with all link weights set to one, shown
in green. Here, the SPT source node considered is 4. When geographic events occur, we
assume that several nodes in an area are affected and disabled. This may affect the default
SPT in a minimal way as Fig. 53(b) shows; only routing to nodes 20 and 21 was affected
when nodes 10, 11, 15, 16 were disabled. In Fig. 53(c), the topology generated is shown
when the vulnerability point is Vi = (22, 57) with a radius of R = 20. Here, the topology
moves the vulnerable point to the leaves of the tree.
However, when nodes 1, 2, 6, and 7 are disabled, Fig. 53(d) shows that routing to
10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, and 22 is affected by the SPT change. Clearly, the location
of the vulnerability with respect to the main part of the default SPT affects the impact of
the outage. Fig. 53(e) shows the 5× 5 grid with a topology generated with a vulnerability
point at Vi = (40, 24) with a radius of R = 20.
7.7 Complexity of Approach
It is well known that Dijkstra shortest path algorithm has O(n log(n) + e) com-
plexity, where n is the number of nodes and e is the number of edges (links). With this
approach, the shortest path algorithm is executed more often before the event in order
to maintain a complete set of SPTs at all nodes when the event occurs. If there are k
topologies, k being constant, it will be executed k(n log(n) + e) times, while the overall
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complexity remains at O(n log(n) + e).
Since these topologies are not used until the event occurs, we would recommend
that the calculations of the additional SPTs be prioritized lower that the in-use topology
(normally default) during SPT calculation. Furthermore, it is possible that the calculation
of the SPT of the not-in-use topologies could even be delayed till the in-use topology
has been updated a given number of times (t). It would reduce the execution time to
k
t
(n log(n) + e).
7.8 Analysis on Moderate and Large Topologies
To conduct further analysis of our gMTR algorithms, two networks were chosen.
The first network is the Cost266 network, shown in Fig. 54, from the Survivable Network
Design Library (SNDlib 1.0) [119]. It is a moderate size network topology with 37 nodes
and 56 links. The second network is the AT&T Layer 1 topology generated by Sterbenz
et al. [145] and is available at [84]. Fig. 55 shown this large physical layer topology with
383 nodes and 483 links.
Since one of the goals of the simulation is to determine the effect of the topology
center difference from the event center, this analysis is applicable to both gtMTR as well
as gcMTR. Assuming with gtMTR, one has knowledge of the location of the event, it
should present results based on a small difference between the event center and topology
center.
We computed and analyzed the following two metrics:
1. Percentage of Dropped Connections (%Drop). This is the percentage of all paths
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(PK) used to implement K demands that are interrupted immediately following
the geographic event at t = 0 as shown in (7.2). This does not include demands
disconnected because a node at either end of the demand was disabled by the event.
%Drop =
PK − PK(t=0+)
PK
(7.2)
2. Average path length (L (PK)). This is the average length of paths (PK) used to
implement K demands.
During simulation, we considered the time to re-establish services interrupted by
the geographic event, referred to here as the convergence time. The gMTR Gain is defined
as the convergence time × the bit rate interrupted with the default topology, giving us the
effective amount of information not lost by using the selected topology as opposed to the
default.
For the Cost266 network, SPTs were generated from all nodes as sources for the
Dijkstra’s algorithm and the results were averaged. The services are defined as connec-
tions from the sources to all other nodes. For the ATT L1 network, SPTs were generated
from a selection of 30 nodes across the network as sources for the Dijkstra’s algorithm.
Thirty major metropolitan areas were chosen.
7.8.1 Cost266 Network
In the Cost266 network, a series of topologies with a circular coverage pattern and
in a hexagonal coverage pattern was created to provide coverage plans for that network.
Fig. 51 shows a circular pattern and Fig. 52 shows a hexagonal pattern of 6 locations (Vi)
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used to create the coverage topologies. The closest (Vi) to the event center is the selected
topology. Fig. 54(a) shows the Cost266 network Default Topology (all link weights = 1).
For illustrative purposes, the SPT source in the figures is Lisbon. Three geographic events
were created for evaluation as shown in Table 18. These were loosely based on possible
disaster scenarios.
Fig. 54(b) shows the SPT with a Lisbon source after event 2. Amsterdam, Dussel-
dorf, and Brussels and all associated links were removed in this event. Fig. 54(c) shows
the SPT with new link weights created by the selected topology using London as a source.
The selected topology was 1 with a V1 located at (1, 51.0).
Table 19 shows the improvements gained by using a selected topology that was
similar to the actual event. Generally, it was noted that if the event disconnects a major
part of the default SPT, the improvements were significantly better than if the event was
located in the leaves of the SPT. Event 2 disrupted the default path that crossed northern
Europe. The circular topology that the was selected topology routed connections around
this area and improved the number of disconnected services significantly. We found that
the topologies generated by the hexagonal pattern performed better than the topologies
generated by the circular pattern with the exception of Event 2.
Table 20 shows the average path distance prior to the event and after the event
using the default topology, and after the event using the selected topology generated by
the circular pattern or the hexagonal pattern. The distance was shortest during the default
topology having more options than during the event or selected topology; however, the
additional path length was not substantial.
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Table 18: Cost266 Geographic Events
Event Number X Location Y Location Radius
1 1.2 47.2 3.5
2 5.0 52.5 3.0
3 18.0 47.0 4.0
Table 19: Cost266 Evaluation - %Drop During Event
Event Default Circular-based Hexagonal-based
Topology Topology Topology
1 0.1093 0.0433 0.0000
2 0.2067 0.0164 0.1756
3 0.0703 0.0332 0.0000
7.8.2 ATT L1 Network
In the ATT L1 network, 8 topologies were created using the circular and hexagonal
coverage plan for the network. Fig. 55(a) shows the circular pattern of 8 locations (Vi)
and radii (Ri) used to create the coverage topologies. For brevity, we show details only
for the topologies based on the circular pattern but the topologies used with the hexagonal
pattern are shown in Fig. 56.
Fig. 55(b) shows the ATT L1 network Default Topology (all link weights = 1).
The SPT source in the figures is New York. Four geographic events were created for
evaluation as shown in Table 21. These were loosely based on possible disaster scenarios.
Fig. 55(c) shows the SPT with a New York source after event 1. Nodes and links
in the New Madrid, MO, USA area were removed in this event, simulating a major earth-
quake along the New Madrid fault. In Fig. 55(d), the SPT created by the selected topology
using New York as a source is shown with Vi = (−92, 33), Radius= 3.5. Fig. 55(e) shows
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Table 20: Cost266 Evaluation - Average Path Length (Hops)
Event Pre- Post- Post- Post-
Event Event Event Event
Default Default (Circular) (Hexagonal)
1 3.657 3.769 3.714 4.097
2 3.662 3.918 3.913 4.063
3 3.578 3.669 3.615 3.883
the SPT with a New York source after event 4. Nodes and links in the Chicago, IL, USA
area were removed in this event. Fig. 55(f), the SPT created by the selected topology
using New York as a source, is shown with Vi = (−92, 41), Radius = 3.5.
In Table 22, we see that the %Drop actually increased using the selected topology
based on the circular pattern for event 1. This occurred for two reasons. First, the topology
selected was not matched well with the area of the event. The topology selected (see
Fig. 55(a) location (-92,33)) was centered significantly south of the center of the actual
event. Second, the event itself did not cut either major branch of the default SPT that
traversed the network from east to west. The topology actually re-routed connections
north into the area where the event occurred. This can be observed on Fig. 55(c) and
Fig. 55(d).
Furthermore, in Table 22, it is noted that when event 4 did sever a main branch
of the SPT, significant improvements were gained by switching to the selected topology
during that event. The %Drop changed from 20.5% to 1.2%. The other two events
showed significant improvements also. During the evaluations on the larger network, it
appears that the selected topology tended to route traffic further around the vulnerability
point than occurred during the event. This is confirmed in Table 23, the path lengths were
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slightly longer during the selected topologies.
As with the Cost266 network, the topologies generated by the hexagonal pattern
performed favorably compared to topologies generated by the circular pattern except for
event 2. This is likely due to the improved coverage and better locations of topologies in
the hexagonal pattern.
Table 21: ATT L1 Geographic Events
Event Number X Location Y Location Radius
1 -89.5 36.6 3.8
2 -78.6 34.0 4.0
3 -119.7 35.6 4.0
4 -90.0 40.0 3.5
Table 22: ATT L1 Evaluation - %Drop During Event
Event Default Circular-based Hexagonal-based
Topology Topology Topology
1 0.2294 0.2700 0.0183
2 0.1266 0.0028 0.0086
3 0.0426 0.0279 0.0115
4 0.2053 0.0126 0.0058
Table 23: ATT L1 Evaluation - Average Path Length (Hops)
Event Pre- Post- Post- Post-
Event Event Event Event
Default Default (Circular) (Hexagonal)
1 14.378 14.956 15.272 16.302
2 14.162 14.351 14.556 18.186
3 13.022 12.898 13.082 13.252
3 14.391 14.743 15.878 15.133
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7.8.3 Sensitivity to Event Size, Node Density, & Location
One of the areas of interest is how sensitive these methods are to events that are
not located directly on a topology from a location or size perspective and how sensitive
these methods are to the density of nodes in a topology. The first test to evaluate this
was to change the location of all 4 events in the ATT network to locations west and east
relative to the center of the topology by 50%, 100%, and 200% of the selected topology
radius. Fig. 57 shows the Drop% using both the default topology and the selected topol-
ogy when the event center is not aligned with the topology center. The results were as one
would expect. The selected topology performed well when the event was centered where
the topology is centered. As the event drifts away from the center of the topology, the
performance degrades approaching the performance of the default topology.
The second test varied the topology size of all 4 events in the ATT network from
25% to 200% of the event radius. Fig. 58 shows the average percentage of connections
dropped using both the default topology and selected topology when the event size is not
aligned with the topology size. When the topology size is between 100% and 200% of
the event size, gMTR performs well. Performance degrades quickly outside these bounds.
We also looked at the performance when the average number of nodes in a topology is
varied. Fig. 59 shows the average number of nodes per topology versusDrop%. This was
done by reducing the topology size and event size concurrently. Fig. 58 and Fig. 59 are
very similar. This leads to the following important observations. First, there is a definitive
practical lower bound on the number of nodes per topology. It appears to be near 4.
Second, the upper bound is related to the portion of the entire network that is covered by a
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single topology. As the topology covered more than 70 out of 383 nodes (approximately
18%), the performance approached default performance. That would imply that a single
topology should not cover more than approximately 15% to 20% of an entire network.
7.9 Simulation Study
To better understand the convergence process used by OSPF and gains that are
possible using gMTR, we conducted a simulation study on the larger topology, the ATT
L1 network. The goal of the simulation was to see how quickly traffic, which was inter-
rupted by a geographic event was restored using the OSPF routing protocol in a large net-
work and the gain obtained due to gMTR. During simulation, we considered at the time to
re-establish services (“convergence time”) interrupted by the geographic event. The gain
using our gMTR approach can be simply identified as the product of the convergence time
and the bit rate interrupted with the default topology versus the gMTR-selected topology.
The simulation was built using OPNET [118]. All 383 nodes were built using a Cisco
12000 series router as the model. All of the ports were set up to use OSPF routing. The
network was connected as per the ATT topology using 10 Mbps point-to-point Ethernet
connections.
We constructed two scenarios. The first one was a single pair of demand between
Pittsburgh, PA and Salt Lake City, UT. The traffic for this demand was a constant bit
rate (UDP) approximately at 32 Kbps. The second scenario was a full mesh of demands
between 12 cities. These are listed in Table 24. In both scenarios, a large geographic
outage was scheduled to occur at approximately 200 sec into the simulation. The outage
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is the same as is depicted in Fig. 55(e).
In the simulation, the gMTR topology that was used is topology 3 as shown in
Fig. 55(d). This is the selected topology using Algorithm 12. Link weights in the selected
topology were determined by our algorithm.
In all cases, the traffic was not initiated until approximately 100 sec into the sim-
ulation. This is to allow the routing protocol to initially converge prior to data trans-
mission. The traffic noted at approximately 50 sec is routing protocol traffic. In all
cases, except where noted, the HelloInterval was set to the default of 10 sec and
RouterDeadInterval was set to 40 sec.
Table 24: ATT L1 Simulation - Multiple Demand Cities
New York, NY Washington, DC
Atlanta, GA Miami, FL
Chicago, IL Dallas, TX
Minneapolis, MN Pittsburgh, PA
Salt Lake City, UT Seattle, WA
San Francisco, CA Los Angeles, CA
7.9.1 Single Demand Simulation
Figs. 60 - 63 are related to the default topology and how gMTR would work
with an outage occurring in the region surrounding Chicago, IL, which was depicted in
Fig. 55(e). In Fig. 60 we see the traffic path used by the default topology prior to the
event at 200 sec. This path is through Chicago. The traffic path used by the default topol-
ogy after the event occurs is also shown, going though Kansas City, MO. In Fig. 62, the
throughput is shown for the demand. It is easy to see the 40 sec interruption in traffic
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when the outage occurs.
Fig. 61 shows the path used due to the gMTR-selected topology. The path takes a
wider route around the topology 3. Finally, as expected, Fig. 61 shows the un-interrupted
traffic flow through the outage.
To further explore the influence of RouterDeadInterval on the convergence
time, we conducted additional tests. This tests were run with a HelloInterval of
2 sec and RouterDeadInterval of 10 sec. As shown in Fig. 64, the convergence time
was reduced from 40 sec to approximately 10 sec, which follows the RouterDeadInterval
settings. This confirms the relationship between the settings for RouterDeadInterval
and the convergence time in OSPF.
It raises the question of why one would not just reduce RouterDeadInterval
in OSPF to achieve faster convergence times? As was pointed out in Section 7, reduction
of the OSPF RouterDeadInterval timer reduces the stability of OSPF and can cause
flapping. The methods described here reduce convergence and are found to be stable.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
Figure 53: Grid5 Network, SPT Source = 4, SPT links are solid, non-SPT links are
dashed. Link weights are shown. (a) Grid5 Default Topology (b) Network with nodes
surrounding (22, 57) with radius R = 20 deleted (c) Topology created with Vi = (22, 57)
with radius R = 20 (d) Network with nodes surrounding (40, 24) with radius R = 20
deleted (e) Topology created with Vi = (40, 24) with radius R = 20
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 54: Cost266 Network, SPT Source = Lisbon, SPT links are solid, non-SPT links
are dashed. Link weights are shown. (a) Default Topology, (b) Event Scenario 2, Location
= (5, 52.5) Radius = 3.0, (c) Selected Topology with Vi = (1.0, 51.0), Radius = 4.25.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 55: ATT L1 Network, SPT Source = New York, SPT links are solid, non-SPT links
are dashed. Link weights are shown. (a) Topology Coverage Plan (b) Default Topology
(c) Event Scenario 1, Location = (−89.5, 36.6) Radius = 3.8. (d) Selected Topology
with Vi = (−92, 33), Radius = 3.5 (e) Event Scenario 4, Location = (−90, 40) Radius
= 3.5. (f) Selected Topology with Vi = (−92, 41), Radius = 3.5
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Figure 56: ATT L1 Network, Hex Topology Coverage Plan
Figure 57: Event distance from Topology Center versus %Drop
Figure 58: Topology Size compared to Event Radius versus %Drop
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Figure 59: Average Nodes per Topology versus %Drop
Figure 60: Single Demand Showing Pre-outage and Post-outage Paths
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Figure 61: Single Demand Using Selected Topology Routing based on gMTR
Figure 62: Throughput Using Default Topology (Single Demand)
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Figure 63: Throughput Using Selected Topology based on gMTR (Single Demand)
Figure 64: Throughput Using Default Topology and Modified OSPF Timer Settings (Sin-
gle Demand)
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7.9.2 Multiple Demand Simulation
Figs. 65 - 27(b) are related to how OSPF would function with a large geographic
outage near Chicago, IL prior to and after gMTR is implemented as is depicted in Fig. 55(e).
In Fig. 65 we see multiple traffic paths used by the default topology prior and after the
event at 200 sec. Prior to the event, much of the traffic from Pittsburgh and New York that
is destined to Seattle and San Francisco traverses through Chicago. After the event, the
traffic shifts to a more southerly route through St. Louis.
Fig. 67 shows the received traffic at Salt Lake City from the other 11 sites using
the default topology during the event. It is worthwhile to note progression through the
event. At 200 sec, the traffic that crosses Chicago is lost. At approximately 230 sec, the
traffic that was rerouted around Chicago is restored. The final level is the the original
traffic minus the traffic that was terminated at Chicago. Fig. 68 shows the throughput on
the Bridgeton, MO (near St. Louis, MO) to Columbia, MO link. This is the link that
would have acquired much of the rerouted Chicago traffic. The increase in traffic is noted
at approximately 240 sec. Finally Fig. 69 shows the traffic demands between Salt Lake
City and one of the following cities: Dallas, Chicago, or Pittsburgh. The demand traffic
reacts as expected during this event.
With gMTR implemented, Figure 66 shows the differences in demand paths. It
is worthwhile to note the wider path around the chosen gMTR topology that is used,
steering the traffic as far south as Dallas. It is apparent that with gMTR, a margin of error
is implemented in case the outage is not exactly as predicted.
Fig. 70 shows the received traffic at Salt Lake City post-gMTR implementation
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Figure 65: Pre-outage and Post-outage Paths Using Default Topology (Multiple Demands
case)
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Figure 66: Pre-outage and Post-outage Paths Using Selected Topology based on gMTR
(Multiple Demands case)
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Figure 67: Receive Traffic at Salt Lake City, UT (Multiple Demands case)
Figure 68: Throughput on Bridgeton, MO to Columbia, MO Link (Multiple Demands
case)
during the event. When the event occurs, the only change that occurs is the loss of the
traffic associated with the Chicago node. This illustrates the reduction of churn in the
network when using gMTR.
Simulation results discussed so far considered outages as a single event. However,
it is unlikely that in real life they would appear as a single event. Cascading outages that
are geographically correlated have been documented and are discussed in Section 7. It
is useful to investigate the harm caused by cascading outages. A cascading outage was
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Figure 69: Traffic Using Default Topology between Salt Lake City, UT and a) Dallas, TX
b) Chicago, IL c) Pittsburgh, PA (Multiple Demands case)
constructed by allowing the Chicago node to fail at 200 sec and the remaining nodes re-
lated to that geographic outage to fail at 260 sec. This caused the notable (but predictable)
results between nodes at Minneapolis and Pittsburgh shown in Fig. 71. The traffic flow
was interrupted initially at 200 sec, restored at approximately 240 sec, and failed again
at 260 sec, and finally restored at approximately 300 sec. This illustrates the benefits
of using gMTR for cascading events to provide a stable path for traffic that avoids the
geographic area.
7.10 Summary
Through this work, we demonstrate that geographic multi-topology routing (gMTR)
can be used to improve performance of routing during large geographic events like natural
disasters. These improvements are achieved by maintaining additional topologies created
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Figure 70: Receive Traffic at Salt Lake City, UT using Selected Topology based on gMTR
(Multiple Demands case)
Figure 71: Demand Traffic Between Pittsburgh, PA and Minneapolis, MN during Cascad-
ing Failure
by increasing link weights in specific areas of the network through the gMTR approach.
This has the effect of pushing the trunk of the Shortest Path Tree out of the region of
highest impact, preventing disruption of much of the traffic during the event.
Multiple topologies can be created to anticipate multiple events in a network.
When this is done, a topology is selected when it is apparent that a geographic event
has occurred. The traffic is moved to the new SPT quickly and the impact of the event is
minimized. Essentially, the amount of network churn is reduced during the geographic
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event.
Clearly the key to improving routing performance during geographic events is to
have knowledge of that event and be able to act on that event prior to the rerouting process
used by OSPF, which is constrained by several timers intended to provide more stability in
the routing algorithm. RouterDeadInterval and HelloInterval are key timers
that can directly influence, not only the convergence time in the network but also the
stability in the network. By using fast detection or forecasting techniques and switching
to a known stable SPT, the convergence time can be minimized using OSPF.
We proposed three algorithms. Two algorithms gcMTR and gtMTR provided
methods to create topologies in both a network wide coverage approach and targeted
approach that can be used to anticipate a specific event, where knowledge of that event
exists. gcMTR is implemented using a circular and a hexagonal approach. The third
algorithm specifies a way to detect a geographic event and select a topology to use. A dis-
cussion is included of operational models that can be used to detect geographical events.
During evaluation, it was discovered that the number of dropped connections is
typically significantly better if a selected topology is used. The exception to this is if
the condition exist where (1) the event does not disrupt a significant branch of the de-
fault SPT and (2) the selected topology does not fit well with the event from a location
perspective. We explored this further by modifying the distance that the event occurs
from the center of the topology and by modifying the size of the event compared to the
radius of the topology. Although not unexpected, the results emphasize the importance
of the algorithm and parameter selection. An important observation is that there appears
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to be practical bounds related to topology size and the distribution. If a topology does
not contain more than approximately 4 nodes, the performance degrades to default and if
a single topology covers a significantly portion of the overall network, the performance
also suffers. These are both intuitive observations, and our testing provides a guide during
implementation of topologies. Topologies generated by the hexagonal pattern tended to
outperform topologies generated by the circular pattern in the networks tested here. The
better coverage and more optimal locations of topology centers is likely the reason for
this advantage. More research in the distribution of topologies is needed to determine the
optimum configuration.
We used simulation to investigate the effects of geographic outages in networks us-
ing OSPF without gMTR and with gMTR. We analyzed the convergence times, defined as
the time to restore traffic flows after the event, using default settings for HelloInterval
and RouterDeadInterval timers in OSPF. The settings are then modified to under-
stand the relationship between the timers and convergence times. Finally, a cascading
geographic failure was simulated to show the impact of these types of failures.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this research we looked at methods of providing resiliency against geographic
vulnerabilities in mission critical networks. As we have seen, this is a multiple step pro-
cess involving many components. In this this work, we looked at many of these steps.
The FAA SWIM network was used as a real life example of a mission critical network
involving air traffic control. Before discussing the individual steps in the resilience design
process, we note that a key opportunity for future research is the assimilation of several
of these methods into a singular set of tools. For example, the NIR involves the selec-
tion of a network test. The LAQT performance method discussed in Chapter 3 would
be an interesting network test. Another interesting combination would be to incorporate
the provisioning and restoral methods referenced in Chapter 5 with the NIR which would
enable the NIR to capture not only the vulnerabilities but also the ability of the network
to restore the most critical services.
First, we investigated the QoS in a mission critical multi-layer network. The two
methods that we created are both based on network decomposition. The first method is
an extension of QNA. The second method was a network decomposition approach based
on Linear Algebraic Queueing Theory (LAQT). We were able to show that both methods
can be used to approximate multi-layer networks. The LAQT method is relatively more
accurate than the QNA method. Errors between simulation and the analytic methods
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are suspected to be related to correlation between the arrival and departure process and
correlation in the departure process. Future research directions include capturing various
types of correlation in the LAQT model in a tractable manner.
Geographic vulnerabilities in networks were evaluated next. The NIR metric and
SP-NSG algorithm were created to help evaluate networks for geographic vulnerabilities.
During the SP-NSG process, one of the important benefits of state space pruning is that it
can be used to find geographic vulnerabilities in networks. This benefit is exploited in this
work. The NIR has the primary benefit that it can be used with different network tests,
which allows the NIR to be configured specifically to the mission of the network and its
applications.
However, for large networks, the vulnerability analysis can still become intractable.
To maintain tractability in large networks, we also present a K-means clustering method.
It relies on the idea of reducing the number of nodes for purposes of the state based
analysis using clustering. Matrix transformation is used both for the K-Means Clustering
Approach and the multilayer testing method that maps geographic failures simultaneously
onto multiple layers. There are several areas of future research that can be explored re-
lated to the NIR and SP-NSG. A primary extension of this research would be the use of
additional network tests like the performance methods described in Chapter 3. More re-
search related to model selection and specifically the selection of K is also needed and
discussed in Section 4.5.1.
Provisioning and restoration methods during disasters were investigated next. We
propose a framework to use Service Level Agreements (SLAs) to provide much of the
198
information necessary to solve the challenging problems of remediation during geograph-
ically correlated events like natural disasters. We form the solutions to these problems as
provisioning and rerouting solutions to limit outages on the most critical services due to
geographic events. From the SLA parameters: system response time, availability, and sur-
vivability, we can create integer linear programs and heuristics to solve the provisioning
and rerouting problems.
The MILP and heuristic approaches to the network provisioning problem with ge-
ographic challenges are both found to be effective solutions. The performance of both
approaches are similar. The cost of the MILP approach varies from slightly less expen-
sive to moderately less expensive than the heuristic solution. The MILP and heuristic
approaches to the rerouting problem have significant differences. The heuristic approach
performs slightly better than the MILP solution for the emergency services. But, the
normal services see significant benefit under the MILP rerouting solution. The MILP for-
mulation provides a better overall solution to the rerouting problem. This research could
be extended significantly in a couple of ways. First, it would be interesting to explore the
effect that topology selection has on the performance of the algorithms. Second, it would
be useful to extend these algorithms to include multi-layer networks.
The goal of the topology improvements discussed in Chapter 6 was to develop
methods to identify and mitigate geographic vulnerabilities in networks by adding nodes
at locations that would minimize the vulnerabilities. Two scenarios were considered.
The point-to-point scenario looks at providing geographic diversity between two paths
for a given demand. The all-terminal scenario seeks to develop network configurations
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to protect the connectivity of all nodes in the network from geographic impacts. Two
approaches were used. The first is an ILP approach that used a geographic weighting
scheme to encourage path 1 to locate in a different geographic area of the network than
path 2 and spanning tree 1 (all-terminal) from spanning tree 2. The second was a PSO
approach that incorporated V (N,E, r) as the non-linear objective. This was used for both
the point-to-point and all-terminal scenarios.
There were benefits to both approaches. The ILP approach is significantly faster
but only estimated V (N,E, r). The PSO methods used the V (N,E, r) directly, but was
expensive from a processing approach. In addition to testing a more extensive selection of
PSO parameters (like the number of starting solutions), we would like to test a larger di-
versity of topologies including topologies that are better suited for wired networks. Also,
these methods could be extended to include new links without new nodes (especially in
the case of wired networks).
Finally, with respect to routing during geographic failures, we were able to demon-
strate that geographic multi-topology routing (gMTR) can be used to improve perfor-
mance of routing during large geographic events like natural disasters. These improve-
ments are achieved by maintaining additional topologies created by increasing link weights
in specific areas of the network through the gMTR approach. This has the effect of push-
ing the trunk of the Shortest Path Tree out of the region of highest impact, preventing
disruption of much of the traffic during the event. Finally, optimization of the routing
topologies (size, shape, and location) and frequency of calculating shortest path trees for
not-in-use topologies could be interesting extensions of this work.
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APPENDIX A
PUB/SUB SIMULATION MODEL DESCRIPTION
A.1 Message Routing/Forwarding Node
Figure 72: Routing/Forwarding Node
The message routing and forwarding node is shown in Figure 72. It includes
standard Modeler transmit and receive interfaces. The process node is shown in Figure
73. It is a standard Modeler FIFO queue with modifications to copy the messages to send
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out on multiple destination nodes. A more practical implementation may include a set of
input and output queues instead of a single FIFO queue. But, this is a better model to
validate and verify the analytical model.
Pub/sub message routing and forwarding is achieved via a CSV text file that con-
tains the routing information for each product at each node. Table 25 shows the contents
of a portion of the routing file. A message from product 1 arrives at node 1 from source 1
as shown in Figure 13. From there the product is copied to destination ports 2,3,4 which
happen to go to nodes 3,2,4 as is shown on the first 3 lines of Table 25. Line 9 shows that
a message from source 2 entering node 2 would be routed to node 6. It is easy to see how
the one-to-many feature of pub/sub is implemented.
Table 25: Scenario 1-3 Configuration
Node Message Source Exit Port Destination Node
1 1 3 Node 2
1 1 2 Node 3
1 1 4 Node 4
2 1 2 Node 6
4 1 0 Node 5
5 1 2 Node 7
6 1 2 Node 9
1 2 3 Node 2
2 2 2 Node 6
1 3 4 Node 4
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
The code changes to accommodate message copying and distribution are shown
here. This simply copies the message and sends to each output port specified in the routing
file. The original message is then destroyed.
op_pk_nfd_get (pkptr, "source", &source);
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for (i = 0;i<tg_route_rows;i++)
{
if (tg_route[i].node == tg_node)
if (tg_route[i].source == source)
{
outport = tg_route[i].outport;
pkptr2 = op_pk_copy (pkptr);
op_pk_send(pkptr2, outport);
}
}
op_pk_destroy (pkptr);
Figure 73: Routing/Forwarding Process Diagram
A.2 Message Generation Node
The message source is a typical OPNET packet generator with a modification
to allow for the use of ME distributions both in the arrival process and in the message
size process. A novel method to generate ME random variates is proposed Section B.6.
Figures 74 and 75 show the message generation node and process models, which look the
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same as the standard packet generation Modeler models. The only differences are in the
code and are shown below.
Figure 74: Message Generation Node
Figure 75: Message Generation Process
Configuration is via the OPNET attributes for the specific source. Figure 76 shows
a typical hyper-exponential distribution being used to generate interarrival times (src 1.Ar-
rival) with< p,B, e >matrices as shown in (A.1). TheB matrix is entered as a single line
with columns and rows separated by spaces. The RNG code assembles the matrix from
that data and the- ME size attribute. The ME use attribute selects exponential, hyper-
exponential, erlang, or general ME distributions. This enables the RNG to select the most
efficient method of generating random variates.
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p =
[
0.788 0.2113
]
B =
[
52.57 0.0
0.0 14.01
]
e =
[
1
1
]
(A.1)
Figure 76: Source Configuration Attributes
The code snippet modifications to allow multiple random number generators is
shown here. Option 0 uses the Modeler random number generator (RNG). Option 1 uses
the ME RNG. Options 2 and 3 use 4 uses Exponential, Hyper-Exponential, and Erlang
RNGs. These are described in Appendix B.
FIN (ss_packet_generate ());
/* Generate a packet size outcome. */
if (tg_svc_me_use == 0)
pktime = (double) (oms_dist_outcome (pksize_dist_ptr));
else if (tg_svc_me_use == 1)
pktime = svc_dist.tg_get_merv(2.0);
else if (tg_svc_me_use == 2)
pktime = svc_dist.tg_get_exp();
else if (tg_svc_me_use == 3)
pktime = svc_dist.tg_get_hyper2();
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else if (tg_svc_me_use == 4)
pktime = svc_dist.tg_get_erlang();
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APPENDIX B
ME RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION
This appendix describes the Matrix Exponential (ME) Random Number Gener-
ators (RNG) that were constructed for the simulation associated with the performance
analysis. Other RNGs that were constructed and used are also descibed. Finally, we
describe a novel numeric linear combination approach to ME RNG.
B.1 Related Work
Brown, et al. [24] describes ME RV generation approaches that uses an accept/reject
method for the tail of the ME distribution and a numerical CDF inversion via bisection for
the remainder of the distributio n. This was demonstrated on several distributions and ME
distributions created using moment matching of empirical samples. The moment match-
ing techniques to create ME distributions by Van de Liefvoort in [151] are used in our
work as well. The methods proposed in this work were able to generate ME RVs with one
uniform random variate and on the average 19 matrix exponential calculations. It should
be noted that the methods proposed in [24] had no limitations with respect to the type of
ME distributions used, and this work was extended to generate RVs for correlated ME
processes in 2006 by Fitzgerald, et al. [47].
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For phase type distributions and certain ME distributions (those including Marko-
vian generator matrices and all ones summation vectors) relatively efficient RNGs have
been proposed recently that take a different approach. Horvath, Telek, and others [74]
[129], have built a suite of tools known as LIBPHPRNG library that can model many ME
distributions in a representative block form. These forms include the Hyper-Feedback-
Erlang form and Hypo-Feedback-Erlang form. Once in this form, each block is reduced
to a less complicated form using the eigenvalues of that block. If the eigenvalues are real,
an Erlang block is used. If the eigenvalues are complex, a transformation is applied that
enlarges the block, and eliminates the complex components. Essentially, their method
constructs an efficient phase-type representation, if possible. Once in PH representation,
a sequence of uniform random variates is generated, arranged in proper form, taking log-
arithms as necessary to create the final ME/PH random variate.
To handle negative elements in the starting vector, the authors use an accept/reject
method. They build the accept probability by separating the positive and negative coeffi-
cients of the starting vector and arranging an acceptance ratio. The number of logarithms
and uniform random variates needed for their methods can vary widely and are dependent
on the complexity, structure, and values of the eigenvalues of the generator matrices as
well as the average acceptance probabilities if negative starting vector coefficients exist.
The authors were able to reduce the complexity considerably by using efficient transfor-
mations over simply playing the queue. These results are described in [74]. They were
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able to show that these methods could be used with empirical samples and moment match-
ing using techniques described in [148]. In addition, they extended their work to include
rational arrival processes.
One related work was completed by Rideout in [130]. While it was intended to
describe methods to generate random variables for distributions that are only known by
their Laplace transform, it is interesting to note that if the tail of the distribution is suffi-
ciently flat, different methods of CDF inversion may need to be employed to accurately
capture the properties of the distribution in this region.
While all of these methods are very useful in their respective application areas,
none of these methods were sufficiently general and highly efficient in their approaches
to generate ME random variates for our purposes. The ME RNG in this work fulfills the
need to have an efficient and general ME RNG.
Modeler includes a variety of distributions that can generate random variates for
interarrival and packet size distributions. Generally while useful, they do not provide
the flexibility we need in this model. Matrix Exponential models are necessary for that
level of flexibility. Four random number generators were created for use with this sim-
ulation model. These are described in this section. They include Exponential, Hyper-
Exponential, Erlang, Matrix-Exponential (ME). The ME RNG could create any of the
other random variates, but the specific RNGs are generally more efficient. These specific
RNG techniques are generally known as playing the queue.
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An RNG object is created using a C++ include file. The structure of the object is
as follows:
class ME_dist {
public:
MatrixXd B;
MatrixXd V;
MatrixXd p;
MatrixXd e;
...
Where B, V, p, e are matrix objects using the Eigen library [66]. They represent
the < p,B, e > and V matrices in Section 3.3.
B.2 Exponential RNG
The Exponential RNG simply uses the Modeler op dist exponential() function
to create the Exponential RNGs.
B.3 Hyper2-Exponential RNG
The Hyper2-Exponential RNG on probability p generates an exponential random
variate with mean of 1.0/B(0, 0) and 1.0/B(1, 1) with probability 1 − p. The code is
shown:
double r1, r2, p1, u, mernd;
r1 = B(0,0);
r2 = B(1,1);
p1 = p(0);
u = op_dist_uniform(1.0);
if (u < p1)
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mernd = op_dist_exponential(1.0/r1);
else
mernd = op_dist_exponential(1.0/r2);
return(mernd);
B.4 Erlang RNG
The Erlang RNG generates k exponential random variates with a mean of B(0, 0).
These are summed to create the Erlang random variate. The code is shown:
double sz, r, mernd;
int i;
sz = B.rows();
r = B(0,0);
mernd = 0;
for (i=0; i<sz; i++)
mernd = mernd + op_dist_exponential(1.0/r);
return(mernd);
B.5 Matrix Exponential (ME) RNG
There are a couple of methods of generating ME RNGs. The playing the queue
techniques can be extended to include hyper-erlang variations. They still cannot generate
many ME variations.
Other methods include numerical CDF Inversion Methods. This work uses a vari-
ation of that method here. Coupled with a table lookup and interpolation, this creates
an efficient and accurate RNG. In addition, this work pioneered another variation of this
work that contains the maximum number in the lookup table between 0 and 1 considerably
simplifying the lookup process. This is shown in Section B.6.
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The ME Lookup method involves a couple of steps. The table is created using a
numerical CDF inversion while sampling from 0.0 to 1.0. Random Variates are created
by generating uniform random variates between 0.0 and 1.0. These are then used in the
table lookup. The code used for numerical CDF inversion is shown:
double ME_dist::tg_rand_me(double u)
{
int sz, j, stat, itr;
double a, b, x, r, dtem1, dtem2;
sz = B.rows();
MatrixXd Mtem1(1,1), Mtem2(sz,sz), Mtem3(sz,sz);
b = rvmax; // max value of random variable
// initialize
a = 0;
itr = 0;
stat = 0;
j = 0;
// start loop
while (stat == 0)
{
j = j + 1;
itr = itr + 1;
x = (a+b)/2;
Mtem2 = -B*x;
Mtem3 = Mtem2.exp();
Mtem1 = p*Mtem3*e;
dtem1 = (double) Mtem1(0,0);
dtem2 = 1.0 - dtem1;
if (dtem2 <= u)
a = x;
else
b = x;
if ((b-a) < err)
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stat = 1;
}
return(x);
}
B.6 ME RNG using a Numeric Linear Combination Approach
The goal of this ME RNG is to create a simple, accurate, and efficient ME random
number generator (RNG) that could be used for a wide variety of ME distributions includ-
ing those with complex and negative components in the constituent matrices. Scalability
is important because of the state space growth associated with certain ME queueing op-
erations. It also became clear that closed form solutions were not feasible and numerical
solutions may present the best options to achieve these goals.
A challenge of random number generation is capturing the properties of the tail
of the distribution correctly. Several works [38, 48, 50] have documented the existence of
self-similar and heavy tailed distributions in internet traffic, specifically file sizes in web
traffic. A review of ME Distributions is in Section 2.1. An advantage of ME distributions
is that heavy tailed and self-similar distributions can be modeled as is demonstrated by
Lipsky in [91]. The methods described this current work can be used to generate random
numbers for these distributions (within the capability of the simulation model). A feature
of this RNG is that the entire tail of the distribution need not be modeled.
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In the work by Felgueiras et al. [45], the relationship between distribution func-
tions and density functions that are closed under minimization is exploited to create non-
convex mixtures of the base density function. Depending on the density function chosen,
the corresponding mixture function may be composed of a weighted sum of the base den-
sity function and square of the base density function. In this case, the mixture distribution
is re-written and the base density function is replaced with a variable. The new equation
is solved in closed form using the quadratic equation. If the base density function can
be inverted, random variates can readily be generated. An example using the exponential
distribution was shown.
Using a similar approach and noting e−ax = (e−x)a, the ME CDF for e−x is
solved numerically which allows a uniform random variate to be scaled for the particular
ME distribution prior to an exponential inversion. To accomplish this, the ME distribution
is transformed to diagonal form, which enables the distribution to be written as a linear
combination of exponentials and the equation is solved numerically. In this work, we
relax the requirement that the weights are positive. Since they still sum to one, the density
is non-negative, and that the density integrates to one; we are only working with valid
distributions. The advantage of this approach is that the random variates are generated
from a single uniform random variate, using a single logarithm calculation, and using a
single interpolation. This makes the RNG efficient and accurate. The disadvantage of this
approach is the requirement to store numerical information about the scaling function.
214
We will demonstrate the flexibility, efficiency, and accuracy of this approach.
B.6.1 Development of the ME RNG
B.6.1.1 ME Random Variate Generation
To create random variates for a given ME distribution, 〈p,B, e〉, we start with the
N×N sizeBmatrix. If the matrixB is not defective, matrix decomposition can be used to
diagonalize B (defective B matrices are discussed later in this section). The CDF can be
rewritten as shown in (B.2) whereB∗ is a diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues (λ1, λ2, ...)
on the diagonal. λi and the eigenvector matrix X can be complex and/or negative, which
is not a concern if (B.1) is true ensuring that f(x) is a valid density function.
f(x) ≥ 0 ∀x > 0 and
∫ ∞
0
f(x)dx = 1 (B.1)
F (x) = 1− pexp (−Bx) e′ = 1− pXexp (−B∗x)X−1e′ (B.2)
Re-arranging into a new representation of the original ME distribution, the new
p∗ and e∗ are shown in (B.3) which leaves (B.4).
p∗ = pX, e∗′ = X−1e′ (B.3)
F (x) = 1− p∗exp (−B∗x) e∗′ (B.4)
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It is clear that the CDF is a linear combination of exponentials as shown in (B.5)
where αi is p∗i × e∗i . The exponentials λi is element (i,i) of B∗ where B∗ is of size NxN .
α and λ can be complex valued, in which case a complex conjugated peer component
exist which cancels the purely complex values.
F (x) = 1− (α1e−λ1x + α2e−λ2x + ...+ αNe−λNx) (B.5)
There are specific ME formulations that may have defective B matrices, like the
following 4×4 Erlang ME distribution (B.6). It is clear thatB is defective and would yield
an eigenvector matrix that was conditioned poorly. Noting the PDF of this distribution in
(B.7), we can see that we have repeated eigenvalues.
B = λ

1 −1 0 0
0 1 −1 0
0 0 1 −1
0 0 0 1
 (B.6)
f (x; k, λ) =
λ
(k − 1)!(λx)
k−1e−λx x > 0 (B.7)
In order to keep this RNG as general as possible and not make exceptions for a particular
ME formulation, a matrix perturbation method is used to condition the matrix as nec-
essary. Generally, if the B fails a standard eigenvalue condition test, a small negative
random perturbation (order of magnitude is 10−9) is added to the lower left corner of the
Bmatrix. If the the matrix is still defective, the perturbation is increased. We were able to
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capture the properties of the Erlang distribution closely using this conditioning technique.
For a more in depth review of eigenvalue conditioning, the reader is referred to Wilkinson
in [156, p. 90].
The classic method of generating random variates of a distribution f(x) is to gen-
erate a uniform random variate and set it equal to the CDF, F (x) = U The new random
variate is obtained by solving for x, x = F−1(U). Applying this to (B.5) we now have
(B.8):
U = 1− (α1e−λ1x + α2e−λ2x + ...+ αNe−λNx) (B.8)
Since 1− U is also a uniform distribution on U(0, 1), 1− U can be replaced with
U . The exponentials can now be rewritten as (e−x)λi .
U = α1(e
−x)λ1 + α2(e−x)λ2 + ...+ αN(e−x)λN ) (B.9)
In a manner similar to [45], we substitute e−x with z leading to (B.10).
U = (α1z
λ1 + α2z
λ2 + ...+ αNz
λN ) (B.10)
Next, g(z) is defined as shown in (B.11), which leads to (B.12). In this formula-
tion, α and λ can be negative and/or complex. Since complex components are in conjugate
pairs, the purely complex value is canceled.
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g(z) = (α1z
λ1 + α2z
λ2 + ...+ αNz
λN ) =
N∑
i=1
αiz
λi (B.11)
U = g(z), z = g−1(U) (B.12)
Since e−x = z, x can be solved with a simple logarithm (B.13).
x = −log(z) (B.13)
Since g−1(U) is difficult to solve in closed form, we generate a g−1(u) numerically
as u goes from 0 to 1 and perform an linear interpolation to arrive at z. Since g−1(u) is
generated prior to random number generation, each random number requires a single
uniform random variate, interpolation, and logarithmic calculation.
Theorem 1. Equation (B.11) has a single unique solution in the range of [0,1].
Proof. Since g(z) in (B.11) is 1 − F (x), g(z) is by definition monotonically decreasing.
At z = 0, it is clear that g(z) = 0. At z = 1, g(z) = 1. We can see this by letting x
go to zero in (B.5). F (x) also must go to zero therefore α1 + α2 + ... + αN must be one
and therefore g(1) = 1. Finally, since the above are true, there can only be one possible
solution to (B.11) in the range [0,1].
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B.6.1.2 ME RNG Algorithms
Algorithm 13 shows the ME RNG setup procedure. The initial setup consists
of eigenvalue decomposition, similarity transformation, and recombination into a linear
combination of exponentials. After the linear combination of exponentials is created,
g−1(u) is calculated numerically using a standard bisection algorithm where M is the
number of points representing g−1(u).
Algorithm 13 ME RNG Setup
λi ← Eigenvalues of B
X ← Eigenvectors of B
p∗ ← pX
e∗′ ← X−1e′
αi ← p∗i × e∗′i
g(x)← α1xλ1 + ...+ αNxλN
for all i such that 0 ≤ i ≤M do
ui ← iM
zi ← g−1(ui) using bisection
end for
Algorithm 14 shows the ME random variate generation procedure. To generate an
ME random variate, the following steps are followed. First, a uniform random variate is
generated between [0, 1]. Next, z = g−1(U) is calculated using simple interpolation. The
ME random variate is calculated by taking the logarithm of z and multiplying by −1.
Algorithm 14 ME RV Generation
U ←Generate Uniform Random Variate
z ← g−1(U) using linear interpolation
ME RV← −log(z)
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These algorithms have been implemented in C++ and Octave [115]. In C++, the
Eigen Library [66] was used for Matrix Exponential Computations and Eigenvalue de-
composition. The C++ implementation has been imported into Opnet [118] using C++
include files. We have used the ME RVs as both arrival and service distributions during
simulation of a Gi/G/1 queue which is a part of ongoing research.
B.6.1.3 Complexity
The process of generating an ME RV involves a single ME RNG setup and multi-
ple ME RV Generations. The setup costs (in time) vary depending on the distribution and
are generally trivial compared to the ME RV generation for large runs of random variants.
Using an Intel Core I-7 with 2.4 GHz processors, the setup costs range from approxi-
mately 250ms for a typical distribution to several seconds for a heavy tail distribution. Is
should be noted that this is a one time cost per distribution.
Since ME random variate requires a single uniform random variate, interpolation,
and logarithmic calculation, the process to generate ME random variates is fast. Table
26 shows the number of ME RVs per second versus the number of exponential RVs per
second that were generated using the C++ TR1 Random Library.
Table 26: ME RNG Performance
RVs/sec
Exponential 4.1× 106
ME 3.7× 106
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B.6.1.4 Numerical Considerations
Eigenvalue decomposition and subsequent matrix inversion can lead to numerical
problems and we refer to Section 2.2 for a more complete discussion of the Eigenvalue
decomposition approach used in this work.
The selection of M affects the precision of the numerical calculation of z =
g−1(u). ME PDFs have two regions of concern. First the main body of the PDF can
generally be captured using a relatively small number of data points. M = 1000 was
used in this work. The tail of the distribution is reliant on the region where u is near zero.
Depending on the distribution, g−1(u) can be very small near this region. In order to
calculate the RVs on the tail of the distribution, g−1(u) needs to be estimated accurately
in this region. This is primarily a concern with heavy tailed distributions. Two measures
were used to mitigate these concerns.
First, the stopping error in the bisection algorithm, was set to 1 × 10−6. But,
if z < 10 × error the error was reduced by a factor of 10 during the bisection. This
is continued as necessary till the error is near the overall smallest possible value of the
system being used (1 × 10−200 was used in this work). Second, if zi/zi−1 > 10, M is
increased by a factor of 100 for that region. This enabled a better linear approximation of
that region.
This approach to generate ME random variates provides efficient and accurate RVs
for a wide variety of probability distributions.
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B.6.2 Examples
We tested the ME RNG with a wide variety of distributions including exponential
and hyper-exponential. For brevity, we chose to show the more interesting examples
that demonstrate the efficiency, flexibility, and accuracy of the ME RNG. The examples
include Erlang, complex sinusoidal, moment matched and heavy tail distributions.
B.6.2.1 Erlang Case
The first example is the Erlang distribution. Equation (B.14) shows the 〈p,B, e〉
representation for a k = 6 size Erlang distribution. Figure 77 shows the g−1(u) function
for the Erlang-6 distribution. Table 27 shows the g(z) parameters. Figure 78 shows the
PDF and histogram of the generated RVs. Table 28 shows the calculated moments versus
the moments generated from the RNG with 1×107 RVs generated. A random perturbation
on the order of −1 × 10−4 was added to B(6, 1) location for this case (see discussion of
Erlang distributions in Section B.6.1.1).
p =
[
1 0 0 0 0 0
]
B =

1 −1 0 0 0 0
0 1 −1 0 0 0
0 0 1 −1 0 0
0 0 0 1 −1 0
0 0 0 0 1 −1
0 0 0 0 0 1

e =

1
1
1
1
1
1

(B.14)
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Table 27: Erlang g(z) Parameters
N αi λi
1 457.63 + 0.0i 0.7846 + 0.0i
2 122.95 - 374.18i 0.8923 + 0.1866i
3 122.95 + 374.18i 0.8923 - 0.1866i
4 -203.56 - 246.41i 1.1077 + 0.1866i
5 -203.56 + 246.41i 1.1077 - 0.1866i
6 -295.40 + 0.0i 1.2154 - 0.0i
Table 28: Erlang Distribution Performance
Calculated RV Generated
1st Moment 6.00 6.00
2nd Moment 42.00 42.01
3rd Moment 336.00 336.18
C2 0.17 0.17
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Figure 77: Erlang g−1(u) Function
Figure 78: Erlang ME RV Histogram and PDF
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B.6.2.2 Sinusoidal Case
The second example is a distribution with a strong sinusoidal component in the
PDF. Equation (B.15) shows the 〈p,B, e〉 representation for this distribution. Figure 79
shows the g−1(u) function for the sinusoidal distribution. 29 shows the g(z) parameters.
Figure 80 shows the PDF and histogram of the generated RVs. Table 30 shows the calcu-
lated moments versus the moments generated from the RNG with 1× 107 RVs generated.
p =
[
1 0 0
]
B =

1.2222 −1.2222 0
0 1.2222 −1.2222
0 9.7778 1.2222
 e =

1
1
1

(B.15)
Table 29: Sinusoidal g(z) Parameters
N αi λi
1 1.125000 + 0.000000i 1.2222 + 0.0000i
2 -0.062500 - 0.176777i 1.2222 + 3.4570i
3 -0.062500 + 0.176777i 1.2222 - 3.4570i
Table 30: Sinusoidal PDF Performance
Calculated RV Generated
1st Moment 1.00 1.00
2nd Moment 1.55 1.55
3rd Moment 3.69 3.69
C2 0.554 0.554
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Figure 79: Sinusoidal g−1(u) Function
Figure 80: Sinusoidal ME RV Histogram and PDF
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B.6.2.3 Empirical Sample using a Moment Match
This example is a distribution constructed with a moment matching technique as
noted in [151]. Equation (B.16) shows the 〈p,B, e〉 representation for this distribution.
Figure 81 shows the g−1(u) function for the moment matched distribution. 31 shows the
g(z) parameters.Figure 82 shows the PDF and histogram of the generated RVs. Table 32
shows the calculated moments versus the moments generated from the RNG with 1× 107
RVs generated.
p =
[
1 0
]
B =
[
2.0 −1.0
−1.0 1.0
]
e =
[
1
0
]
(B.16)
Table 31: Moment Matched g(z) Parameters
N αi λi
1 0.2764 0.3820
2 0.72361 2.6180
Table 32: Moment Generated PDF Performance
Design Calculated RV Generated
1st Moment 1 1.0 1.00
2nd Moment 4 4.0 3.99
3rd Moment 30 30.0 29.94
C2 3.00 3.00
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Figure 81: Moment Matched g−1(u) Function
Figure 82: Moment Matched ME RV Histogram and PDF
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B.6.2.4 Truncated Power Tail Case
The final example is a distribution with a heavy tail component in the PDF. This
example of a Truncated Power Tail (TPT) distribution can be found in [91] by Lipsky.
Equation (B.17) shows the 〈p,B, e〉 representation for this distribution. 33 shows the g(z)
parameters. Figure 83 shows the g−1(u) function for the sinusoidal distribution. Figure
84 shows the PDF and histogram of the generated RVs. Table 34 shows the calculated
moments versus the moments generated from the RNG with 1× 107 RVs generated.
p = [ 0.70 0.21 0.063 0.019 0.0057 0.0017 0.0 ]
B =

1.0 0 0 0 0 0 −1.0
0 0.423 0 0 0 0 −0.423
0 0 0.179 0 0 0 −0.179
0 0 0 0.0758 0 0 −0.0758
0 0 0 0 0.0321 0 −0.0321
0 0 0 0 0 0.0136 −0.0136
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.010
 e =
 1111
1
1
1
 (B.17)
Table 33: TPT g(z) Parameters
N αi λi
1 -0.007076 1.0000
2 -0.005086 0.4232
3 -0.003729 0.1791
4 -0.002875 0.07578
5 -0.002571 0.03207
6 -0.004768 0.01357
7 1.02611 0.01000
The TPT distribution (and any heavy tail distribution) can cause numerical issues
due to the extremely small probability of large mass items occurring. We see this in Fig.
84 with the RVs that are generated at x = 700. Noting that e−700 ≈ 1×10−304 is the limit
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Table 34: TPT PDF Performance
Calculated RV Generated
1st Moment 102.10 101.96
2nd Moment 20464 20281
3rd Moment 6.1447e6 5.9406e6
C2 .963 .951
Figure 83: TPT g−1(u) Function
of precision on most machines. Even with this anomaly, the RVs generated were still high
quality based on the moments and PDF. It should be noted that heavy tail and rare event
simulation required careful analysis of the distributions to ensure that numerical errors do
not become significant in RV generation.
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Figure 84: TPT ME RV Histogram and PDF
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